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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis analyzes the first decade of experience with the principle of the responsibility to 
protect (R2P), in order to evaluate the status of the R2P principle in contemporary international 
law. The R2P principle is an important topic because its meaning, as well as its effect, continues 
to be debated in international law. The thesis examines state practice within the United Nations 
and beyond after the articulation of the R2P principle in 2001. The analysis includes detailed 
case studies relevant to R2P: Darfur, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Syria. The thesis argues that the 
R2P principle has not significantly changed international law because state practice continues to 
exhibit serious disagreements about and problems with the substance and implementation of the 
R2P principle. These disagreements and problems are most explicit in the context of 
international law on military intervention to address long-scale atrocities. Further, the 
controversies surrounding the R2P principle mirror the same disagreements in international law 
concerning humanitarian intervention before the R2P principle emerged, demonstrating that the 
R2P principle has not changed international law in any significant way.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND    
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1.1 From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect: Impact on 
International Law 
After the crimes of the holocaust had become internationally identified, the world vowed 
such crimes would never happen again. However, since 1945 the international community 
repeatedly witnessed many incidents of genocide or other large-scale atrocities. In a report to 
Member States of the United Nations (UN), Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon described the 
“responsibility to protect” (R2P) as an “idea whose time has come,” and he presented a 
comprehensive plan for operationalizing R2P within the UN system.1 The R2P principle seeks to 
ensure that the international community never again fails to act in the face of genocide and other 
gross forms of human rights abuses.  
The R2P principle was initially introduced by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001.2 Thereafter, the R2P principle was adopted 
by heads of state and governments at the UN’s World Summit in 2005.3 Therefore, R2P should 
be understood as a solemn promise made by leaders of every country to all people who are 
threatened by mass atrocities. The R2P principle, in fact, was introduced as a remedy to 
controversies involving humanitarian intervention, and it was intended to move the international 
community past the controversies that international law experienced with humanitarian 
                                                          
1 U.N. Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary General. U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).  
2 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, REPORT 2001: THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter ICISS], available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
3 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, G.A Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
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intervention. As Kofi Annan stated, by reconciling the principle of sovereignty with human 
rights, the R2P principle constitutes the most comprehensive and carefully-considered response 
to the dilemma of humanitarian intervention.4  
The R2P principle primarily highlights sovereignty as responsibility.5 The principle 
stipulates, first, that states have an obligation to protect their citizens from mass atrocities; 
second, that the international community should assist them in doing so; and, third, that, if the 
state in question fails to act appropriately, the responsibility to take action falls to the larger 
community of states.6 The primary responsibility for protecting its own people from mass 
atrocity crimes lies with the state itself. State sovereignty implies responsibility, not an authority 
to kill. But when a state is unwilling or unable to halt or avert such crimes, the wider 
international community then has a collective responsibility to take whatever action is 
necessary.7 R2P primarily emphasizes preventive action before taking any coercive measures. 
These prevention efforts include various forms of assistance for states struggling with crises.  
Since its inception, there has been substantial attention paid to the R2P principle. 
Nevertheless, the place of the R2P principle in international law continues to be controversial 
and surrounded by disagreements. There are divergent perspectives on whether and now the R2P 
principle has affected contemporary international law. To date, there is very little consensus on 
various aspects of the R2P principle among scholars as well as states. One of the main questions 
about the R2P principle is whether it is a new and different concept from humanitarian 
intervention that existed before R2P emerged. Many scholars view R2P as the most 
                                                          
4 U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century: Rep. of the 
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000). 
5 Id. ¶ 2.30. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
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comprehensive framework for approaching humanitarian intervention ever put forth.8  Others 
claim that it merely legitimizes the status quo by relying on the Security Council as the primary 
authorizing body.9 As Welsh notes, much of the criticism of the ICISS report on the R2P 
principle mirrors the preexisting debate about humanitarian intervention.10 Some argue that a 
simple change in language from “humanitarian intervention” to “responsibility to protect” does 
not circumvent the necessity of resolving debates that have always existed regarding 
humanitarian intervention.11  There are also significant fears that the R2P principle is simply a 
cover for legitimating the neo-colonialist tendencies of major powers.12 In particular, a 
fundamental problem is that, no matter what criteria are established for a justifiable intervention, 
the decisive factors will always be authority, political will, and operational capacity.13 
Stedman, however, argues that R2P is a new concept because it has succeeded in creating 
a new legal duty for the international community to protect victims in foreign countries by 
providing a basis “for legitimizing coercive interference in the domestic affairs” of states that are 
unable to protect their own people.14 Evans, an Australian international policymaker, former 
politician and pioneer architect of the R2P principle, supports the argument that the R2P 
principle has taken international law beyond older controversies of humanitarian intervention. He 
argues that traditional humanitarian intervention narrowly focuses the debate on outsiders, rather 
                                                          
8 Rebecca J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine - But What of Implementation? 
19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 292 (2006). 
9 Jeremy I. Levitt, The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver Without a Dam? 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 153, 176 (2003). 
10 Jennifer Welsh, The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, 57 INT’L J. 500 (2002). 
11 Id. 
12 ALLEX J. BELLAMY, SARA E. DAVIS & LUKE GLANVILLE, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 292 (2011), (citing Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Administration, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 99, 115 (2004)). 
13 S. Neil MacFarlane, The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention? 25 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 977 (2004). 
14 Stephen John Stedman, UN Transformation in an Era of Soft Balancing, 5 INT’L AFF. 933, 938 (2007), available 
at http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/cig/shared/CIG/Algerie_2009/documentation/01_acteurs_multi/10.pdf.  
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than considering the urgent needs of those insiders suffering from harm.15 Evans expressly 
rejects the claim that the R2P principle is just another name for humanitarian intervention and 
argues that they are very different concepts.16 According to Evans, the very core of the 
traditional meaning of “humanitarian intervention” is nothing more than coercive military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. But “the responsibility to protect” is about much more 
than that.17 Evans notes that, as every relevant document from the ICISS report to the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document makes clear, R2P is about taking effective preventive action 
at the earliest possible stage of a conflict.18 According to Molier, the R2P principle replaced the 
concept of humanitarian intervention at the beginning of the 21st century, but, from a legal point 
of view, nothing has changed because military intervention for human protection purposes 
without the authorization of the Security Council is still illegal. 19  
Further, there are claims that the R2P principle reflects existing international law and is 
not a new or different idea. Bellamy and Reike argue that R2P has not resolved the dilemmas 
that appeared with humanitarian intervention.20  According to Bellamy and Reike, paragraphs 
138-140 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document reveal that the R2P principle does not 
transform the international legal framework.21 Contarino, Lucent and Rosenberg note that 
                                                          
15 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone? 22 INT’L REL. 286 
(2008), available at http://ire.sagepub.com/content/22/3/283.full.pdf. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Gelijn Molier, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect After 9/11, 53 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 37 
(2006). 
20 Alex J. Bellamy & Ruben Reike, The Responsibility to Protect and International Law, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (Allex J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davis & Luke Glanville eds., 2011). 
21 Id. at 83. 
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various strands of international law were already pointing towards the obligations to save 
strangers and that the R2P principle is not anything new.22 
At the time of the publication of the R2P report, experts on the ICISS were clear: the 
international obligations of R2P were not part of international law.23 Rather, R2P was described 
by the ICISS specifically as an emerging principle grounded in a miscellany of legal foundations 
growing out of state practice and the Security Council’s own practice.24 The ICISS noted, 
however, that, if the Security Council gave credence to R2P and its doctrinal basis, a new rule of 
customary international law might eventually be recognized.25 
However, Evans argues that the R2P principle has already reached the status of an 
international legal norm, indicating that the whole of R2P has reached a tipping point.26 He cites 
several events that have contributed to its status as an international legal norm. Most notably, 
Evans cites the inclusion of R2P in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Evans further 
claims that the April 2006 Security Council adoption of the Resolution on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict contains an express reaffirmation of the World Summit conclusions 
relating to R2P. For Evans, approval of these documents by most members of the international 
system indicates that a critical mass of states has accepted the principle of R2P as part of 
international law.27  
                                                          
22 Michael Contarino & Selena Lucent, Stopping the Killing: The International Criminal Court and Judicial 
Determination of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 
(Allex J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davis & Luke Glanville eds., 2011); Sheri P. Rosenberg, Responsibility to Protect: A 
Framework for Prevention, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (Allex J. Bellamy, 
Sara E. Davis & Luke Glanville eds., 2011). 
23 ICISS, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6.17, 6.18. 
24 Id. 
25 Id., ¶ 6.17. 
26 Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, Keynote Address at the Human Rights Law Resource Centre, 
Melbourne: The Responsibility to Protect: Creating and Implementing a New International Norm (Aug. 13, 2007), 
available at http://www.gevans.org/speeches.html . 
27 Id. 
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Welsh and Banda argue that, although the R2P principle does not create formal legal 
obligations, it may influence the way in which states understand their duties as members of the 
international community.28 Strauss, arguing that R2P has not yet achieved international legal 
status, states that even the General Assembly resolution that gave effect to the global consensus 
on the R2P principle in 2005 is a non-binding recommendation for Member States, rather than a 
statement of international law, and that such resolutions cannot create new law by themselves.29 
Alvarez argues that conceiving of the R2P principle in terms of a legal norm is dangerous 
because that would involve redefining sovereignty, enabling self-interested coercive 
intervention, and expanding the scope of potential interference into the domestic affairs of 
states.30 
There are also many views about the substantive content of the R2P principle.  There is a 
lack of clarity around who, precisely, bears the international responsibility to protect. The ICISS 
spoke of an international responsibility to protect.31 While the international community as a 
whole is said to be responsible, which international actor bears the responsibility to protect in the 
final analysis remains uncertain. For a political theorist like Pattison, this ambiguity in the ICISS 
report is highly unsatisfactory. According to Pattison, whether the Security Council should 
authorize military intervention or if, alternatively, any other actor should authorize such an 
intervention is not clear. 32 As Pattison notes, though the ICISS report largely succeeded in 
changing the nature of the debate on humanitarian intervention, its appeal to the international 
                                                          
28 Jennifer M. Welsh & Maria Banda, International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding 
States’ Responsibilities? in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (Allex J. Bellamy, Sara 
E. Davis & Luke Glanville eds., 2011). 
29 Ekkehard Strauss, A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush – On the Assumed Legal Nature of the 
Responsibility to Protect, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (Allex J. Bellamy, Sara 
E. Davis & Luke Glanville eds., 2011). 
30 JOSE E. ALVAREZ, THE SCHIZOPHRENIA OF R2P (2007). 
31 See generally ICISS, supra note 2.  
32 JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: WHO SHOULD 
INTERVENE? 284 (2010). 
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community is a very general one.33 Beyond claiming that the Security Council should ideally 
authorize any forceful action to relieve mass humanitarian suffering, it did not clarify which 
particular agent bears the responsibilities associated with R2P.34 Tan frames this problem with 
R2P as an “imperfect duty” which has not been assigned to one specific agent. 35 As Tan points 
out, there is a lack of clarity in identifying a responsible agent, even in an informal way, such as 
the widely accepted norm of “the most legitimate intervener to act,” which leaves room for other 
actors to join when necessary.36 Tan asserts the existence of positive state obligations to protect 
populations from mass atrocities within another state's jurisdiction, but the law remains unclear 
as to which states have that obligation to act in precise circumstances.37 Also, paragraph 139 of 
the World Summit Outcome Document places the responsibility to protect firmly within the UN 
and, more specifically, the Security Council. By allocating R2P clearly to the Security Council, 
the World Summit Outcome Document does not identify any new legal obligations on the part of 
states to prevent or react to atrocities.  
As Pattison notes, if the word ''responsibility'' is going to be used, then responsibility 
must rest somewhere, and must mean something.38 Pattison identifies the morally important 
qualities of potential interveners.39 In taking up the challenge of assigning the international 
responsibility to protect, Pattison does not offer a sustained treatment of the questions that have 
preoccupied most normative theorists on humanitarian intervention. For example, in identifying 
who should intervene, Pattison privileges those agents who currently have the capacity to deliver 
                                                          
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Kok-Chor Tan, The Duty to Protect, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 84 (Terry Nardin & Melissa Williams 
eds., 2006). 
36 Id. 
37 Louise Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice, 34 INT’L STUD. 
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humanitarian outcomes through military action. Thus, the question of who exactly bears the 
international responsibility to protect is still being debated.  
The ICISS describes the responsibility to prevent as the single most important dimension 
of the R2P principle.40 If the overarching goal of the R2P principle is to save lives, the focus 
should be on prevention, not on reaction. In a critique of the ICISS’s stance on prevention, Weiss 
and Hubert argued that it is preposterous to set prevention as the single most important priority.41 
Weiss and Hubert continued that, “most of the stammering about prevention and rebuilding is a 
superficially attractive but highly unrealistic way to try and pretend that we can finesse the hard 
issue of what essentially amounts to humanitarian intervention.”42 For Weiss and Hubert, the 
prevention and rebuild duties are the worst threats to the R2P’s conceptual clarity.43  Bellamy 
states that, despite stressing the critical importance of conflict prevention, the ICISS did not 
make concrete proposals other than the call to centralize the world’s conflict prevention efforts 
and to develop a capacity in relation to early warning.44 The ICISS avoided explicit discussion of 
the single most pressing dilemmas in relation to the responsibility to prevent, which is the 
question of how to translate early warning signs into a commitment to act and a consensus on 
how to act.45  
The R2P principle and its conceptual approach are surrounded with many disagreements. 
There is no apparent consensus in the literature about whether the R2P principle has changed 
international law. The various disagreements in the existing literature about the R2P principle 
and its application to gross human right violations are a clear manifestation of the disputed place 
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of R2P within contemporary international law. These debates involve not only the conceptual 
aspects of the R2P principle, but also its application to situations involving gross human rights 
violations. Given the disagreements and confusion in existing literature, it is important to 
continue to ask whether R2P has changed international law in connection with states, as well as 
the international community’s, responses to humanitarian crises.  
This thesis, in answering this question, undertakes a close examination of state practice 
within the UN and beyond that occurred after the articulation of the R2P principle in 2001. 
Although the existing literature on the R2P principle is voluminous, it does not contain the kind 
of detailed examination of state practice on multiple case studies extending over the course of 
more than a decade. The thesis, therefore, aims to situate the debates surrounding the R2P 
principle into an analytical framework. To achieve this task, the thesis focuses on state practice 
during major humanitarian crises in the first decade after the inception of the R2P principle. The 
analysis includes detailed case studies relevant to R2P: Darfur, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Syria. In 
analyzing the R2P principle and its international legal impact, the thesis focuses on customary 
international law as states have not, to date, incorporated R2P in any treaty.  
Further, the thesis will examine different approaches that have been proposed to intensify 
the importance of the R2P principle in international law. The thesis critically analyzes: (1) the 
French proposal of the concept of the “responsibility not to veto” (RN2V), which provides that 
the five permanent members of the Security Council should agree not to use their veto power to 
block action in response to genocide and mass atrocities that a majority vote of the Security 
Council would otherwise approve; and (2) the Brazilian proposal of the “responsibility while 
protecting” (RWP), which highlights the need for stringent limitations on the use of military 
force authorized under the R2P principle by the Security Council. Further, RWP calls for 
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Security Council oversight and authority over ongoing military operations approved by the 
Security Council.  
The thesis argues that the R2P principle does not represent a significant change in 
international law because too many disagreements about the substance and implementation of the 
R2P principle continue to exist. The analysis of state practice identifies the disagreements that 
exist among UN Member States on the application of the R2P principle in humanitarian crises. 
These disagreements are more evident in the context of the legal authorization of military 
intervention to protect civilians from mass atrocities. Further, the controversies surrounding the 
R2P principle mirror the same disagreements that affected international law concerning 
humanitarian intervention before the R2P principle emerged, demonstrating that the R2P 
principle has not changed contemporary international law in any significant way. These 
disagreements on the content and application of R2P in state practice indicate the international 
community’s failure to resolve fundamental controversies in international law about handling 
humanitarian crises.   
 
1.2 Humanitarian Crises and International Law 
 There have been many man-made humanitarian crises throughout history, and 
interventions by one state in the affairs of another have always been an issue that the 
international community has had to confront. The historical evolution of humanitarian 
intervention indicates that controversies have arisen in the convergence of bodies of international 
legal rules: sovereignty, non-intervention, international law on the use of force, international 
human rights, and international humanitarian law. Ever since the Peace of Westphalia that ended 
Europe’s wars of religion in the 17th century, the principle of sovereignty has evolved to become 
the core principle of international relations. Until the 20th century, there were no international 
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legal rules governing the use of force, and, thus, states could go to war for any reason. Most of 
the humanitarian crises that occurred during this period were related to interventions made in 
connection with religious purposes or pretexts.  
Humanitarian crises during the late 18th century and the 19th century were heightened by 
increased tension between state sovereignty and the unlimited right to use force. European states 
considered themselves as civilized nations that had the sovereign right to make interventions 
against uncivilized nations. During this period, there were many interventions carried out under 
the justification of humanitarian intervention, such as: the 1827 French, British, and Russian 
intervention in Greece; the French intervention in Syria in 1860 to protect Christian population 
from the Ottoman Empire; Russian intervention in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria in 1877, 
which were all under the Ottoman Empire; and the Cuban invasion by the United States in 1898. 
Although these interventions were justified as humanitarian, those were moral and political 
justifications, and had no legal impact in a context where states could legally resort to force for 
any reason. The 19th century also marked major developments in the laws of warfare. The 
creation of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 1864 Geneva Convention, and 
the Hague Conventions, adopted at the end of the century, all tried to regulate the conduct of 
warfare to make it more humane.  
 Disputes between the major powers began to increase at the end of the 19th century and 
beginning of the 20th century. These included: the outbreak of the 1884 Sino-French War; the 
1898 Spanish-American War; the 1898-1900 joint great-power intervention in China; the 1904 
Russian-Japanese War; the Japanese intervention in Manchuria in 1931; the Italian intervention 
in Ethiopia; and the German intervention in Bohemia and Moravia in Czechoslovakia in 1938. 
These conflicts were justified as humanitarian interventions, which show, in some cases, a 
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tendency to abuse the humanitarian intervention concept. Nevertheless, these justifications were 
again simply moral and political in nature and not legal justifications. After World War I, and 
with the Versailles Treaty and Kellogg-Briand Pact, international law began to move towards 
restricting the use of force. However, the development of an international human rights regime 
after World War II created a dynamic where humanitarian intervention began to confront the 
protection of sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force. Yet, these new developments 
were weak and not yet sufficient to clarify whether humanitarian intervention had a place in 
international law.  
 The UN Charter affirmed the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in 
international law, and a system of collective security emerged in the UN. The UN system was 
supposed to help avert man-made humanitarian crises. The UN Charter laid down provisions 
prohibiting the use of force. However, the UN Charter permits the use of force: (1) where the 
Security Council determines that the situation creates a threat to international peace and security 
and authorizes the use of force, and (2) when the use of force is necessary in self-defense. In 
addition to these permitted uses of force, the development of international human rights law 
under the UN Charter strengthened the humanitarian intervention concept. The 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights conventions qualified the principles 
of sovereignty and non-intervention and raised the potential need for military interventions to 
address large-scale humanitarian abuses. However, none of these instruments created legal 
obligations on states to engage in humanitarian interventions.  
There were a number of humanitarian crises that occurred during the Cold War period. 
Nevertheless, state practice during the Cold War period demonstrated great reluctance by states 
to justify the use of force under the humanitarian intervention concept. India’s intervention in 
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Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1979, and Tanzanian intervention in 
Uganda in 1979 were all ultimately justified under self-defense. Therefore, despite the 
developments of international human rights norms during the Cold War period, state practice did 
not demonstrate great willingness to claim international law permitted humanitarian intervention.  
With socio-political changes after the Cold War, especially with the disappearance of the 
bi-polar system, international human rights law and international humanitarian law gained 
greater attention. The relationships in international law between sovereignty, the prohibition of 
the use of force, human rights, and humanitarian intervention turned more volatile and became 
the main source of controversies in the 1990s, especially in humanitarian crises in Rwanda and 
Kosovo. The international community’s failure to respond adequately during the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994 raised questions about how to protect civilians from atrocities more effectively 
in the future.46 Although UN Member States were aware of the mass atrocities in Rwanda, none 
made serious efforts to prevent or stop those atrocities. The UN could not take any action to stop 
atrocities without the support of its members. The UN and the international community were 
criticized for their collective failure to take timely and adequate actions to stop mass killings in 
Rwanda. Nevertheless, Rwanda involved no violations of international law because states did not 
use military force without Security Council authorization. Rwanda rather was considered a 
massive moral failure in terms of the legitimacy of the international community. Rwanda 
involved a situation where the efforts of the international community were considered legal in 
terms of use of force but illegitimate as a response to genocide.  
A different situation occurred in the Kosovo crisis. NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 
to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo occurred without the authorization of the Security Council, 
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and created controversy on the conditions under which states could use force to protect civilians 
from mass atrocities.47 Kosovo involved a use of force without Security Council authorization - 
considered by many as illegal - but the intervention was otherwise viewed as a legitimate action 
to stop ethnic cleansing or, in other words, NATO actions were considered illegal but legitimate.  
In the wake of the controversies in Rwanda and Kosovo, the international community 
began to search for a new consensus on the legitimacy and legality of action, including military 
intervention, to protect civilians from mass atrocities. In 1999, the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan challenged the international community to develop a way forward on reconciling the 
principles of maintaining sovereignty and protecting fundamental human rights when faced with 
humanitarian crises.48 Annan followed-up this challenge in the 2000 Millennium Summit Report 
by again asking UN members to look at the perceived tension between sovereignty and human 
rights in humanitarian crises.49 This desire to find a new avenue to legally and legitimately 
justify humanitarian intervention led to the ICISS report and the inception of the R2P principle. 
 
1.3 Emergence and Application of the R2P Principle 
Responding to Annan’s challenge, Canada formed the ICISS in 2000. In its 2001 report 
entitled The Responsibility to Protect, the ICISS developed the R2P principle.50 Through its 
report, the ICISS tried to distinguish the R2P principle from the prior international law on 
humanitarian intervention in several ways. First, the report emphasized that the R2P idea looks at 
intervention from a different perspective than the concept of humanitarian intervention. The 
ICISS stressed that the R2P principle addresses the dilemma of intervention from the perspective 
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of those who need support rather than from the interests and perspectives of those who carry out 
humanitarian intervention.51  
Second, the ICISS sought to bridge the gap between intervention and sovereignty by 
introducing the complementary concept of responsibility, under which responsibility is shared by 
both the national state and the broader international community. The ICISS recognized that the 
main responsibility to protect resides with the state whose people are directly affected by conflict 
or massive human rights abuses, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this 
responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it becomes the responsibility of the international 
community to act in its place.52 Third, the ICISS expanded the conceptual parameters of the 
notion of intervention, declaring that an effective response to mass atrocities requires not only 
reaction, but also ongoing engagement to prevent conflict and rebuild after the event.53  
Thus, the R2P principle as presented by the ICISS report consists of three 
responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild.54 The ICISS report presented the 
responsibility to prevent as the single most important aspect of the R2P principle, directed at 
addressing the direct causes of conflict that put human security at risk. The responsibility to react 
consists of a wide gamut of measures, including economic, political and diplomatic tools, with 
the very last resort being military intervention. The responsibility to rebuild focuses on the post-
conflict recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation of a state and aims at preventing potential 
recurrences of humanitarian crises. 
The responsibility to react is the most difficult aspect of the R2P principle. The ICISS 
stressed the importance of taking all measures short of military action. It stated that, wherever 
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possible, coercive measures short of military intervention ought first to be examined, including 
various types of political, economic and military sanctions.55  The decision to intervene by 
military means to protect people should only occur when a state is unable or unwilling to 
discharge its primary responsibility, and should be limited to extreme cases that genuinely 
“shock the conscience of mankind,” or situations that present such an obvious and imminent 
danger to international security that they call for coercive military intervention. Coercive 
measures are to be conducted only when all other preventative action has been exercised.56  
In order to identify cases that demand coercive measures, the ICISS proposed a set of 
criteria that must be fulfilled before a decision to intervene is taken. A “just cause” threshold 
must be met, involving the danger of a large-scale loss of life or large-scale ethnic cleansing. 
Consequently, the ICISS formula for humanitarian intervention legitimizes anticipatory measures 
in response to clear evidence of probable large-scale killing, as explained in the report, in order 
to avoid the morally untenable position of having to await the beginning of genocide before 
being able to stop it.57 Four precautionary principles for military intervention are also included in 
the criteria, which demand (a) a right intention, (b) last resort, (c) proportional means, and (d) 
reasonable prospects of achieving the intended results.58  
The ICISS report acknowledges that the Security Council is the appropriate body to 
authorize military interventions.59 But, if the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal 
with a proposal within a reasonable time, the ICISS report proposes alternative options.60 The 
matter could, in such situations, be considered in the General Assembly under the “Uniting for 
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Peace” procedure, or, if that fails, by a regional organization, subject to seeking Security Council 
authorization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.61 Furthermore, the ICISS report warns that, 
if the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in “conscience-shocking 
situations crying out for action,” the Security Council should take into account that it is 
unrealistic to expect concerned states to rule out other means or forms of action to meet a 
humanitarian emergency.62 However, the ICISS does not explicitly entrust the responsibility of 
military intervention to any entity outside the Security Council. Nevertheless, although the 
possibility of coalitions of states willing to take action under the R2P principle is not exactly 
recommended, the ICISS did not explicitly rule out such a coalition in situations where all other 
responsible actors fail to act.63  
Another critical factor is that the five permanent members of the Security Council have 
divergent geopolitical interests and ideologies, and, so, where some permanent members see a 
need for intervention, others might exercise their veto because they have different interests at 
stake, disagree about the need for military intervention, or worry about military intervention 
turning into “regime change.” To address this problem, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Hubert Védrine, proposed a concept of the “responsibility not to veto” (RN2V), during the 
preliminary discussions of the R2P principle.64  Védrine first proposed a new “code of conduct” 
for the five permanent members in the context of the R2P principle. The concept of RN2V 
proposes that the five permanent members of the Security Council should agree not to use their 
veto power to block action in response to genocide and mass atrocities which would otherwise 
pass by a majority. The ICISS supported the idea that a permanent member of the Security 
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Council should not exercise its veto where: (1) there is majority support on the Security Council 
for intervention; (2) genocide or mass atrocities have occurred; and (3) a permanent member 
does not have “vital security interests” at stake.65 However, as Blätter and Williams note, RN2V 
would not be adopted as a formal procedural rule, but as an informal rule that would prevent 
interventions from being unjustifiably blocked.66 The responsibility element of the concept 
implies that, when gross human rights abuses and mass atrocities are occurring, the five 
permanent members of the Security Council should not use the veto to achieve political goals. 
As developed by the ICISS, the R2P principle is based upon the concept of human 
security, and focuses attention on the human needs of those seeking protection. The ICISS 
claimed that this approach differed from previously contested arguments in international law 
about the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, which the ICISS argued focused more 
narrowly on the rights of outsiders to intervene than privileging the urgent needs of the insiders 
suffering from harm.67 In essence, the ICISS argued that the R2P principle was broader than 
humanitarian intervention as previously debated in international law and, thus, was novel and 
different. As such, the ICISS claimed that it had distinguished the R2P principle from earlier 
arguments of international law that permitted humanitarian intervention.  
After the release of the ICISS report in 2001, interest in the R2P principle increased 
among the international community, the Security Council, the Secretary General, non-
government actors and academics. The UN has attempted to advance and apply the R2P 
principle in many instances. One of the important steps was the adoption of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document, which recognized the responsibility of each individual state to 
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protect its population from mass atrocities. The World Summit Outcome Document made 
reference to the R2P principle in its paragraphs 138 and 139 and attempted to create a political 
consensus on R2P. 
The UN has also made numerous attempts to advance and apply the R2P principle since 
the adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. On April 28, 2006, the Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 
(POC).68 Resolution 1674 contained the first official Security Council reference to R2P by 
reaffirming the provisions of the R2P principle within paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World 
Summit Outcome Document. It also noted the Security Council’s readiness to address gross 
violations of human rights because mass atrocities may constitute threats to international peace 
and security. On June 28, 2006, the Security Council held its first open debate on the protection 
of civilians in armed conflict. During this debate, many governments reacted positively to the 
R2P reference in Resolution 1674.69 At the end of August 2007, the UN Secretary General 
appointed Edward Luck as Special Adviser to focus on the R2P principle. Luck's primary role 
was to focus on the conceptual development of, and consensus building around, R2P and to 
assist the General Assembly in its ongoing consideration of the principle.70 Luck’s 
responsibilities as Special Adviser included developing clarity and building consensus for the 
R2P principle, as well as assisting the General Assembly continue its consideration of the R2P 
principle. Throughout the end of 2008, Luck tried to garner political support of the Member 
States, key agencies within the UN, and civil society towards the better implementation of the 
R2P principle. 
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UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s report “Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect,” was released on January 12, 2009, which outlined measures and actors involved in 
operationalizing, or implementing, the R2P principle.71 The first General Assembly informal, 
interactive debate on R2P started on July 23, 2009. Noting that the concept of R2P as endorsed 
in 2005 was not to be renegotiated, presenters stated that the scope of the principle should remain 
limited to the four crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic 
cleansing.72 The first General Assembly resolution on R2P was adopted in October 2009, and it 
took note of the Secretary General’s report of January 2009.73  Resolution 1894, adopted by the 
Security Council in November 2009, recognized that states have the primary responsibility to 
protect their population and reaffirmed the provisions on R2P within paragraphs 138 and 139 of 
the World Summit Outcome Document.74 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a report on “Early Warning, Assessment 
and the Responsibility to Protect” on June 14, 2010.75  This report identified the capacities and 
gaps of exiting early warning mechanisms and the insufficient level of information and analysis 
sharing. The Secretary-General next released another report on June 27, 2011, entitled, “The 
Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements on Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect.”76 The report emphasized that the Security Council and regional and sub-regional 
organizations lend legitimacy to each other. The report highlighted the role that regional and sub-
regional organizations play in protecting populations from mass atrocities. Another report of the 
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Secretary General was released on July 25, 2012, entitled, “Responsibility to Protect – Timely 
and Decisive Response,” and it discussed the broad range of non-coercive and coercive tools 
available and the role of actors at the international, regional, national and local levels in its 
implementation.77 This report emphasized the importance of preventing crimes, but noted that, in 
cases in which preventive measures proved inadequate and the threat to populations remained 
imminent, the international community has a responsibility to take collective action to protect 
civilians. 
 Despite all the attention and efforts by the UN to sustain the momentum that R2P 
generated, such efforts have failed to produce clarity about R2P’s impact on international law. 
Although the R2P principle was intended to move international law past the controversies that 
international law experienced with humanitarian intervention, the R2P principle itself still faces 
many unresolved conflicts and controversies. One of the primary issues with the R2P principle is 
whether it has changed the pre-R2P humanitarian intervention impasses. The R2P principle is 
designed to include more than just coercive military intervention for humanitarian purposes. 
Compared to previous articulations of humanitarian intervention, the R2P principle provides a 
more holistic and integrated approach to conflict prevention, the avoidance of human rights 
abuses, and protection against mass atrocities. Notwithstanding the R2P principle’s inclusion of 
responsibilities to prevent and rebuild, however, the crux of the principle focuses on the issue of 
military intervention. Indeed, the majority of the ICISS report is devoted to the responsibility to 
react. The R2P principle was intended to move international law past the controversies involving 
the use of force for humanitarian intervention. However, the development of R2P during its first 
decade suggests that the controversies about the use of military force remain.  
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Moreover, during the first decade after R2P’s inception, one of the most debated 
questions was when to invoke the R2P principle. The ICISS set the R2P principle’s threshold for 
action as the potential for large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, but the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document restricts the application of R2P to four specific crimes: genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.78 Even so, questions arose about whether 
the principle should cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change, or response to 
natural disasters. This debate involved arguments that extending the R2P principle to these areas 
would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond either recognition or 
operational utility.  
Further, under the ICISS report, the R2P principle consists of three responsibilities: the 
responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.79 However, 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document only retained the prevention 
and reaction aspects of the R2P principle. It does not specify responsibility to rebuild as a part of 
R2P, even though it addresses post-conflict rebuilding elsewhere. Whether all three 
responsibilities form part of R2P is still debated. Therefore, while it is not clear when to invoke 
the R2P principle, it is also not clear as to which responsibility should be invoked under R2P.  
Additionally, there are many questions regarding the substantive content of the R2P 
principle. Under the R2P principle, what actions states should take in exercising the 
responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild are not clear. The ICISS report, as well as the World 
Summit Outcome Document, provides that prevention is the single most important dimension of 
R2P. Under the ICISS, the state has the duty to take “all measures to prevent genocide which 
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were within its power,” but the ICISS also offered the more restrained suggestion that states must 
“employ all means reasonably available to them.”80 However, it is not exactly clear what states 
are supposed to do to prevent atrocities or whether there are any limitations in taking preventive 
measures. Further, under R2P, the international community is required to assist other states in 
exercising their responsibility towards their citizens. The extent of any assistance given to states 
is still an open question under the principle. The international community has the responsibility 
to take actions using peaceful means to protect populations when a state manifestly fails to 
protect its population from atrocities. However, there is no clear indication of what kind of 
peaceful measures should be taken and to what extent those measures should be taken. The 
responsibility to react also presents the question of what military actions should be carried-out in 
any intervention in cases where there are gross humanitarian violations. The responsibility to 
rebuild aspect of R2P also faces substantive questions as it is not clear from the ICISS report 
what should be rebuilt.  
Further, there are issues regarding how R2P works procedurally across the 
responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild. Under R2P, it is not clear who takes the decisions, 
where decisions happen or how decisions are made regarding the responsibilities to prevent, 
react and rebuild. Under the responsibility to prevent, it is not clear who should take the decision 
on how to assist states in carrying-out preventive measures. The responsibility to react raises 
questions as to who should take the decision on the use of peaceful means and how to use the 
peaceful means in assisting the host state. Other issues include who bears the responsibility to 
carry-out military intervention under the R2P principle, and how they carry-out such 
interventions. The ICISS report, as well as the World Summit Outcome Document, 
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acknowledges that the Security Council is the appropriate body to authorize military 
interventions.81 But there is an issue whether regional organizations and individual states also 
have the authority to undertake military intervention under R2P. Therefore, it is not clear who 
decides to authorize the use of military force. The responsibility to rebuild aspect of R2P also 
faces the question of who should be involved in rebuilding post-conflict settings and how 
rebuilding should occur.  
Another critical issue with the R2P principle is the ability of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council to use their veto power. They may use their veto power against 
application of the R2P principle, even in cases involving gross human rights violations. While 
the RN2V concept is embedded in the ICISS report, the World Summit Outcome Document does 
not specifically address the RN2V concept. There are two main doubts regarding the RN2V’s 
goal of expanding the protection of civilians. First, RN2V implicitly favors military action over 
non-military responses to human rights abuses. Second, RN2V regulates the veto based on the 
seriousness of abuses rather than any characteristic of the proposed intervention. As a result, 
inappropriate interventions are too easy to authorize. The five permanent members of the UN 
will not agree to accept the RN2V for fear of lowering their political influence and power within 
the UN. 
Further, there are many issues regarding the implementation of the R2P principle. For 
example, there is a question of how to implement preventive measures and how to monitor such 
implementation mechanisms. Also, there are no clear guidelines on how to implement 
international assistance in support of preventive measures in a host state. Effective preventive 
measures can also be highly intrusive, and therefore do not avoid the problem of states’ 
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sensitivities about sovereignty. Developing countries have already expressed concern that any 
monitoring of R2P-related crimes might place a category of states under permanent surveillance. 
Further, the implementation of military intervention must be supported with adequate financial 
funding, as well as troop contributions. However, there are no mandatory rules which compel 
any member of the international community to support such decisions. There are also concerns 
regarding lack of intra-departmental and inter-agency coordination within the UN. The track 
record of collaboration and resource-sharing between the UN and regions should raise questions 
about the likelihood of fulfilling R2P-related aspirations. 
1.4 Focus on State Practice and Roadmap for the Analysis 
The R2P principle, its substantive content and implementation are surrounded by many 
disagreements. The various disagreements in the existing literature about the R2P principle are 
clear manifestations of the principle’s disputed place within contemporary international law. This 
thesis examines the disagreements and debates surrounding the R2P principle in order to provide 
more clarity from the perspective of international legal analysis. To achieve this task, the thesis 
focuses on state practice during humanitarian crises in the first decade after the inception of the 
R2P principle.  
The thesis analyzes state practice in two basic ways: (1) by providing an overview of the 
application of the R2P principles since its emergence in 2001; and (2) by exploring more closely 
four case studies on the application of the R2P principle. The overview of the application of the 
R2P principle analyzes a range of R2P-related events that occurred after 2001, including 
humanitarian crises in: Darfur (2004), Kenya (2007), Burma (2008), Georgia (2008), Gaza 
(2008), Sri Lanka (2009), Libya (2011), Côte d’Ivoire (2011), and Syria (2013). The in-depth 
analysis of four case studies involving gross human rights violations provides the basis for 
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examining state practice in more detail: Darfur, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Syria. The four case 
studies are important because they represent humanitarian crises in which the R2P principle 
featured prominently as an issue. In analyzing the case studies, the thesis will concentrate on 
state practice within the UN, but will also include, where relevant, state practice outside the UN. 
These four cases span the first decade of the R2P principle’s existence, beginning with the 
Darfur crisis and concluding with the on-going crisis in Syria. The case studies also include 
variations on key aspects of the R2P debate, with, for example, two case studies involving 
Security Council authorization of military force and two case studies marked by the Security 
Council’s failure to act.  
Analyzing whether the R2P principle has changed international law must proceed 
through an analysis of customary international law because, to date, states have not expressly 
incorporated the R2P principle in treaty law. However, since many resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council include R2P language, analyzing the relationship between the R2P principle 
and the UN Charter is important. Even though the analysis of the status of the R2P principle in 
contemporary international law is based on customary international law, custom remains a 
controversial source of international law in many areas of international relations. Not only is 
there disagreement about the components of state practice and opinio juris, but there is also 
controversy about how custom-formation works. However, the thesis does not attempt to resolve 
these debates with customary international law as a source of international law. Instead, the 
thesis applies the traditional requirements for the formation of customary international law to 
case studies, and analyzes whether the R2P principle has changed the international law from 
what existed in the pre-R2P era. 
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Chapter 2 describes how the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, international law 
on use of force, human rights, and international humanitarian law generally developed in the pre-
R2P period and then converged in the post-Cold War period in controversial ways that led to the 
creation of the R2P principle. This chapter also analyzes the international legal background of 
humanitarian intervention against which the thesis will compare state practice after the inception 
of the R2P principle in 2001. The essential objective of this chapter is to describe international 
law on humanitarian intervention before publication of the ICISS report. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the emergence and evolution of the substantive content of the R2P 
principle from its inception through recent developments. It discusses in detail the articulation, 
content, and interpretation of the principle in both the ICISS report of 2001 and the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document.   
Chapter 4 provides an overview of a number of prominent humanitarian crises that 
involved reference to, and uses of, the R2P principle from 2001 to 2013. This chapter also 
analyzes the UN’s efforts and activities to advance R2P. By analyzing key developments 
concerning the R2P principle, this chapter identifies the elements and problems associated with 
R2P. Ultimately, analyzing how R2P was used or not used since 2001 will help shed light on 
how state practice and UN activities have affected the relationship between the R2P principle 
and international law. 
  Chapters 5-8 of the thesis address state practice regarding the R2P principle, primarily 
within the UN, as a critical aspect of determining whether such practice has made the R2P 
principle part of international law. Chapters 5-8 examine in detail the Darfur, Libya, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Syria case studies, all of which involved arguments about, or application of, the R2P 
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principle. These four case studies have significantly, yet differently, contributed to the debate 
about the meaning and impact of the R2P principle in international law.   
Chapter 9 synthesizes the analysis of the R2P principle in international law. The chapter 
highlights findings and conclusions from previous chapters, and integrates them to show that the 
R2P principle has not changed international law.  
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   CHAPTER 2 
           HISTORY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction  
 The controversy about humanitarian intervention in international law that led to the 
development of R2P arose from the convergence of the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention; international law on use of force; human rights; and international humanitarian law. 
This chapter describes how all these areas of international law came together in the post-Cold 
War period to create the problems that led to the creation of the R2P principle. This chapter also 
analyzes the international legal background of humanitarian intervention against which the thesis 
will compare state practice after the inception of the R2P principle in 2001. The objective of this 
chapter is to analyze the status of international law on humanitarian intervention at the time of 
the introduction of the ICISS report. 
 
2.2 Humanitarian Intervention and International Law Prior to the Establishment of the 
United Nations 
 This section discusses the historical development of the humanitarian intervention 
concept during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. The objective is to understand the emergence of 
the humanitarian intervention idea and the problems associated with it in international law before 
the establishment of the UN. More specifically, the analysis pays close attention to the 
development of doctrinal issues over time and the state practice associated with such 
developments. This section also analyzes whether humanitarian intervention was connected with 
any right or obligation in international law for a state to engage in the use of force.   
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2.2.1 Humanitarian Intervention and International Law from the 17th Century to the End 
of the 19th Century 
The first historical phases of humanitarian intervention issues are dominated by the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and the lack of any international legal rules 
restricting the use of force. One of the fundamental international legal principles is state 
sovereignty. State sovereignty is the foundation of inter-state relations. By the mid-17th century, 
sovereign equality was embedded in the Peace of Westphalia following the end of the Thirty 
Years’ War that had raged over Europe. As Glanville notes, by the 17th century, states enjoyed 
unfettered rights to self-government and non-intervention in internal affairs.1 In the Westphalian 
system, the ultimate holder of legal authority and power is the state.  
The idea of state sovereignty developed with the rise of positivist thinking in the 17th 
century. Scholars in the 17th century, such as Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, regarded 
sovereignty as a final political authority. The positivist idea that states need not account for their 
actions in their territories is most forcefully expressed by Hobbes, who regarded sovereignty as 
“absolute, unified, inalienable, and based upon a voluntary but irrevocable contract.”2 He argued 
that a state cannot harm a citizen, any more than a master could injure his slave.3 In Leviathan, 
Hobbes emphasized the immunity of the sovereign from legal accountability.4 According to 
Bodin, sovereignty is the highest, absolute, and continuous power over the citizens.5 Therefore, 
during the 17th century, sovereignty was regarded as absolute power within a state. According to 
                                                          
1 Luke Glanville, The Antecedents of ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’, 17 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 234 (2011). 
2 CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU 378 (1968). 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF A COMMONWEALTH, bk.1, ch.8 (1606), available at  
http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin_1.htm.  
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Fodéré, intervention in internal affairs for any reason was illegal because it constituted a 
violation of the independence of states.6 
Natural law ideas that developed during the 17th century took a different view that 
interventions into the affairs of others states could be justified and legitimate. During this period, 
interventions did happen and were based on Christian beliefs and the religious notion of the self-
respect of man.7 Using such religious ideas, Thomas Aquinas stated well before the 17th century 
that a sovereign state has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another state when that 
state greatly mistreats its subjects.8 These religious notions became the basis for natural law 
arguments justifying interventions into the affairs of sovereign states. According to Grotius, the 
law governing every human society should be informed by a principle of humanity.9 If a 
sovereign, although exercising his rights, ill-treats his own population, the right to intervene may 
be lawfully exercised.10 Under this perspective, a sovereign may take up arms to punish a nation 
which is guilty of an enormous transgression against natural law.  
During this period, international law had no regulations governing when a state could 
resort to force, meaning states could go to war for any reason. Although the use of force was not 
restricted by any legal rules during this period, some jurists tried to identify limitations on the 
use of force by states. By the mid-17th century, Grotius recognized the principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention and the lack of positive rules restricting a state’s rights to wage war. 
However, according to Grotius, states had a duty to observe the rules of warfare regardless of the 
                                                          
6 Quoted in Jean Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its 
Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 216 (1973). 
7 Id. at 206.    
8 Id. at 214.  
9 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, bk.1, ch.3, sec.16 (1625), available at 
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/grotius/gro-103.htm.  
10 Id.  
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reasons they were waging war.11 Grotius further advocated a just war theory, which prescribes 
when war is morally justifiable.12 Grotius explained the right conduct in war, or jus in bello, and 
under this notion, acts of war should be directed only towards enemy combatants, and not 
towards civilians.13 Grotius identified: (1) limits on war taken from the just war theory, and (2) a 
right of intervention concerning a state’s significant mistreatment of its people. Grotius managed 
to identify both authority and responsibility in his approach to sovereignty and war. However, 
Grotius’ approach was heavily dependent on natural law, which was not necessarily the same as 
the law of nations in the 17th century. During this period, the law of nations was still a fluid 
mixture of positivist and natural law thinking, yet, in state practice, the actual law of nations did 
not seem to reflect all the ideas of Grotius.  
During the 19th century, there was a clear tension between sovereignty and the unlimited 
right to wage war, in which weaker states were vulnerable to the interests of more powerful 
states. There was a strong reflection of sovereignty and non-intervention in international law. 
Many liberals in new democracies sought to defend the non-intervention norm, expecting that it 
would discourage autocratic states from intervening to preserve monarchical rule. However, the 
“standard of civilization” was an exception for the strong adherence to sovereignty and non-
intervention during this period. The imperialists believed that only civilized Western powers 
were sovereign, and the rest of the globe was considered uncivilized.14 As Strang states, the 
Western standard of civilization was used to evaluate non-Western polities.15 In its relations with 
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14 David Strang, Contested Sovereignty: The Construction of Colonial Imperialism, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS 
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Western nationals, a civilized state had all the freedoms including the freedom of trade and the 
freedom of internal politics.16  
In addition, there was an agreement among some states that intervention might be used 
for debt collection and to save populations from suffering.17 Western states increasingly 
permitted interventions to protect Christian populations within the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the 
term “humanitarian intervention” appears to have been first introduced and used during this 
period.18 One of the first humanitarian interventions took place in 1827 when France, Britain, 
and Russia intervened in order to prevent massive bloodshed in Greece, then under Ottoman 
occupation.19 The 1827 Treaty of London signed between the three powers illustrated the 
specific humanitarian grounds on which they justified their intervention.20 Also, France 
intervened militarily in Syria in 1860 to protect the Christian population from slaughter at the 
hands of the Ottoman Empire.21 Though French troops stayed on and became an occupying 
force, this case was widely accepted as a case of humanitarian intervention to save the Christian 
population.22 Another example of intervention that was justified in the name of humanity was the 
Russian intervention in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1877, which were all under 
Ottoman rule.23 The Cuban invasion by the United States in 1898 was also justified on 
humanitarian grounds.24 Addressing the United States Congress in 1898, President William 
                                                          
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 86.  
18 Id. at 24.  
19 Thomas E. Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed Force, A Legal Theory Survey, 
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McKinley emphasized that “the purpose of the intervention was in the name of humanity and to 
put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there.”25 
These interventions made to protect civilian populations were important for later 
developments of international human rights law and international humanitarian laws as well. 
However, although these interventions were justified on humanitarian grounds, these 
justifications had no direct legal implications. Such interventions did not need a legal 
justification when states could use force for any reason, which makes the justifications 
essentially moral or political in nature. The 19th century, therefore, saw no real changes with 
states having the right in international law to use of force without restriction. Episodes of 
humanitarian intervention based largely on moral and political reasoning echoed the natural law 
thinking used by Grotius, but they did not really affect international law on sovereignty and the 
use of force or create any serious notion of universal human rights.  
However, the law of armed conflict developed in the 19th century, which began the 
process of creating legal responsibilities on how states waged war. This era marked the start of a 
process for turning just war theory concepts of jus in bello into international law. Prior to the 
1860s, customary rules of warfare were largely determined by monarchs and commanders, or 
agreed on between belligerents with a view to satisfy their desires and convenience. After 
witnessing the devastation at the Battle of Solferino in 1859, a decisive battle in the second 
Italian war of independence, Swiss social activist Henry Dunant published his book, A Memory 
of Solferino, in 1862.26 This book and its ideas led to the establishment of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva. The ICRC led the development of the 1864 
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Geneva Convention, the first codified international treaty that covered the sick and wounded 
soldiers on the battlefield. The Geneva Convention contained ten articles designed to ensure that 
all soldiers wounded on the battlefield - regardless of the side they were on - were taken care of 
without distinction.27 The Convention provided rules to protect both the medical personnel and 
the medical facilities treating the wounded.28 The Geneva Convention centered on the needs of 
war victims.29 All these rules aimed to protect humanitarian values in the midst of wars.    
The 1863 Lieber Code was another set of rules related to jus in bello. President Abraham 
Lincoln issued the Code as instructions for the Union armies fighting in the American Civil War 
and, as such, the Code did not have the status of a treaty.30 This Code was the first official, 
comprehensive codified regulations for military activities during armed conflict. The ICRC, 
Geneva Convention, and Lieber Code are important to the story of humanitarian intervention in 
international law because they mark the start of developments in international law on armed 
conflict, which later evolves into international humanitarian law. 
Towards the end of the 19th century, the Hague Conventions were adopted stipulating the 
way wars should be conducted.31 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are international 
treaties and declarations negotiated at two international peace conferences at The Hague in the 
Netherlands. The Hague Conventions of 1899 consisted of three main treaties and three 
additional declarations that addressed the rules governing wars on land.32 These documents 
included the rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war, the prohibition of using poisons, 
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arts. 2, 7, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.  
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29 Id. at arts. 5, 7. 
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the prohibition of killing enemy combatants who have surrendered, the prohibition of looting 
towns or other places, and attacking or bombarding undefended towns or habitations.33 Along 
with the 1864 Geneva Convention, the Hague Conventions were among the first formal 
statements of the laws of war and war crimes in international law. These rules limited the state’s 
right in international law concerning how wars are fought.    
 These developments marked a change in international law on armed conflict that 
emphasized both authority to wage war and responsibility for how wars are fought. Nevertheless, 
disputes between the major powers began to increase towards the later part of the 19th century 
and the beginning of the 20th century.  Among these were the outbreak of the 1884 Sino-French 
War, the 1898 Spanish-American War, the 1898-1900 joint great-power intervention in China, 
and the 1904 Russian-Japanese War. With these incidents, the relationship between sovereignty, 
non-intervention, the use of force, and conduct during war became more complicated and 
controversial. 
2.2.2 Humanitarian Intervention and International Law in the First Half of the 20th 
Century 
In contrast to the 19th century, where international legal changes occurred mainly with 
respect to the law of war, the 20th century witnessed more comprehensive changes in 
international law relevant to humanitarian intervention. The first half of the 20th century involved 
attempts to restrict the right of states to use force. Developing such restrictions created a 
doctrinal need for a legal justification for using force for humanitarian purposes, as opposed to 
formulating just a political or moral justification. However, during the first half of the 20th 
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century, neither international human rights law nor international humanitarian law developed 
enough to provide a legal basis for humanitarian intervention.  
In practice, however, the efforts to restrict the use of force were not successful during this 
period. One such effort occurred in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which introduced a 
limited restriction on the sovereign right to resort to war.34 The Covenant required states to 
guarantee their people freedom of conscious and religion.35 It further prohibited the slave trade 
and required states to secure and maintain fair and human labor conditions.36 Especially with the 
development of minority rights, the Covenant sought to restrict sovereignty within a state’s own 
territory, which raised questions about the legitimacy of outside interference or intervention in a 
state’s affairs for humanitarian reasons associated with protecting certain populations from 
persecution.  
However, the Covenant did not prohibit the use of force by states. Instead, members of 
the League agreed that, if any dispute was likely to lead to an armed conflict, they would submit 
the issue either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council of the League. Further, they agreed 
that, in no case, would they resort to war until three months after either an award by the 
arbitrators or the report by the Council.37 Thus, the Covenant established procedural mechanisms 
to encourage states to have a “cooling off” period and to try to resolve disputes peacefully before 
commencing hostilities. Nevertheless, once the procedural safeguards laid down in the Covenant 
were exhausted, a state could still legally resort to war.  
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A different effort occurred in 1928, with the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War 
signed on August 27, 1928, commonly called the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This Pact went beyond 
the Covenant with respect to the use of force.38 This treaty represented the first attempt to outlaw 
war, as the parties condemned any recourse to war for the solution of international controversies 
and renounced war as an instrument of foreign policy in their relationships with each other.39 
This prohibition bans a use of force undertaken for any reason except in self-defense, and this 
prohibition effectively banned using force for humanitarian purposes. The Kellogg-Briand Pact’s 
purpose was not really connected to humanitarian intervention as an issue because it aimed to 
regulate the use of force more comprehensively as a feature of international relations. However, 
the Pact had no impact on state behavior after its adoption. The Kellogg-Briand Pact failed to 
prevent the outbreak of World War II.  
Although the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact both attempted to restrict a state’s 
right to use force, the use of force during the first half of the 20th century revealed how the idea 
of humanitarian intervention could be severely abused. States using force during this period often 
appealed to humanitarian justifications, in particular to protect minority rights. Japan invaded 
Manchuria in September 1931, and initially characterized the intervention as necessary to protect 
Japanese nationals from violence carried out by Chinese military forces.40 Under this pretext, 
Japan declared a new state of Manchukuo in 1932 and embarked on a full-scale war with China, 
which dragged on until the end of World War II.41 Although Japan tried to rationalize its 
invasion on humanitarian reasons, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was regarded as blatant 
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aggression.42 Similar events occurred in October 1935 when Italy invaded Ethiopia, and when 
Germany annexed Bohemia and Moravia in Czechoslovakia in March 1939.43 Like the Japanese 
in China, Italy and Germany rationalized their actions as humanitarian intervention.44 However, 
many saw such humanitarian justifications as abusive under both international law and natural 
law. This potential for abuse of humanitarian justifications in the use of force also threatened 
sovereignty and non-intervention in international law. 
2.3 Humanitarian Intervention and International Law during the Cold War 
The promulgation of the UN Charter following World War II created a set of principles 
and norms to govern the international system. There were major developments concerning 
humanitarian intervention during this period: international legal rules on the use of force 
(especially Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter), the robust authority given to the Security 
Council to authorize the use of force, the development of international human rights law, and the 
continued evolution of international humanitarian law. During the latter half of the 20th century, 
these changes raised a major international legal debate on whether states could use force when 
atrocities occurred in other states. 
2.3.1 Doctrinal Developments 
 During the Cold War, tensions emerged in international law between strong support for 
maximalist interpretations of sovereignty and non-intervention, restrictive rules on the use of 
force, and the emergence of responsibilities under international human rights law and 
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international humanitarian law. This section examines these tensions in each of these areas of 
international law.  
2.3.1.1 International Law on Sovereignty and Non-intervention 
The complimentary principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention support the idea 
that each state is a sovereign actor capable of deciding its own policies, internal organization, 
and independence. These principles played a key role in the evolution of the international order, 
and there is no doubt that they became well-established in international law. During the Cold 
War, the most vigorous supporters of sovereignty and non-intervention policy were developing 
countries, mostly newly independent states emerging from colonial rule, often strongly supported 
by socialist states.  
The principle of non-intervention is recognized in the UN Charter, which provides in 
Article 2(7) that: 
[N]othing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter; but 
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII.45 
State practice at the UN during the Cold War demonstrated support for a maximalist 
interpretation of the UN Charter’s prohibition of intervention. This view was reflected in UN 
General Assembly resolutions, such as the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in 
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, 
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adopted in 1965. This declaration reads in part that “no state has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state.”46 This general 
prohibition of intervention was reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the UN 
Charter adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970.47  
2.3.1.2 International Law on the Use of Force 
 The principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states are 
directly linked to the question of the use of force. The restrictions on the use of force in 
international law have an influence on the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. 
The prohibition of the threat or use of force was laid down in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
which provides that: 
[A]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.48 
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides for the right of states to use force in self-defense, 
including collective self-defense, in response to an armed attack: 
[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
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immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.49 
Further, Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowered the Security Council to authorize UN 
members to use force to address a threat to international peace and security.  
The presence of these rules in the UN Charter creates the legal necessity for an exception 
to the prohibition on the use of force for military action for humanitarian purposes. As this 
chapter previously described, the absence of effective restrictions on the use of force in 
international law before World War II meant that a legal justification for using force for 
humanitarian purposes was not required under treaty and customary international law. Under the 
Charter, the clearest legal justification for using force for humanitarian purposes would come 
from a decision of the Security Council.  
Beyond that, controversies emerged, for example, about the precise scope of the 
prohibition of the use of force under the UN Charter. The question is whether the language of 
Article 2(4) should be construed as a strict prohibition, or whether unilateral use of force without 
Security Council authorization should be allowed, especially when the goal is to protect human 
rights and purposes not otherwise inconsistent with the objectives of the UN.  This debate 
focused on whether states with genuine humanitarian motives can act collectively to protect 
civilian populations without violating Article 2(4) in cases where the Security Council fails to 
take an effective action in protecting civilian populations from mass atrocities.  
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Some scholars interpret the UN Charter to permit humanitarian intervention without 
Security Council approval. Tesón states that humanitarian intervention supports the overall 
purpose of the UN Charter because the preservation of human rights is one of the Charter’s 
primary objectives.50 He also states that humanitarian intervention does not violate Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter because such an intervention impairs neither the territorial integrity nor the 
political independence of the targeted state.51 Mackinlay and Chopra argue that, in cases where 
UN approval of the use of military force is extremely difficult to obtain, humanitarian 
intervention should be legal.52  Fonteyne states that humanitarian intervention remains legal 
under the UN Charter as the drafters of the UN Charter did not explicitly ban humanitarian 
intervention, although they had the opportunity to do so.53  Other scholars, such as Hathaway and 
Shapiro, argue that Article 2(4) permits individual and collective self-defense, but bars all other 
forms of intervention without express Security Council authorization.54  For Koh, this “per se 
illegal” rule is plainly overbroad. Koh does not believe humanitarian intervention is illegal under 
international law.55 For Koh, a nation could lawfully use or threaten the use of force for 
genuinely humanitarian purposes, even without Security Council authorization. However, 
commentators advocating the illegality of humanitarian intervention argue that state practice 
does not support the legality of humanitarian intervention.56 They argue that states that 
intervened in the past usually did so for their own political gain, not with any humanitarian 
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motives.57 According to Brownlie, the Security Council has a monopoly on the use of force 
except in cases of self-defense as specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter.58   
2.3.1.3 International Law on Human Rights 
Under the UN Charter, the Security Council can authorize the use of force to address 
grave violations of human rights when the Security Council decides that such violations 
represent a threat to international peace and security. However, another debate emerged about 
whether the development of international human rights law provided a legal justification for use 
of force for humanitarian purposes in the absence of Security Council authorization. Human 
rights qualify and limit the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention by (a) obligating states 
to respect the rights of individuals, and (b) giving states an interest in how other states treat their 
citizens. Therefore, human rights create the responsibility to go with the authority the principle 
of sovereignty creates. The UN Charter provided initial principles for the protection of human 
rights. The preamble of the Charter re-affirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of human person, and in the equal rights of men and women.59 One of the purposes of 
the UN Charter is “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights.” In accordance with 
Article 55, UN Member States reaffirm a commitment to promoting universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of any kind.60 
Further, under Article 56 of the UN Charter, all members of the UN “pledge themselves to take 
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joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the 
purposes set forth in Article 55.”61  
International legal protection for human rights has undergone dramatic development 
since the founding of the UN in 1945. The international human rights movement was 
strengthened on December 10, 1948, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).62 Adoption of the UDHR further highlighted the need to 
respect the fundamental human rights of every person. The preamble of UDHR emphasizes that 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”63 The UDHR 
includes the complete range of civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights. It is generally agreed that many provisions of the UDHR gained formal legal force by 
becoming part of customary international law. 
In addition to the UDHR, other international instruments were adopted which aimed to 
protect human rights. One such effort was the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), which was adopted in 1966 by the UN General Assembly and entered into force 
in 1976.64 This Covenant sets out, in much greater detail than the UDHR, a variety of rights and 
freedoms. It imposes obligations on each state party to respect and ensure to all individuals, 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, the rights recognized in the Covenant without 
distinction of any kind.65 Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in 
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1976.66 It elaborates upon most of the economic, social and cultural rights provided for under the 
UDHR. These two Covenants, together with the UDHR, constitute the International Bill of 
Human Rights. 
Apart from these instruments, there are also many treaties and declarations clarifying 
specific obligations pertaining to particular human rights. These include, among others, the 1966 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 1984 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.67 
In addition, there are also regional human rights systems, which include the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.68 
Importantly, some of these human rights are considered as having gained the status of 
customary international law, and some fundamental human rights are recognized as erga omnes 
norms, or obligations owed to the international community as a whole. Therefore, a state may no 
longer plead the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention as a bar to intervention by the 
international community to protect those human rights. Some commentators argue that, when a 
government commits egregious human rights abuses against its citizens, and when international 
                                                          
66 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
67 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Sept. 22, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
68 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by 
Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; the American Convention on Human Rights,  Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S 123; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights Organization of African Unity, June 27, 1981, 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
47 
 
organizations fail to prevent these abuses, the international community has the right of 
humanitarian intervention to address those abuses.69  
This idea of contingent sovereignty suggests that statehood itself is legally dependent on 
acceptable government behavior, and the failure of a government to meet certain minimum 
standards invalidates its claim to non-interference. Therefore, these claims suggest that, under 
international law, a state, group of states or an organization can use force against another state 
when a state abuses its sovereign power and violates human rights. However, international law 
does not generally impose obligations on states to undertake humanitarian interventions, even in 
cases of large-scale violations of human rights. Nevertheless, the UN Charter’s inclusion of 
human rights provides the legal counterweight to the principles of sovereignty and the 
prohibition on the use of force found in the Charter. The other legal counterweight emerges from 
developments in international humanitarian law.  
2.3.1.4 International Humanitarian Law 
Similar to the development of human rights law, international humanitarian law 
developed more significantly in the post-World War II period, including for non-international 
armed conflicts, which linked with the emergence of international human rights law, in 
supporting the need for humanitarian intervention in certain circumstances. The development of 
international humanitarian law contributed to advocacy for humanitarian intervention in contexts 
not involving Security Council authorization.  
One of the main developments during the Cold War was the 1948 Convention on 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which set limits on behavior during an 
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armed conflict. Another major development occurred with the adoption of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949: the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The four Geneva Conventions 
were supplemented by two further agreements: the Additional Protocols of 1977 relating to the 
protection of victims of armed conflicts. Additional Protocol I expands protection for the civilian 
population and military and civilian medical workers in international armed conflicts. Additional 
Protocol II extends similar but more limited protections during non-international armed conflicts. 
The development of international humanitarian law during the Cold War connected with 
the emergence of human rights law to support a claim that international law permitted 
humanitarian intervention in response to large-scale atrocities, even in the absence of a Security 
Council resolution. In other words, the convergence of international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law produced, in the limited context of large-scale atrocities, an 
international legal right to resort to force to stop the atrocities from continuing. This right acts as 
a customary exception to the Charter prohibition on the use of force not dependent on the right of 
self-defense or an authorization from the Security Council. Under these claims, substantively the 
violations have to be large-scale and, procedurally, the use of force has to be the last resort and is 
subject to all rules regulating the use of military force.   
These arguments in favor of humanitarian intervention generated controversy. Often the 
right of humanitarian intervention was criticized as an attempt to legitimize political interference 
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of internal affairs of other states.70 Many but not all states rejected the idea of humanitarian 
intervention, and international legal scholars disagreed over the legality of humanitarian 
intervention. While some scholars recognized the lawfulness of the right to humanitarian 
intervention, others maintained that unilateral humanitarian intervention violates Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter and the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention.71 Some who wished 
to support humanitarian intervention to halt mass atrocities and protect civilians worried about 
the consequences of authorizing a right to engage in humanitarian intervention as a matter of 
law.72 
2.3.2 State Practice  
The legality of the use of force for humanitarian purposes in the absence of Security 
Council action arose on a number of occasions during the Cold War. India gained independence 
from Great Britain in 1947.73 As Great Britain withdrew from India, two separate nations came 
into existence: India and Pakistan. Pakistan was also geographically divided into East and 
West.74 In 1970, West Pakistan gained political and economic control of East Pakistan. This 
development created unrest in East Pakistan. In the meantime, general elections were held in 
Pakistan in December 1970 in which the Awami League, an opposition party in East Pakistan, 
won a majority of seats in the National Assembly and demanded more autonomy for the East.75 
In opposition to the outcome of this election, the central government of Pakistan postponed the 
convening of the National Assembly indefinitely. As unrest in East Pakistan escalated, Mujibur 
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Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, issued a Declaration of Emancipation on March 23, 
1971.76 
On March 25, 1971, Pakistani government forces attacked East Pakistan and began the 
indiscriminate killing of unarmed civilians, in particular the minority Hindu population.77 As the 
crisis worsened, relations between India and Pakistan became tense. On December 3, 1971, India 
attacked Pakistan and formally recognized East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh 
on December 6, 1971.78 India initially justified the intervention into East Pakistan on 
humanitarian grounds.79 The Indian representative to the UN stated that India had pure motives 
and its intention was to rescue the people in East Pakistan from their suffering.80 This claim was 
rejected by a number of states, including the United States, Argentina, Tunisia, China, and Saudi 
Arabia.81 These countries argued that principles of sovereignty and non-interference should take 
precedence and that India had no right to meddle in what they viewed as an internal matter.82 In 
response, the Indian delegation later justified its action as lawful self-defense.83  
Some commentators argued that India’s change of justification from humanitarian to self-
defense meant India acknowledged that humanitarian intervention was not legal.84 Frank and 
Rodley did not consider the Bangladesh case one that constitutes the basis for a definable, 
workable, or desirable new rule of international law which, in the future, would make certain 
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kinds of military interventions permissible.85 State practice concerning India’s military 
intervention did not support the idea that international law permitted the use of force for the 
purpose of humanitarian intervention.  
Vietnam’s military intervention in Cambodia and overthrow of the Pol Pot regime in 
1979 was another case initially justified on humanitarian grounds. The Communist Party of 
Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) took control of Cambodia in April 1975.86 In the process of 
restructuring Cambodia, and in an attempt to wipe out foreign influence, the Khmer Rouge killed 
millions of Cambodians.87 A special rapporteur for the UN concluded that the Cambodian crisis 
was the worst violation of human rights since the Nazi era.88 The war between Vietnam and 
Cambodia began with clashes along the land and sea borders of the two countries. After more 
mass killings by the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam invaded Cambodia on December 25, 1978, and took 
control of Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979.89 Later, Vietnam justified its invasion as self-defense 
from Cambodian attacks that started from a border dispute between the two nations.90  
However, international reaction to the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam was hostile to 
Vietnam’s claimed justifications. The UN General Assembly called for the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from Cambodia and accepted the credentials of the Khmer Rouge delegation at the 
UN, rather than the credentials from the Vietnam-supported People’s Republic of Kampuchea.91 
The UN also did not agree with Vietnams’ claim of self-defense. As Chesterman notes, 
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Vietnam’s concern with Cambodia was only partly humanitarian in origin. This episode also 
provides little evidence that state practice supported the idea that international law recognized a 
right to use force for humanitarian purposes. 
A claim of humanitarian intervention was initially raised by Tanzania in 1979 when it 
attacked Uganda and overthrew Idi Amin. Amin’s regime committed mass atrocities and human 
rights violations against civilians in Uganda during its eight years of power from 1971 to 1979.92 
The Ugandan regime killed thousands of civilians, and episodes of rape, torture, and other 
inhuman and degrading violence against civilians was discovered and reported by Amnesty 
International as evidence of the brutality of Amin’s regime.93 Amin’s regime not only massacred 
its own civilians, but also attacked neighboring Tanzania. In October 1978, Ugandan troops 
invaded Tanzania and occupied the Kagera salient, an area located between Uganda and 
Tanzania that borders the Kagera River.94 In response to this act, on November 15, 1979, 
Tanzania launched an offensive against Uganda and toppled Amin.95 Tanzania later justified its 
intervention as self-defense from Ugandan aggression.96 After the intervention, the Tanzanian 
leader stated that the war between Tanzania and Uganda was caused by the Ugandan army’s 
aggression against Tanzania, and there was no other cause.97 Except for a few countries, such as 
Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, and Sudan, the Ugandan intervention by Tanzania was tolerated by other 
states.98 This intervention was not discussed in any UN organs. The Secretary General was 
involved only at a later stage in an effort to mediate a ceasefire. The Organization for African 
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Unity (OAU), despite non-intervention provisions in the OAU Charter, never condemned the 
intervention.99  
Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda is widely perceived as producing a desirable result and 
as a victory for human rights. According to Tesón, humanitarian considerations were prominent 
in this intervention and, in general, Tanzania’s action was accepted by the international 
community.100 Tesón concluded that it was a genuine instance of humanitarian intervention. 
However, some commentators, like Ronzitti, rejected the claim that Tanzania was acting 
legally.101 Similarly, Burrows stated that the Tanzanian intervention was illegal under 
international law.102 She stated that Tanzania’s action would have been legal only if Tanzania 
had obtained Security Council approval.103 In terms of state practice, Tanzania’s actions fall 
somewhere between its humanitarian and self-defense justifications. Chesterman suggested that 
it can be said with confidence only that “the action was not condemned,” and he concluded that 
“there is little evidence of opinio juris beyond an affirmation of the right of self-defense.”104 
As seen from these cases, the debates focused on humanitarian intervention and the use 
of force. The cases did not involve atrocity or conflict prevention efforts or post-conflict 
rebuilding strategies. The international community did not accept humanitarian intervention as a 
justification for the unilateral use of force with respect to these episodes. State practice illustrates 
great reluctance on the part of states during the Cold War to defend the use of force on the basis 
of humanitarian intervention. This situation makes sense analytically because international 
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human rights law and international humanitarian law were still developing in this period, making 
it legally risky to claim that international law clearly permitted the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes. Thus, humanitarian intervention as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force 
was not widely supported by state practice. 
2.4 Humanitarian Intervention and International Law in the Early Post-Cold War Period 
 
There were many political changes during the early post-Cold War period. The Soviet 
Union disappeared, the bi-polar superpower competition ended, and East-West ideological 
rivalry vanished. The political space created by the end of the Cold War created more room for 
the development of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
Developments in the post-Cold War era concerning humanitarian intervention suggest a change 
in attitudes, specifically in increasing challenges to state sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention. International humanitarian law also developed during this period, with the 
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as 
well as creation of the International Criminal Court. The Security Council was actively engaged 
in taking actions in various crises and, in fact, began to authorize a number of interventions for 
humanitarian purposes, such as in Haiti and Somalia. With these developments, the dynamics in 
international law between sovereignty and non-intervention, the prohibition on the use of force, 
human rights, and humanitarian law became more volatile and led to controversies in the 1990s, 
especially with respect to crises in Rwanda and Kosovo that led the international community to 
look for a new strategy to guide international responses to atrocities. 
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2.4.1 Rwanda 
In the early 1990s, the world was confronted with a serious humanitarian situation in 
Rwanda.105 Although the world witnessed dire human rights and humanitarian violations in 
Rwanda, not one state responded to the crisis in a timely and effective manner. There was great 
reluctance among UN Member States to respond to the Rwandan crisis.106 This reluctance to 
respond among the Member States on the Security Council led to a failure of the international 
community to react effectively to the Rwandan crisis. The Rwandan situation raised many 
questions, including who bears the responsibility to protect innocent victims of humanitarian 
atrocities, such as those in the Rwandan genocide. Although the UN had some responsibility to 
respond to the crisis, the UN was powerless without state desire or interest to take any action. 
Edward Luck, the Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General on R2P, stated later that “the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was a very important piece of R2P.”107 Thus, in order to understand 
the significance of the Rwandan crisis in the development of the R2P principle, it is important to 
analyze the Rwandan conflict and the various responses of the international community.  
When the 1990s began, the Rwandan government was led by members of the Hutu tribe. 
The opposition Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Ugandan-based rebel group composed mostly 
of Tutsi refugees, invaded northern Rwanda on October 1, 1990, in an attempt to defeat the 
Hutu-led government.108 This power struggle exacerbated ethnic tensions in the country. 
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Continuing ethnic strife resulted in the Tutsi rebels’ displacing and killing large numbers of 
Hutus in the north, while Tutsis were killed by Hutus in the south.109  
There were plenty of early warnings of these mass atrocities. On March 27, 1992, the 
Belgian Ambassador in Kigali, Johan Swinner, warned the Belgian government that a secret 
group of Hutus was planning the extermination of all Tutsis in Rwanda with the goal of 
resolving, once and for all, the ethnic problem.110 Further, in a press conference organized by the 
Belgian Senate, Professor Filip Reyntjens explained the ways in which the Hutu death squads 
were organized.111 By 1993, the year before the massacre took place, many human rights 
organizations were actively reporting on Rwanda. In March 1993, for example, Human Rights 
Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights issued a report of mass killings in 
Rwanda.112 Further, after his mission to Rwanda in April 1993, B. W. Ndiaye, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary, and Extrajudicial Executions, informed the UN Human 
Rights Commission that the massacres of Tutsis constituted genocide under the Genocide 
Convention.113 
As the violence in Rwanda intensified, the international community took some efforts to 
prevent further escalation of atrocities. The international community pressed the Hutu-led 
government of Juvénal Habyarimana to sign the Arusha Accords in 1993, which led to a 
ceasefire and were intended to end the Rwandan conflict.114 In order to implement the Arusha 
Accords between the Rwandan government and the RPF, the UN established the United Nations 
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Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) on October 5, 1993, through Security Council 
Resolution 872.115 Its mandate included:  
[E]nsuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitoring the ceasefire agreement, 
including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization 
procedures; monitoring the security situation during the final period of the transitional 
Government's mandate leading up to elections; assisting with mine-clearance; and 
assisting in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with 
relief operations.116  
UNAMIR’s authorized strength was 2,500 personnel, but it took approximately five months for 
the mission to reach that level.117 From the beginning of the mission, UNAMIR Commander 
General Romeo Dallaire argued that UNAMIR required heavy weapons and a minimum of 4,500 
well-trained and well-supplied troops.118 Although the capabilities for preventing mass atrocities 
were severely limited, General Dallaire further insisted on having a clear mandate to use force to 
stop the killing of civilians. However, the United States and the United Kingdom were opposed 
to the authorization of 4,500 troops.119  
The assassination of Habyarimana in April 1994 set off a violent reaction, during which 
Hutu groups conducted mass killings of Tutsis.120 These mass killings had reportedly been 
planned by members of the Hutu tribe, many of whom occupied positions at top levels of the 
Hutu-led government.121 These killings of Tutsis were supported and coordinated by the national 
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government, as well as by local military, civil officials, and the mass media.122 According to 
Human Rights Watch, this genocidal slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus took tens of thousands of lives 
while displacing many more Rwandans.123  
With this genocidal slaughter, the international community felt the need to react to stop 
such atrocities. Considering the scale of violence, some Member States of the UN expressed the 
belief that UNAMIR forces lacked the strength to stop the mass atrocities. However, the United 
States and some other states were not willing to send their own troops.124 The United States was 
not willing to change UNAMIR’s mandate, and it assumed that the troop-contributing nations 
had only committed to a peacekeeping mission.125 In fact, UNAMIR was weakened from the 
outset by resistance from some Member States on the Security Council. Rather than acceding to 
the request made by General Dallaire for increased troop support in the wake of the massacres, 
the Security Council decided to reduce UNAMIR to a token force of 270 troops.126 Although the 
Secretary General backed a plan which called for the deployment of 5,500 soldiers to Rwanda, it 
was opposed by some Member States.127 Further, after the killing of 10 Belgian soldiers, 
Belgium withdrew its contingent.128  
Only on May 17, 1994, was the Security Council able to adopt Resolution 918, which 
imposed an arms embargo against the Rwandan government and authorized UNAMIR’s 
expansion to include: (a) actions to secure the safety of displaced persons and refugees; and (b) 
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ongoing security during the distribution of humanitarian aid.129 On June 8, 1994, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 925, which noted that acts constituting genocide had been carried 
out in Rwanda.130 On June 22, 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 929 and 
authorized France to take control of the Rwandan situation with a view towards improving 
security and protecting displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk.131 However, France did 
not intervene until the latter stages of the mass killings, which ended primarily because of the 
RPF’s military victory.132 The French were not willing to risk their soldiers. In fact, at the height 
of the crisis, the Security Council ordered UNAMIR to withdraw, rather than sending additional 
troops to stop the genocide.133 
The main reason for this decision was that some Member States felt they had no core 
national interests at stake in Rwanda. Nor did states believe they had any obligation under 
international law to respond. The reluctance of some Member States, in particular, the United 
States and the United Kingdom, to send a stronger UNAMIR force created the impression that 
nothing could be done effectively. This unwillingness of states to react with military force in 
Rwanda is a clear indication that international law imposes no such obligation. Despite massive 
atrocities in Rwanda, neither the Security Council nor individual states seemed interested in 
using force for humanitarian purposes. 
Much criticism was levied at the exceedingly slow and tardy actions of the international 
community in Rwanda. Wheeler argued that “the point is not that lives were saved, but that more 
lives could have been saved had France selected military means that were appropriate to its 
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humanitarian claims.”134 However, referring to controversies concerning humanitarian 
intervention during the Cold War, Finnemore stated that “no significant constituency was 
claiming that intervention in Rwanda for humanitarian purposes would have been illegitimate or 
an illegal breach of sovereignty.”135 Finnemore emphasized that Rwanda caused a shift in the 
burden to act.136 According to Finnemore, after Rwanda, the international community understood 
that it had not just a right to intervene, but a duty to intervene.137 However, there was no 
obligation for states to intervene and, thus, no legal duty existed to intervene, only a moral duty. 
The Rwandan crisis never tested the question whether states have a right under international law 
to use force for humanitarian reasons without Security Council authorization.  
Following the end of the main killings in 1994, UNAMIR was faced with many 
challenges to rebuild Rwanda, maintain a fragile peace, stabilize the government, and most 
importantly, care for displaced persons in camps within Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, and 
Uganda.138 The large camps around Lake Kivu in the north-west of Rwanda were holding 
hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians, as well as creating enormous security, health, and 
ecological problems.139 Following the genocide in Rwanda, the entire UN system was prepared 
to help stabilize the situation. The UN took a number of efforts to protect human rights and 
rebuild Rwanda's judicial system. The UN undertook refugee-oriented humanitarian assistance 
programs and the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda began to 
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prosecute alleged perpetrators of the genocide.140 The UN also entrusted that its peacekeepers 
worked to deliver security, mine clearance, refugees settlement and infrastructure rebuilding.141 
However, when the new Rwandan government declared that UNAMIR had failed in its mission, 
the Security Council withdrew UNAMIR’s mandate on March 8, 1996.142  
Given the UN and international community’s failure to respond to the Rwandan crisis in 
a timely and adequate manner, Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that, although both human 
rights and sovereignty should always enjoy support, in places where crimes against humanity 
occur no legal principle should ever serve as a shield.143 However, he added, when all peaceful 
measures were exhausted, the Security Council had a duty to act to protect civilians from mass 
atrocities.144 The UN appointed an Independent Inquiry to assess the UN’s role in the Rwandan 
crisis and found that the UN had failed to protect the Rwandans from genocide.145 It noted that 
the lack of capacity, including resources for the UN peacekeepers, to face these challenges, as 
well as an inadequate mandate for UNAMIR, were primary reasons for the failure.146 The UN 
and other international actors failed to recognize and respond to early warning signs. Therefore, 
the failure of the international community to respond effectively to the Rwandan crisis became a 
normative assertion about the moral responsibility of the international community to protect 
civilian populations. However, this moral duty neither justifies humanitarian intervention nor 
imposes any legal obligation on states to act. Therefore, such a moral duty does not change 
international law on responding to humanitarian crises.  
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2.4.2 Kosovo 
The UN and the international community were criticized for their collective failure to 
take timely and adequate actions to stop mass killings in Rwanda. The international community 
was then criticized for the use of unauthorized, excessive force in Kosovo. In the 1990s, in 
particular, after the international community’s failure in Rwanda, a general acceptance emerged 
among some UN Member States regarding a “right to intervene” in order to protect civilian 
populations from mass atrocities. However, this right was not controversial if the Security 
Council authorized intervention, and whether the right existed outside Security Council 
authorization remained controversial.  Some Member States on the Security Council accepted the 
idea that they had a responsibility to protect human rights.147 However, the international 
community realized the perilous nature of this right to intervene when they faced the crisis in 
Kosovo. The unauthorized NATO intervention in Kosovo heightened the discussion on the right 
to humanitarian intervention and led the international community to commence a review process 
which, in turn, led to the creation of the R2P principle.  
The Kosovo conflict lasted from 1998 until 1999. It was fought by the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia forces, the Kosovo Albanian rebel group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), and NATO.148 After its formation, the KLA began its first campaign in 1995 by 
attacking Serbian law enforcement in Kosovo. In June 1996, the KLA accepted responsibility for 
targeting the Kosovo police.149 The KLA continued its attack against Kosovo law enforcement 
                                                          
147 Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders, 12 OXFORD HUM. RTS. L. REV. 2 (Jan. 24, 2012). 
148 Anup Shah, The Kosovo Crisis, GLOBAL ISSUES (Jan. 21, 2001), http://www.globalissues.org/article/126/the-
kosovo-crisis. 
149 Kosovo War, DEP’T. OF IOWA VFW, http://www.vfwiowa.org/Kosovo-War.asp (last visited July 25, 2014).  
63 
 
personnel. In 1998, attacks targeting Yugoslav authorities in Kosovo resulted in the increased 
presence of Serb paramilitaries and regular forces.150  
As the conflict intensified, the international community tried to take some preventive 
efforts to stop mass atrocities. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1160 on March 31, 
1998, imposing an arms embargo and economic sanctions on Kosovo.151 The Member States 
also reached a broad agreement that the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to international 
peace and security. However, China abstained on the resolution, stating that the Kosovo crisis 
should be treated as an internal matter and that the international community should not 
intervene.152 The Security Council then adopted Resolution 1199 on September 23, 1998, and 
called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.153 Under Resolution 1199, 
which was voted on under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council emphasized the 
deteriorating situation in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security.154 The resolution 
demanded that the Milosevic regime and Kosovo Albanians cease hostilities in order to avert a 
humanitarian catastrophe.155  
The United States extended its full support to this resolution.156 However, Russia and 
China were reluctant to vote for Resolution 1199.157 Russia was categorically against the use of 
force by NATO to stop the atrocities against the Kosovo Albanians. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian 
Ambassador to the UN, stated that the Security Council should not authorize military force or 
sanctions, which would destabilize the Balkans region and which would also result in long-term 
                                                          
150 Id.  
151 S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998). 
152 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes Arms Embargo on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Pending Action to Resolve Kosovo Crisis, U.N. Release SC/6496 (Mar. 31, 1998).  
153 S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998). 
154 Id. 
155 Id.   
156 U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3930 (Sept. 23, 1998).  
157 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands All Parties End Hostilities and Maintain a Ceasefire 
in Kosovo, U.N. Release SC/6577 (Sept. 23, 1998). 
64 
 
adverse consequences throughout Europe.158 China did not believe that the situation in Kosovo 
was a threat to international peace and security. The Chinese Ambassador argued that Resolution 
1199 would adversely affect the possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.159 
Speaking later at the UN General Assembly, Chinese Ambassador Qin Hu Asun condemned the 
NATO air campaign, stating it “amounts to a blatant violation of the UN Charter and of the 
accepted norms of international law.”160  
By end of March 1999, Yugoslav government forces began a campaign of retribution 
targeting KLA sympathizers as well as political opponents in a drive which left thousands of 
combatants and civilians dead and produced hundreds of thousands of refugees.161 After the 
failure of attempted diplomatic solutions, some states felt the need to react with more serious 
measures. NATO intervened and claimed Kosovo was a humanitarian war.162 However, 
Yugoslav forces continued to commit atrocities.163 In order to stop the widespread violence, on 
March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, an air campaign that targeted Serb 
military positions and Serb leadership in Belgrade. The NATO-led bombings lasted until June 
11, 1999, when Milosevic agreed to “end all violence in Kosovo, withdraw all Serb forces, and 
submit to an international presence under UN auspices.”164 The war ended with the Kumanovo 
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Treaty as Yugoslav forces agreed to withdraw from Kosovo in order to make way for an 
international presence.165  
Following the NATO bombing of Kosovo, thousands of Albanian refugees returned. 
Therefore, after the NATO intervention, the international community realized the need to rebuild 
Kosovo and, in 1999, by adopting Resolution 1244, the Security Council took measures to 
establish the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Mission was 
mandated to help ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo 
and advance regional stability in the Western Balkans. Among its priorities, the Mission aimed to 
promote security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo and in the region. In 
furtherance of its goals, UNMIK continued its constructive engagement with Pristina and 
Belgrade, other communities in Kosovo, as well as regional and international actors. Under 
UNMIK, the UN Human Settlements Program (UN Habitat) resumed the daunting task of 
rebuilding the municipal governments in the region, establishing who owns which property in the 
process. Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008, and its sovereignty has been 
recognized by more than 100 UN Member States.  
Nevertheless, a report by Amnesty International asserts that the UNMIK failed to rebuild 
Kosovo.166 According to Amnesty International, UNMIK failed to comply with international 
legal standards concerning the right to fair trial.167  Amnesty International reported that 
“hundreds of cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, including rapes and enforced 
disappearances, as well as other inter-ethnic crimes, remain unresolved seven years after the UN 
began its efforts to rebuild the Kosovo judicial system. Hundreds of cases have been closed, for 
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want of evidence that was neither promptly nor effectively gathered. Relatives of missing people 
report that they have been interviewed too many times by international police and prosecutors 
new to their case, yet no progress was ever made.”168  
Clearly, Kosovo raised the issue of humanitarian intervention in the Balkans. The 
bombing campaign against Milosevic and Serbia in support of the Kosovar Albanians was 
carried out without Security Council authorization and remains controversial today.169 Initially, 
the United States and its NATO allies sought a Security Council resolution that specifically 
authorized the use of force. However, this effort proved impossible because of strong opposition 
from both Russia and China.170 Despite this resistance, the United States and its allies were 
determined to undertake collective action through NATO.171 
NATO leaders offered many reasons in support of the alliance’s intervention.172 
Highlighting the importance of preventing genocide, Bill Clinton, President of the United States, 
stated that NATO’s action was a result of the “moral revulsion at the killing in Kosovo and to 
prevent genocide in the heart of Europe.”173 Emphasizing humanitarian considerations as the 
main impulse of the action, French President Jacques Chirac asserted that the action was justified 
due to the horrific humanitarian crisis.174 Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, commended the 
United States’ vision to see the international impact of instability, chaos, and racial genocide in 
Kosovo and emphasized his support for the U.S.-led air campaign against the Milosevic 
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regime.175 German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder maintained a favorable stance with regard to 
NATO’s air strikes and stated that, in reference to UN Resolution 1199, NATO was indeed 
acting within the framework of the United Nations.176 The NATO air campaign was the first time 
that German military forces participated in combat since World War II. 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan agreed that there are times when the use of force may 
be legitimate in the pursuit of peace.177 Traub quotes the Secretary General as saying “when you 
look at the Declaration of Human Rights, the principle behind intervention in Kosovo was quite 
legitimate. The fact that the council couldn’t come together doesn’t make it not legitimate.”178 
According to Bellamy, Secretary General Annan’s view accurately reflected the popular 
sentiment in international society.179  
The question whether NATO could legally use force without UN authorization was 
extensively debated during the crisis in Kosovo. Bellamy stated that, subsequent to NATO’s 
action in Kosovo, there has been growing acceptance of the idea that intervention can be 
legitimate in humanitarian emergencies.180 Rice and Loomis observed that “NATO violated the 
law, but acted in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter.”181 The United States 
characterized atrocities in Kosovo as a humanitarian tragedy and, thus, justified NATO action as 
a moral imperative to end the killing of ethnic Albanian civilians. This moral justification 
however, did not mean it is legally justified. Therefore, a view emerged that, if humanitarian 
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intervention is not possible with the authorization of the Security Council, then military action 
may still be morally justified in order to avoid or end cases of humanitarian disasters.182  
The need to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities has been generally 
recognized by the international community, even before the Rwandan crisis. NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo was also justified by the need to protect civilian populations from mass 
atrocities. Western allies, namely the United States, United Kingdom, and France, supported 
humanitarian intervention to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities. However, China 
and Russia did not accept any type of foreign intervention in sovereign states. Instead, they 
called for the peaceful resolution of crises through political dialogue. Therefore, there was a 
division in the international community between those who supported humanitarian intervention 
and those who opposed it. Ultimately, the international community felt the need to create a new 
concept that represented a significant departure from prior concepts of humanitarian intervention, 
which ultimately led to the inception of the R2P principle.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 The historical development of humanitarian intervention as an issue in international law 
has been dominated by the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. These developments 
demonstrated a difficulty in coexistence between the doctrine of sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention. They more often confronted than partnered. Interventions made during 17th or 19th 
century by larger states against the weaker states for political and religious reasons were justified 
for humanitarian reasons. Nevertheless, these justifications were moral and political rather than 
legal in nature, because if a state can legally use force for any reason, then it can use force for 
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humanitarian purposes without violating any international legal rules. In the 20th century, the 
international community made efforts to restrict the use of force, which reinforced the principles 
of sovereignty and non-intervention against humanitarian intervention. Other developments in 
international law, mainly related to minority rights enshrined in treaties after World War I, 
supported the idea of humanitarian intervention to some extent. Nevertheless, these 
developments were weak and did not counterbalance the convergence of the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention and attempt to restrict the use of force by states.  
 The developments in international law during the 20th century made humanitarian 
intervention a controversial, yet critical, issue that required high-level political attention. The 
controversies and disagreements during the 20th century created by the developments of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law challenged the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention and the rules on the use of force. The principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention were integrated into the UN Charter. International legal rules on the use of 
force were included in the UN Charter and the authority given to the Security Council became a 
central feature of international law. The link between human rights violations and threats to 
international peace and security was widely recognized by the international community, and 
humanitarian intervention authorized by the Security Council did not create much international 
legal controversy. Thus, the authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter is unhindered in situations where internal crises produce humanitarian catastrophes, with 
or without cross-border repercussions.  
However, if intervention was not authorized by the Security Council, its legality under 
international law became more controversial. Nevertheless, the UN Charter’s inclusion of human 
rights norms and the convergence of international humanitarian law and international human 
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rights law provided sufficient justification for elements of the international community to argue 
international law permitted humanitarian intervention to protect civilian populations from mass 
atrocities. However, state practice during the Cold War involved reluctance to defend the uses of 
force on the basis of humanitarian intervention.  
 With the political and social changes in post-Cold War period, international human rights 
and international humanitarian law received more attention. The relationships in international 
law between sovereignty and non-intervention, the prohibition on the use of force, human rights, 
and humanitarian law became more unstable. These circumstances formed the source of the 
controversies in the 1990’s, especially the crises in Rwanda and Kosovo. The international 
community did not violate international law on the use of force in Rwanda, nevertheless it was 
considered a massive failure of the legitimacy of the actions of the international community. In 
other words, its actions were legal but illegitimate. By contrast, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 
without Security Council authorization was considered illegal, but was otherwise viewed as 
legitimate action to stop mass atrocities. In other words, the intention was widely believed to be 
illegal but legitimate. Given this situation, and with the increased unrest around the world, there 
was a great desire to move international law on humanitarian intervention to where such 
intervention is both legal and legitimate. As the next chapter analyzes, the R2P principle 
emerged to address this challenge.  
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             CHAPTER 3  
THE EVOLUTION OF THE R2P PRINCIPLE:  
THE ICISS REPORT AND THE WORLD SUMMIT OUTCOME DOCUMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The R2P principle arose as an effort to move international law beyond the problems 
associated with humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. As Chapter 2 analyze, there has been a 
longstanding debate about humanitarian intervention in international law and, in particular, 
concerning the right of states to intervene militarily in another state, without Security Council 
authorization, in order to prevent or stop gross violations of fundamental human rights and 
international humanitarian law. What underlies the debate is an apparent tension among the values 
of ensuring respect for fundamental human rights, respect for the norms of sovereignty and non-
intervention, and the prohibition on the use of force by states.  
Since its inception in 2001, substantial attention has been paid to the R2P principle, both 
within and outside the UN. As a direct result of the UN Secretary General’s reports and other 
debates analyzed in this chapter, the UN has made a significant effort to make the R2P principle a 
guiding force. Nevertheless, the R2P principle continues to be controversial and is plagued by 
disagreements. There has been a lack of consensus among UN Member States on the R2P 
principle. Also, the scope and substantive aspects of R2P have not been made clear. One of the 
primary issues encountered by the R2P principle is whether it has altered any of the pre-R2P issues 
concerning humanitarian intervention and international law.  
Therefore, in order to answer questions about the R2P principle, it is important to have a 
better understanding of the events that occurred with its inception. Such an analysis is critical in 
determining whether R2P represents a change in contemporary international law. The Report of 
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the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document provide the context in which the R2P principle was created. Thus, 
this chapter describes the background to the formation of the ICISS, the ICISS report, and the 
World Summit Outcome Document, with an emphasis on how the ICISS report and the World 
Summit Outcome Document articulated the substantive components of the R2P principle.  
 
3.2 The ICISS Report 
As Chapter 2 observed, the international community’s failure to respond adequately during 
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 raised questions about how to protect civilians more effectively 
from mass atrocities in the future.1 With the Rwanda tragedy still fresh, NATO attacked Serbia in 
1999 to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, but it did so without the authorization of the Security 
Council. As Welsh notes, this action re-ignited the controversy about the conditions under which 
states could use force to protect civilians from mass atrocities.2 In the wake of the Rwanda and 
Kosovo controversies, many in the international community began to search for a new consensus 
on the legitimacy of state action, including military intervention, to protect civilians from mass 
atrocities.   
In 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged the international community to 
develop a way to reconcile the two respective principles of maintaining sovereignty and protecting 
fundamental human rights when faced with humanitarian crises.3 Annan followed-up this 
challenge in the 2000 Millennium Summit Report by again asking UN members to look at the 
perceived tension between sovereignty and human rights in humanitarian crises, while keeping in 
mind three issues: (1) how to prevent strong states from using humanitarian intervention as a cover 
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to engage in undue interference in the affairs of weaker states; (2) how to address efforts by rebel 
movements to employ violent tactics in order to try to attract outside intervention into a conflict; 
and (3) how the international community avoids selectively applying the principle of humanitarian 
intervention.4 
 
3.2.1 Introduction to the ICISS Report 
In response to Annan’s challenge, Canada formed the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000. In its 2001 report entitled The Responsibility 
to Protect, the ICISS developed the R2P principle.5 The ICISS tried to distinguish the R2P 
principle from prior international law on humanitarian intervention in several ways. Primarily, the 
report emphasized that the R2P principle approaches intervention from a fundamentally different 
perspective than prior concepts of humanitarian intervention. According to the ICISS, the 
distinctive feature is that the R2P principle addresses the problems associated with humanitarian 
intervention from the perspective of the people who suffer from mass atrocities rather than the 
states that want to intervene.6  
Second, the ICISS report introduced a concept of responsibility with a view to remedy the 
controversy between intervention and sovereignty. Under this notion, responsibility is shared by 
the state and the international community. The ICISS recognized that the main responsibility to 
protect human lives resides with the state whose people are directly affected by conflict or massive 
human rights abuses. The international community can interfere only if the state is unable or 
unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or the state is itself the perpetrator.7  
                                                          
4 U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century: Rep. of the 
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000). 
5 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, REPORT 2001: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
6 Id. ¶ 1.40. 
7 Id. ¶ 2.30. 
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Third, the ICISS expanded the conceptual parameters of the concept of intervention, 
declaring that an effective response to mass atrocities requires not only reaction, but also 
engagement to prevent conflict and rebuild after the event.8 Thus, the R2P principle, as presented 
by the ICISS report, consists of three responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the 
responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.9  
The ICISS report is perceived as innovative in several ways.10 The R2P principle is based 
upon the concept of human security and consequently tries to merge two requirements: the need 
for a broader security perspective and the need for the international community to make 
humanitarian interventions under certain circumstances that warrant measures to protect human 
life and security. It further introduces a change of terminology; rather than the highly controversial 
“right to humanitarian intervention,” the ICISS report uses “responsibility to protect.”  
According to the ICISS report, the R2P principle comprehends an integrated approach 
where prevention and rebuilding are included. Thus, the R2P principle, as proposed by the ICISS 
report, strongly emphasizes three responsibilities and not just the military aspects of humanitarian 
intervention. The ICISS report presented the responsibility to prevent as the single most important 
aspect of the R2P principle, directed at addressing the direct causes of a conflict that put human 
security at risk. The responsibility to react consists of a wide gamut of measures, including 
economic, political, and diplomatic tools, with the very last resort being military intervention. The 
responsibility to rebuild focuses on post-conflict recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation 
within a state, and aims at preventing potential recurrences of humanitarian crises. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Id. ¶ 2.29. 
9 Id.  
10 Thomas G. Weiss, Cosmopolitan Force and the Responsibility to Protect, 19 INT’L REL. 234 (2005). 
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3.2.2 Responsibility to Prevent 
Of the three responsibilities, the ICISS report identifies the responsibility to prevent as the 
most important, stating that “prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is 
contemplated and resources must be devoted to it.”11 The ICISS report points out that “state 
sovereignty implies responsibility,” and the primary responsibility to protect its population lies 
with each individual state.12 The internal responsibility of a state to protect refers to “the safety and 
lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare.”13 More specifically, the ICISS report indicates 
that “internal war, insurgency, repression, and state failure” are examples of instances where a 
population may suffer serious harm.14 Further, the ICISS report presented the responsibility to 
prevent as the focus point on the direct causes of a conflict that put human security at risk.  
Prevention is considered more inexpensive than reaction and rebuilding. As Bellamy points 
out, it may be motivated by a wish to move guiding principles away from focusing mostly on 
intervention to a more preventive, morally responsible perspective.15 The Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has defined 
the importance of conflict prevention as “actions undertaken to reduce tensions and to prevent the 
outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. Beyond short term actions, it includes the notion of 
long-term engagement.”16 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan published a report on the Prevention 
of Armed Conflict in June 2001.17 There, Annan called on the international community to move 
                                                          
11 ICISS, supra note 5. 
12 Id. ¶ 2.29. 
13 Id. at xi.  
14 Id. 
15 BELLAMY, supra note 3, at 98.  
16 Guidance on Evaluating Peace Building Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility – Improving Learning for 
Results, Development Co-operation Directorate Development Assistance Committee, 56 DCD/DAC/40/FINAL 10 
(Oct. 12, 2012). 
17 U.N. Secretary General, Prevention of Armed Conflict:  Rep. of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/55/985–
S/2001/574 (June 7, 2001). 
  
76 
 
“from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention,” a call that was advanced by the ICISS.18 
Annan further stated that “both short-term and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, 
human rights, developmental and institutional measures should be employed in a comprehensive 
prevention strategy.”19 His report elaborated on how the UN system could offer assistance to 
states. The report stressed that preventive action, in order to be most effective, should be initiated 
at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle.20 One of the principal aims of preventive action 
should be to address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional, and 
other structural causes that often underlie political conflicts.21 
As stated in the ICISS report, for prevention to be effective, there has to be knowledge of 
the fragility of the situation.22 Under the ICISS report, the first element of the responsibility to 
prevent is developing more robust early-warning systems. The ICISS stressed that the UN should 
implement the recommendations of the Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace 
Operations, which called for a more effective collection and assessment at UN headquarters and 
the establishment of an early-warning capacity within the UN Secretariat.23 Further, ICISS 
highlighted the need of greater regional involvement in early warning efforts.24  
The ICISS report also included measures to address both the root causes and direct causes 
of internal conflicts and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.25 A distinction was 
drawn between “root cause prevention efforts” and “direct prevention efforts.”26 While direct 
measures were to deal with the immediate causes of a conflict in order to avoid parties resorting to 
                                                          
18 Id. ¶ 4; ICISS, supra note 5, ¶ 3.42. 
19 U.N. Doc. A/55/985–S/2001/574, supra note 17, ¶ 169. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 ICISS, supra note 5, ¶ 3.9.  
23 U.N. Secretary General, Identical Letters Dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the General Assembly & the President of the Security Council on the Rep. of the Panel of U.N. Peace 
Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000). 
24 ICISS, supra note 5, ¶ 3.17. 
25 Id. at xi.  
26 Id. ¶¶ 3.18-3.24.  
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more coercive measures, the root cause measures are aimed at addressing the underlying causes of 
deadly conflict.27  
However, the ICISS report did not distinguish between conflict prevention and mass 
atrocity prevention. Throughout the ICISS report, the commission discussed conflict prevention 
rather than genocide or mass atrocity prevention. The arguments are seemingly based on the 
supposition that mass atrocities can be averted by preventing conflicts. In certain aspects, the 
ICISS report indicated even broader conceptions of what should be prevented, such as “man-made 
crises” and “human security-threatening situations.”28 According to Bellamy, the ICISS’s wide 
scope of prevention constitutes a major problem, and much conceptual work remains to be done on 
prevention in the context of R2P.29 However, Evans does not see the need for this kind of 
theoretical work. Rather, he sees the prevention of mass atrocity crimes as an extension of 
effective conflict prevention.30 In his opinion, effective prevention starts with identifying situations 
that have the potential to generate mass atrocity crimes. Since so many of these crimes occur 
during war, it is important to focus on the potential for conflict in general, and to then prevent the 
outbreak, continuation, or recurrence of conflict.31  
The ICISS report stated that the prevention of deadly conflict and other forms of man-made 
catastrophe is, as with all other aspects of the R2P principle, first and foremost the responsibility of 
sovereign states, including the communities and institutions within them.32 This internal 
responsibility of the individual states to prevent mass atrocities is deeply entrenched in existing 
international law. Under international human rights law, states have a duty to protect individuals 
from human rights violations. These duties are defined in various international treaties in different 
                                                          
27 Id. ¶¶ 3.18-3.43. 
28 Id. ¶ 2.32. 
29 BELLAMY, supra note 3, at 102. 
30 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 81 (2002). 
31 Id.  
32 ICISS, supra note 5, ¶ 3.2. 
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contexts.  These obligations of an individual state are clearly stated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).33 As Milanovi points 
out, the responsibility of a state to protect its own populations from mass atrocities is derived from 
a state’s responsibilities under human rights, humanitarian law, and international criminal law, 
both through treaty and customary law.34 Some of these norms have acquired jus cogens or 
peremptory status, such as the prohibition on torture, which is an act that could constitute both a 
war crime and a crime against humanity. Arguably, some of these responsibilities are owed to the 
international community as a whole, as erga omnes obligations. For example, the prohibitions on 
genocide and torture are considered erga omnes obligations.35 Therefore, an individual state’s 
responsibility to prevent human rights violations within the state represents a long-standing and 
continuing obligation in international law.  
Further, according to the ICISS report, conflict prevention is not merely a national or local 
issue, but involves an international responsibility of states to assist other states in their conflict 
prevention efforts.36 The responsibility of the international community to help prevent human 
rights violations in another state is clearly specified under international law.37 In fact, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide includes the international 
community’s undertaking to prevent occurrences of genocide.38 Therefore, the concept of the 
                                                          
33 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/2200 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.S. GAOR, 21st Sess. ¶ 2, UN Doc. A/6316 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
34 Marko Milanovi, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 684 (2007). 
35 CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATION ERGA OMNES 267 (1997).  
36 ICISS, supra note 5, ¶ 3.3. 
37 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/39/46.  
38 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 (III) 
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international community’s responsibility to help prevent human rights violations in another state 
already existed and is not a new idea created by the ICISS.   
Although the ICISS report emphasized the importance of international assistance in 
implementing the responsibility to prevent, this responsibility does not create a right of another 
state to receive such assistance. Failure to extend assistance does not produce any violation or 
sanction. Therefore, the ICISS report did not specifically create or propose any new right or 
obligation under international law for states in the international community.  
Further, the ICISS report identified the vital role of the UN in conflict prevention.39 In 
Chapter IV of the UN Charter, Member States confer primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security on the Security Council.40 Arguably, the UN Charter places the 
responsibility to prevent threats to international peace and security squarely on the shoulders of the 
Security Council. However, both the UN Charter and the ICISS report do not prohibit individual 
states taking preventive actions without Security Council authorization, in particular peaceful 
actions.  
Additionally, the ICISS report did not clearly specify the scope of the responsibility to 
prevent. There is a lack of clarity when the responsibility to prevent should be invoked or what 
specific actions states should take in exercising this responsibility. The report did not specify who, 
precisely, bears the international responsibility to prevent. Moreover, the international processes in 
which decisions are made to invoke the international community’s responsibility to prevent, or 
how to implement and monitor the responsibility to prevent with consistency, are also not clearly 
indicated in the ICISS report.   
                                                          
39 ICISS, supra note 5, ¶ 3.5. 
40  U.N. Charter art. 24. para 1. 
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Many commentators have criticized the ICISS report’s discussion on the responsibility to 
prevent for failing to identify a clear agenda for preventing mass violence against civilians.41 
Weiss and Hubert, for example, argued that it is preposterous to set prevention as the single most 
important priority.42 They state that “most of the stammering about prevention and rebuilding is a 
superficially attractive but highly unrealistic way to try and pretend that we can finesse the hard 
issue of what essentially amounts to humanitarian intervention.”43 For Weiss and Hubert, the 
prevention and rebuilding duties are the worst threats to the R2P’s conceptual clarity.44  Bellamy 
argued that, despite stressing the critical importance of conflict prevention, the ICISS did not make 
concrete proposals other than the call to centralize the world’s conflict prevention efforts and to 
develop a greater capacity in relation to early warning.45 The ICISS, Bellamy continued, avoided 
an explicit discussion of the single most pressing dilemma in relation to the responsibility to 
prevent, which is the question of how to translate early warning signs into a commitment to act and 
a consensus on how to act.46 Further, although the responsibility to prevent has generated these 
conceptual and practical questions, it has received nowhere near the attention that has been focused 
on the responsibility to react. 
 
3.2.3 Responsibility to React 
The ICISS report formulated the responsibility to react as follows: where a population 
suffers serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the 
state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to 
                                                          
41 Serena K. Sharma, Toward a Global Responsibility to Protect: Setbacks on the Path to Implementation, 16 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 121,138 (2010).  
42 THOMAS WEISS & DON HUBERT, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND 367 
(2001). 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 BELLAMY, supra note 3, at 54. 
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the international responsibility to react.47 The responsibility to react consists of a wide variety of 
measures, including economic, political, and diplomatic tools. The very last measure under the 
responsibility to react would be military intervention.  
The responsibility to react is the most controversial aspect of the R2P principle. The ICISS 
stressed the importance of identifying and utilizing measures short of military action. It stated that, 
wherever possible, coercive measures short of military intervention ought to be examined first, 
including various types of political, economic and military sanctions.48  The decision to intervene 
by military means to protect people, when a state is unable or unwilling to discharge its primary 
responsibility, should be limited to extreme cases that genuinely “shock the conscience of 
mankind,” or situations that present such an obvious and imminent danger to international security 
that they call for coercive military intervention.49 The bottom line is that coercive measures should 
be conducted only when all non-military actions have been exercised.50  
In order to identify cases that require coercive measures, the ICISS proposed criteria that 
must be fulfilled before a decision to intervene with military force is taken.51 By introducing these 
threshold criteria, the ICISS intended to differentiate the responsibility to react from pre-R2P 
humanitarian intervention concepts. These six precautionary principles are: 
(a) Just Cause: the action must be taken in response to actual or intended large scale loss of 
life or large scale ethnic cleansing;  
(b) Right Authority: the authority to take action must be legitimate;  
(c) Right Intention: the primary purpose of taking action must be to halt or avert human 
suffering;  
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(d) Last Resort: all other prevention and peaceful means to resolve the crisis must be 
exhausted; 
(e) Proportional Means: the scale, duration, and intensity of the military intervention must 
be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question; and 
(f) Reasonable Prospects: military intervention must be able to achieve the intended 
results.52 
With these threshold criteria on the use of force, the ICISS intended to change the general 
approach of the responsibility to react towards a more holistic, victim-focused approach. However, 
although the responsibility to react aimed to protect the civilian population from mass atrocities, 
the six criteria focus on the intervener not the victims.  
In addition, none of these criteria, stipulated in the ICISS report, are new to the use of 
military force. For example, the Indian epic called “Mahabharata” offers one of first written 
discussions of criteria of proportionality, just means, just cause, and fair treatment of captives and 
the wounded.53 Further, it has been suggested that the ICISS report’s criteria are a reformulation of 
the concept of Just War introduced by Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, and, as Chapter 2 
described, used by Grotius.54 According to Bugnion, the Just War components of jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello limit the use of force by a state or the international community in cases where a 
violation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity occur.55 As Robinson notes, the jus in bello 
includes criteria of proportional means and non-discrimination, while jus ad bellum includes 
                                                          
52 Id. ¶ 8.28. 
53 Application of Theories of Just War to India and Pakistan, SAISAONLINE.ORG (Nov. 30, 2012) 
http://saisaonline.org/analysis/application-of-theories-of-just-war-to-india-and-pakistan/. 
54 Mona Fixdal & Dan Smith, Humanitarian Intervention and Just War, 42 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 292-294 
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criteria of just cause and right intention.56 Therefore, the six criteria stipulated by the ICISS report 
are not new concepts to international law applicable to the use of military force.57  
Another issue regarding the responsibility to react includes uncertainty about its scope. The 
ICISS report did not specify when the responsibility to react should be invoked under the R2P 
principle. The means of measuring imminent danger within a country are unclear. While the 
international community may perceive a situation as imminent, local authorities may grasp it 
differently. Further, the ICISS report provided no clear guideline as to when the international 
community should end actions taken under the responsibility to react.  
Further, it is not clear who bears the responsibility to carry-out military intervention under 
the R2P principle. The ICISS spoke of an international responsibility to react.58 While the 
international community as a whole is responsible, the question of which international actor, 
whether regional organizations and individual states, bears the responsibility to react in the final 
analysis remains uncertain. However, the ICISS report did not indicate any consequences for the 
failure to carry-out such a duty. Therefore, the responsibility to react component of R2P in the 
ICISS report did not propose or create a new obligation under international law.  
The ICISS report specifically acknowledged that the Security Council is the appropriate 
body to authorize military interventions under the responsibility to react.59 The ICISS did not 
entrust the power to authorize military intervention to any entity other than the Security Council. 
Nevertheless, if the Security Council fails to deal with a humanitarian crisis within a reasonable 
time, the ICISS report proposed alternative options.60 For example, the matter could, in such 
situations, be considered in the General Assembly under a “Uniting for Peace” procedure. Or, if 
                                                          
56 PAUL F. ROBINSON, JUST WAR IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 59, 118 (2003). 
57 Stephen P. Marks & Nicholas Cooper, The Responsibility to Protect: Watershed or Old Wine in a New Bottle? 2 
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that fails, a regional organization may consider reacting to a potential crisis, subject to that 
organization seeking Security Council authorization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.61  
Furthermore, the ICISS report warned that, if the Security Council fails to discharge its 
responsibility to protect populations in “conscience-shocking situations crying out for action,” the 
Security Council should take into account that it is unrealistic to expect concerned states to rule out 
other means or forms of action to meet the humanitarian emergency.62 Thus, ICISS report left open 
the possibility of unilateral action in such circumstances:  
[I]f the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention where humanitarian 
or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or the Council fails to deal with such a 
proposal within a reasonable time, it is difficult to argue that alternative means of 
discharging the responsibility to protect can be entirely discounted.63 
Therefore, although the possibility of a coalition of states willing to take action under the R2P 
principle is not exactly recommended, the ICISS did not explicitly rule it out in situations where 
the Security Council fails to act.64 
For a political theorist like Pattison, this vagueness in the ICISS report is highly 
unsatisfactory. According to Pattison, exactly who, whether the Security Council or any other 
actor, should authorize military intervention is not clear. 65 As Pattison notes, though the ICISS 
report largely succeeded in changing the nature of the debate on humanitarian intervention, its 
appeal to the international community was a very general one.66 Beyond claiming that the Security 
Council should ideally authorize any forceful action to relieve mass humanitarian suffering, the 
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report does not clarify which particular agent bears the responsibilities associated with R2P. If the 
word ''responsibility'' is going to be used, then responsibility must rest somewhere and must mean 
something.67 Pattison identifies the morally important qualities of potential interveners.68 He takes 
up the challenge of assigning the international responsibility to protect, but does not offer a 
sustained treatment of the questions that have preoccupied most normative theorists on 
humanitarian intervention. In identifying who should intervene, Pattison privileges those agents 
who currently have the capacity to deliver humanitarian outcomes through military action. 
Tan frames this problem with R2P as an “imperfect duty,” or one which has not been 
assigned to any specific agent.69 As Tan points out, there is a lack of clarity in identifying a 
responsible agent, not even in an informal way, such as the widely accepted norm of “the most 
legitimate intervener to act,” which leaves room for other actors to join when necessary.70 Tan 
asserts that states have positive obligations to protect populations from mass atrocities within 
another state's jurisdiction, but the law remains unclear as to which states have that obligation and 
under what precise circumstances.71 
Another critical matter is the lack of clear guidance on implementing the responsibility to 
react. The five permanent members of the Security Council have divergent geopolitical interests 
and ideologies. Where some permanent members see a need for intervention, others might exercise 
their veto as they have different interests at stake, disagree about the need for military intervention, 
or worry that military intervention will turn into “regime change.” To address this problem, the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, proposed the concept of the “responsibility 
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not to veto” (RN2V), during the preliminary discussions of the R2P principle.72  Védrine first 
proposed a new “code of conduct” for the five permanent members in the context of the R2P 
principle. The concept of RN2V proposes that the five permanent members of the Security Council 
agree not to use their veto power to block action in response to genocide and mass atrocities which 
would otherwise pass by a majority. The ICISS supported the idea that a permanent member of the 
Security Council should not exercise its veto where: (1) there is majority support on the Security 
Council for intervention; (2) genocide or a mass atrocity has occurred; and (3) a permanent 
member does not have “vital security interests” at stake.73 However, RN2V would not be adopted 
as a formal procedural rule, but as an informal rule that would prevent interventions from being 
unjustifiably blocked.74 The responsibility element of the concept implies that, when gross human 
rights abuses are occurring, the five permanent members of the Security Council ought not use the 
veto for only narrow political calculation.  
Therefore, although the ICISS report identified six criteria to be followed in the use of 
force, it did not create any new right to intervene. Similar criteria concerning the use of force were 
already in place during pre-R2P humanitarian intervention. Also, the ICISS report did not create a 
new obligation to use force to protect populations from mass atrocities. While the ICISS report did 
not expressly include any such positive duty, it also did not identify penalties for failure to act on 
any affirmative duty. Moreover, the scope of the responsibility to react remains unclear. As 
presented by the ICISS, the R2P principle did not bridge the long-standing divide among states on 
the use of force. However, although the responsibility to react does not legalize the use of force for 
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humanitarian ends, the ICISS report left open the possibility of unilateral action if the Security 
Council failed to make a decision on use of force.  
 
3.2.4 Responsibility to Rebuild 
The “responsibility to rebuild” is an important part of the R2P principle because it requires 
intervening actors to establish a clear and effective post-intervention strategy.75 The ICISS report 
pointed to the responsibility to rebuild as an inherent and indispensable component of R2P that 
ranges from prevention to reaction, and from reaction to rebuilding, all of which aim at preventing 
future mass atrocities. According to the ICISS report, essential recovery, reconstruction, and 
reconciliation assistance should be provided after a military intervention. Such assistance should 
address the causes of the specific harm that the intervention was designed to halt or avert.76 This 
objective requires obtaining sufficient funds and resources for peace-building, as well as close 
cooperation with local people.  
The ICISS report established three interlinked post-intervention responsibilities for 
intervening parties. First, the intervention force should provide basic security and protection for all 
members of the state in which the intervention takes place. This duty also means that, after the 
initial objectives of an intervention are met, the intervening military forces are obliged to prevent 
revenge killings and even “reverse ethnic cleansing.”77 This task must include disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, and rebuilding of new national armed forces and police, with the 
integration, as far as possible, of elements of formerly competing armed factions.78 
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The second responsibility pertains to achieving justice and reconciliation between the 
parties to the conflict. As the ICISS report pointed out, making transitional arrangements for 
justice during an operation and also restoring a properly functioning judicial system, including 
both the courts and police, is of critical importance.79 Justice and reconciliation must be integrated 
into the peace-building strategy, pending the re-establishment of local institutions.80 There should 
be proper mechanisms to assist the return of refugees and this requires the adoption of 
nondiscriminatory property laws and ending discriminatory policies. The question of establishing 
social and political sustainability must also be addressed. In accordance with the R2P principle, 
“external support for reconciliation efforts should be conscious of the need to encourage this 
cooperation, and dynamically linked to joint development efforts between former adversaries.”81 
The final peace-building responsibility relates to encouraging economic growth and 
sustainable development. It stipulates that intervening parties end any coercive economic measures 
they may have applied to the country before or during the intervention and not prolong punitive 
sanctions.82 They must transfer development responsibility and project implementation to local 
leadership and local actors as soon as possible. The peace-building responsibility must also 
facilitate development work in conjunction with security efforts.83   
The ICISS report defined the responsibility to rebuild as a “post-intervention” 
responsibility to provide, particularly after a “military intervention,” full assistance with recovery, 
reconstruction, and reconciliation, all of which addresses the causes of the harm the intervention 
was designed to halt or avert.84 The ICISS report highlighted the importance of a post-intervention 
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strategy in order for a military intervention to be contemplated.85 As Schnabel notes, the rebuilding 
activities have to take place after prevention efforts have failed and reaction has started to take 
place.86 Therefore, according to the ICISS report, rebuilding efforts need to follow-up any military 
intervention. However, even before any military intervention has taken place, the international 
community can take steps to rebuild and facilitate peace-building efforts in a state. Thus, it is not 
clear whether rebuilding or peace-building efforts should be taken before or after military 
intervention.  
Further, the ICISS report remained vague in terms of the specific objectives and target 
goals relating to post-conflict rebuilding commitments. The report stated that “ensuring sustainable 
reconstruction and rehabilitation will involve the commitment of sufficient funds, resources and 
close cooperation with local people, and may mean staying in the country for some period of time 
after the initial purposes of the intervention have been accomplished.”87 However, it does not 
define what precise actions should be taken in order to achieve these rebuilding goals.  
Moreover, the ICISS report did not specify who should decide to undertake rebuilding 
efforts, where decisions happen, or how such decisions are being made. The report suggested that 
activities dedicated to rebuilding a society after a humanitarian catastrophe need to be both 
achieved and sustained by the local actors themselves.88 But the question is: who decides when a 
society is supposedly able to take responsibility for their future?  
Additionally, the ICISS report did not identify or propose any legally binding obligation for 
states to support rebuilding efforts. The report recognized the international community’s poor 
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reaction towards rebuilding and stated that “too often in the past the responsibility to rebuild has 
been insufficiently recognized, the exit of the interveners has been poorly managed, the 
commitment to help with reconstruction has been inadequate, and countries have found themselves 
at the end of the day still wrestling with the underlying problems that produced the original 
intervention action.”89  
 Furthermore, the ICISS report itself seemed to doubt whether a truly effective and 
sustainable post-conflict rebuilding effort is viable. The report stated that:  
[T]here is always likely in the UN to be a generalized resistance to any resurrection of the 
“trusteeship” concept, on the ground that it represents just another kind of intrusion into 
internal affairs. But “failed states” are quite likely to generate situations which the 
international community simply cannot ignore, as happened - although there the 
intervention was less than successful - in Somalia. The strongest argument against the 
proposal is probably practical: the cost of such an operation for the necessarily long time it 
would take to recreate civil society and rehabilitate the infrastructure in such a state.90  
The report further stated that genuine concern exists about the willingness of governments to 
provide those kinds of resources, other than on a very infrequent and ad hoc basis.91  
This problem clarifies the generally weak interest that intervening nations have towards 
post-conflict rebuilding efforts. The ICISS report itself acknowledged that the R2P principle 
cannot guarantee the successful and continuous implementation of post-conflict rebuilding.92 
Therefore, the ICISS report was itself uncertain about its proposal on the responsibility to rebuild. 
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It insisted on the importance of engaging in rebuilding efforts while, at the same time, expressing 
uncertainties about the responsibility of, and the continued support from, the international 
community.  
3.2.5 Summary on the ICISS  Report 
The ICISS attempted to develop a political consensus on the questions surrounding 
humanitarian intervention. By reformulating the humanitarian intervention problem in terms of 
R2P, the ICISS report gained considerable international attention and made R2P part of 
international political and legal rhetoric. It packaged three responsibilities - prevent, react, and 
rebuild - within one principle. However, when analyzing the ICISS report, the relationship 
between the R2P principle and humanitarian intervention involves more overlap than separation. 
The ICISS report itself reflected the problems associated with the pre-R2P humanitarian 
intervention. This similarity, in turn, cast doubts whether the R2P principle represented a 
conceptual change from pre-exiting international law. 
Most importantly, the continuum of prevention, reaction, and rebuilding responsibilities 
suffers from uncertainties in the scope of each responsibility. The report did not specify when to 
invoke the responsibility to prevent, react, or rebuild. Although mass atrocities are claimed to be 
the trigger to invoke these responsibilities, the level of mass atrocities is not clear. Also, the report 
did not specify what actions states must take in exercising the responsibilities to prevent, react, and 
rebuild. The ICISS report did not indicate how R2P works procedurally across the responsibilities 
to prevent, react, and rebuild. There is no clarity on who takes the decisions, where decisions 
happen, or how decisions are to be made regarding R2P. Further, the ICISS report was silent on 
the implementation of R2P. Interestingly, as Chapter 2 analyzed, pre-R2P humanitarian 
intervention debates in international law suffered from similar uncertainties.  
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In addition, the ICISS report assigned the primary responsibility to protect populations to 
the state, which was a concept already embedded in international law. The ICISS report also 
described the international community’s responsibility to assist individual states to exercise their 
respective responsibility to prevent. However, the ICISS report did not impose any legal penalties 
on the international community for any failure to assist a state to realize its responsibility to 
prevent. Therefore, the ICISS report did not impose any new responsibility on the international 
community. Similarly, the six criteria that should be satisfied under the responsibility to react find 
their roots in pre-R2P humanitarian intervention, Just War, and international legal concepts of jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello.  
Notably, the ICISS report did not strongly argue that military intervention without Security 
Council approval was legal, meaning that the ICISS did not resolve this controversy from the pre-
R2P humanitarian intervention era. Also, the R2P principle, as stipulated by the ICISS report, did 
not advocate for any new right to intervene or any new obligation to react with military force under 
international law.  
The ICISS claimed to have developed a truly global product, yet the report was still 
criticized as being limited to liberal international discourse.93 The incidents that have occurred 
since the inception of the R2P principle in 2001 revealed the international community’s 
uncertainty towards the R2P principle. The manner in which the United States and its allies 
pursued the war on terror after 9/11 and waged war in Iraq starting in 2003 produced hesitation by 
many countries to embrace the R2P principle.94 While the ICISS report has met with much 
approval and praise from many Western and liberal states, Weiss states that, “when the dust from 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon settled, humanitarian intervention became a tertiary 
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issue.”95 Despite its problems, the ICISS report has continued to inform the developing agenda for 
the R2P principle.  
3.3 The World Summit Outcome Document 
In September 2003, the R2P idea was taken-up at the debate on UN reform where Member 
States discussed strengthening the UN through institutional reform and renewing the organization's 
focus on peace, security, human rights, and development.96 The Member States also discussed 
ways of better equipping the UN to handle emerging issues in the 21st century. The report of the 
UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change entitled “A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility,” stated that “there is growing acceptance that sovereign states have the 
primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from catastrophes. However, when they are 
unable or unwilling to do so, the responsibility should be taken up by the wider international 
community. This international community’s responsibility includes prevention of atrocities, 
response to violence, and rebuilding shattered societies.”97 The UN High-level Panel referred to an 
emerging norm of collective responsibility of the international community, which encompassed a 
right to intervene in states experiencing humanitarian catastrophes.98 
In March 2005, the UN Secretary General’s report on “In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All” nurtured the idea that the security of humanity 
and that of states are indivisible and that threats faced by humanity can only be solved through 
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collective action.99 Further, the report referred to the idea of collective responsibility and accepted 
the idea of R2P by stating that R2P should be embraced whenever necessary.100 
The central challenges to the R2P principle, prior to the 2005 UN World Summit, came 
from Russia, China, and the United States. The United States refused to accept a new obligation to 
intervene by the international community. The Ambassador of the United States to the UN, John 
R. Bolton, stated in August 2005 that “the responsibility of the other countries in the international 
community is not of the same character as the responsibility of the host state; that the Security 
Council was not legally obliged to protect endangered civilians; and that the commitment to R2P 
should not preclude the possibility of action absent authorization by the Security Council.”101  
Russia and China had their own reasons for opposing the R2P principle, namely their 
worries that the principle could lead to increased humanitarian intervention by states.102 Both 
countries insisted that all issues relating to military intervention be referred to the Security 
Council, and each of them continued to support a dominant role for the Security Council.103 For 
China, the concept of humanitarian intervention is a myth, and actions of humanitarian 
intervention pose serious problems for international law and international relations.104 Thakur 
noted that the Chinese delegation took the hardest line against intervention and in defense of 
sovereignty.105 Russia contended that the UN already had a criterion to address humanitarian 
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crises, and R2P risked undermining the UN Charter.106 Rice and Loomis, in discussing when it 
was legitimate and appropriate to use force in international affairs, pointed out that conversations 
in small groups of experts, such as the ICISS, cannot be generalized to serve as indicators of 
governmental attitudes.107  
 During the negotiations at the World Summit, European countries supported the R2P 
principle and its appropriate application. European countries emphasized the lack of political will 
and reduced enforcement capacity as two factors that inhibited effective international action.108 
The European Union supported military intervention for humanitarian protection in Africa.109 The 
European Union emphasized its support for humanitarian intervention in cases of genocide and 
ethnic cleansing.110 Norway insisted on international interference when states ignore their 
respective responsibility towards their citizens.111  
Prior to the World Summit, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-
77) articulated strong reservations about R2P. According to Bellamy, India argued that the 
Security Council was already empowered to act in humanitarian emergencies and that the failure to 
act in the past was caused by a lack of political will, not a lack of authority.112 Malaysia’s view 
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was that R2P was identical to humanitarian intervention.113 Jamaica stressed the importance of the 
integrity and the sovereignty of all Member States.114  
 Latin American states were initially hostile towards the R2P principle. Cuba interpreted the 
R2P principle as a “right to intervention crafted by an economic and military dictatorship of a 
super-power seeking to impose its own model of society.”115 According to Thakur, most Latin 
American countries were strongly opposed to R2P, especially as Latin American countries have 
been frequently subjected to various forms of intervention by the United States.116 In expressing 
his resentment towards R2P, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez stated:  
Let’s not allow a handful of countries to try to reinterpret, with impunity, the principles of 
International Law to give way to doctrines like ‘preemptive war’. How do they threaten us 
with preemptive war? And the now so called ‘responsibility to protect,’ but we have to ask 
ourselves who is going to protect us, how are they going to protect us?117  
However, some Latin American countries expressed support for the R2P principle. Peru, for 
example, emphasized the importance of the R2P principle, stating that Member States of the UN 
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must be ready to protect peoples of nations who are unable or unwilling to comply with states’ 
obligations.118  
 African states were reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of other states and even had 
a self-imposed ban on peacekeeping.119 However, the African Union (AU) Charter highlighted 
regional responsibility in the event that a Member State is unwilling or unable to prevent mass 
atrocities. Article 4(h) states, “the Union shall function in accordance with these principles: the 
right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect 
of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”120 Under 
Article 4 of the AU Charter, Bellamy observed, the AU need not defer a matter to the Security 
Council in humanitarian emergencies and, thus, the AU has created an institutional mechanism that 
permits the kind of regional arrangements stipulated by the R2P principle.121 However, the AU has 
been reluctant to undertake or even endorse forceful intervention even where it has been necessary. 
While the leadership of the AU helped to push forward the R2P principle during the 2005 World 
Summit, some African countries expressed reservations and rejected the R2P principle, describing 
it as the same concept as humanitarian intervention and insisting that states should refrain from 
supporting any actions that interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Tanzania was hesitant to 
prioritize mass atrocities above the daily suffering that many Africans endure due to poverty.122 
South Africa was also anxious about the lack of international consensus on core R2P principles.123  
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With all these diverse attitudes, the final version of the World Summit Outcome Document 
was a compromise text that sought to bridge the different positions.124 African states opposed to 
the R2P principle, together with Russia, China, and other Asian states, in particular India, placed 
responsibility to react squarely in the realm of the Security Council.125 The different positions that 
the states adopted prior to the World Summit Outcome Document did not change after its 
adoption. The delegations of Russia and China continued to insist on the importance and 
uniqueness of the Security Council. China, in discussing the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, stated that the Security Council should approach the R2P principle with caution and 
expressed its belief that expanding the R2P principle was inappropriate and would lead to abuse.126 
Therefore, it was clear that before and after the adoption of the World Summit Outcome 
Document, there was no clear and unanimous agreement among UN Member States on the R2P 
principle. 
3.3.1 Introduction to the World Summit Outcome Document 
The R2P principle was embedded in paragraphs 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document.127 Paragraph 138 primarily asserted the individual state’s responsibility to protect its 
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Next, the 
paragraph emphasized that the international community should, as it deems appropriate, encourage 
and help states to exercise their responsibility and support the UN in establishing an early warning 
capability.128  
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Paragraph 139 stated that the international community, through the UN, has the 
responsibility to protect populations by appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.129 This paragraph also asserted 
that the international community is prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, 
on a case-by-case basis, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly 
fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity.130 Moreover, the same paragraph stated that “the UN General Assembly members are 
committed to help states build capacity to protect their populations and to assist those which are 
under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”131 Importantly, paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
World Summit Outcome Document mentioned only the prevention and reaction aspects of the R2P 
principle. It would seem that the World Summit Outcome Document omitted the responsibility to 
rebuild the ICISS report included in the R2P principle. However, paragraphs 97-105 provided the 
framework and mechanism for a Peacebuilding Commission to address rebuilding.132 Therefore, 
the World Summit Outcome Document underscored the three responsibilities: to prevent, to react, 
and to rebuild, as the ICISS report did.133 
  
3.3.2 Responsibility to Prevent 
Similar to the ICISS report, the World Summit Outcome Document emphasized the 
individual state’s primary responsibility to protect its own populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and their incitement.134 Under long-standing 
                                                          
129 Id. ¶ 139. 
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 Id. ¶¶ 97-105. 
133 Id. ¶¶ 138, 139.   
134 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 127, ¶ 138.  
  
100 
 
international law, states have the primary responsibility to prevent atrocities and protect civilians 
from imminent or ongoing atrocities within their respective territories. This consensus reflects 
well-established principles of international law and is not a source of disagreement about the R2P 
principle. This obligation of every state is deeply embedded in existing international law, including 
principles which are considered jus cogens.135 Therefore, the World Summit Outcome Document 
did not identify or propose any new obligation of the host state to protect its own population by 
preventing the four crimes emphasized in the Document.  
Again, similar to the ICISS report, the World Summit Outcome Document spelled out the 
international community’s responsibility to assist a state in fulfilling its responsibility to prevent 
atrocities in its territory.136 The ICISS report indicated that the responsibility of the host state to 
protect its population under the R2P principle shifts to the international community in cases where 
the state is “unable or unwilling” to protect its citizens. However, the World Summit Outcome 
Document limited this responsibility to cases when the host state is “manifestly failing” to protect 
its citizens. The World Summit Outcome Document incorporated a higher threshold before the 
international community could take action.137 The World Summit Outcome Document stated that 
the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
However, similar to the ICISS report, paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document did 
not specify the scope of the international community’s responsibility in assisting a host state. 
When the international community should assist a host state, the specificities of such assistance, 
and who exactly takes the decision and coordinates for the international community, is not clearly 
defined in the World Summit Outcome Document. Paragraph 138 also did not identify or advocate 
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for any new right of a state to receive such assistance from the international community. Failure to 
extend such assistance would not, thus, violate any legal obligation for the international 
community under paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document.  
Further, the World Summit Outcome Document stated that the international community, 
through the UN, assumes responsibility for helping to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The ICISS included the same idea by 
stating that, whenever possible, coercive measures short of military intervention ought to be 
examined first, including various types of political, economic, and military sanctions.138 However, 
under the World Summit Outcome Document, this responsibility is to be exercised through the use 
of appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter.139 Most importantly, by explicitly referring to UN Charter provisions, the 
World Summit Outcome Document intended to follow existing principles of the UN Charter and 
did not attempt to change existing international law. 
  
3.3.3 Responsibility to React 
The World Summit Outcome Document stated that, when a state manifestly fails in its 
protection responsibilities and peaceful means are inadequate, the international community should 
be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use of force authorized by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII.140 Paragraph 139 merely refers to heads of governments’ 
preparedness to take such actions. This approach clearly indicates that the decision to take more 
forceful action has been left to the individual states and is non-mandatory. Paragraphs 138 and 139 
did not describe any legal consequences for failure to take a decision on the use of force. Further, 
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states should be prepared to take actions only on a case-by-case basis through the Security 
Council, making it a non-systematic duty. Thus, the World Summit Outcome Document did not 
recognize or propose new legal rights or obligations concerning use of military force for 
humanitarian intervention.  
The ICISS report specified the need to satisfy the prerequisites of the Just War threshold, 
which includes the six criteria discussed above, before undertaking military intervention in cases 
of “serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur,” 
including “large-scale loss of life” or “large-scale ethnic cleansing.” However, the World Summit 
Outcome Document, taking a narrower approach, restricted these grounds to the more limited 
situations of “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”141  
Although the World Summit Outcome Document granted the decision making choice to 
Member States, similar to the ICISS report, it did not define the scope of collective military 
measures. When exactly the responsibility to react can be invoked, precisely what actions should 
be taken when implementing the reaction measures, who takes the decision, or how decisions are 
taken or, at least, how the reaction measures will be implemented are not addressed in the World 
Summit Outcome Document. Similar ambiguity on the use of force existed in pre-R2P 
humanitarian intervention. Although advocates of the R2P principle tried to differentiate it from 
the earlier humanitarian intervention concept, failure of both the ICISS report and the World 
Summit Outcome Document to address these pressing issues indicates that the R2P principle had 
not broken cleanly away from the problems connected with humanitarian intervention. 
However, in contrast to the ICISS report, the military aspect of the R2P principle in the 
World Summit Outcome Document did not include discussion of criteria. Evans calls this omission 
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is disappointing.142 Yet, the World Summit Outcome Document required the enforcement action 
be in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.143 The World Summit Outcome Document 
placed the responsibility to protect by military means under the Security Council by primarily 
funneling action through it to act under Chapter VII.144 Therefore, only Security Council-
authorized military action was accepted by Member States. This outcome indicates that the World 
Summit Outcome Document was not intended to grant authority to take military action under a 
newly created international legal regime.  
Further, although paragraph 139 included preparedness to take “collective actions,” the 
World Summit Outcome Document omitted any explicit statement on the possibilities of either 
regional organizations or coalitions of the willing engaging in humanitarian interventions by 
military means. The World Summit Outcome Document is silent on the question of what would 
happen if the Security Council fails to act. The World Summit Outcome Document did not 
recognize a new right to intervene in the absence of Security Council authorization, but neither did 
it explicitly prohibit unilateral intervention without such authorization.  
The World Summit Outcome Document urged the General Assembly to continue 
considering the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the UN Charter 
and international law.145 As Stahn noted, this language was inserted in paragraph 139 in deference 
to states that felt R2P was not yet sufficiently clear in conceptual terms and needed further 
consideration in the General Assembly before acceptance and implementation.146 As Stahn 
observed, requesting the General Assembly to further consider R2P, in light of the UN Charter 
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provisions and international law, suggested that the R2P principle, as specified in the World 
Summit Outcome Document, reflected existing international law and was nothing new.  
 
3.3.4 Responsibility to Rebuild 
The World Summit Outcome Document gave less prominence to the responsibility to 
rebuild. It did not include any explicit reference to the responsibility to rebuild in paragraphs 138 
or 139. Instead, the post-intervention responsibility was addressed by proposing a separate 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which would help countries rebuild after conflict.   
The PBC was established in December 2005 by the General Assembly and the Security 
Council acting concurrently.147 Being an intergovernmental body with 31 Member States, the PBC 
seeks to facilitate and provide advice on post-conflict peace building efforts. In order to achieve 
this purpose, it provides short and medium-term engagement between the international community 
and countries that have recently emerged from conflicts. 
The PBC is mandated:  
[T]o bring together all relevant actors to rationalize resources and to advise on and propose 
integrated strategies for post-conflict peace building and recovery; to focus attention on the 
reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to 
support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for 
sustainable development; to provide recommendations and information to improve the 
coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN; to develop best practices; and 
to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period 
of attention given by the international community for post-conflict recovery.148  
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The PBC convened its first session in July 2006, with Burundi and Sierra Leone on the 
Commission’s agenda. The PBC has since expanded its agenda to include the Central African 
Republic (2007), Guinea-Bissau (2008), Liberia (2010), and Guinea (2011). However, in order to 
place a country on the PBC’s agenda, the concerned state government’s consent is required. 
Further, if a government decides that it needs assistance from the PBC, it can request such 
assistance from the UN Secretary General or be referred to the PBC by the Security Council, the 
General Assembly, or the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
In January 2009, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recognized the PBC as an important tool 
under the R2P principle, not only in post-conflict reconciliation and rebuilding efforts, but also as a 
tool of prevention.149 Given the non-controversial nature of the PBC, Member States not only 
supported its efforts, but also welcomed strengthening the PBC. During General Assembly debate 
on R2P in July 2009, several Member States recommended strengthening the PBC as a more 
dynamic step in implementing R2P.150 Benin, Palestine, and many other countries identified the 
PBC as an instrument that implements the responsibility to prevent.151 Uruguay stated that the 
PBC achieved important work in terms of early recovery and assistance to consolidate the state and 
                                                          
149 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
150  G.A. Debate, The Responsibility to Protect and Informal Interactive Dialogue (July 23-28, 2009), 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2493-general-assembly-
debate-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-and-informal-interactive-dialogue-. 
151 Jean-Francis R. Zinsou, Charge d’Affaires of the Republic of Benin to the U.N., Statement at the G.A. Debate on 
the Responsibility to Protect and Informal Interactive Dialogue (July 23, 2009), 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Benin_FR.pdf; Feda Abdelhady Nasser, Charge d’Affaires of the Permanent 
Observer Mission of Palestine to the U.N., Statement at the G.A. Debate on the Responsibility to Protect and Informal 
Interactive Dialogue (July 24, 2009), 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Palestine%20_24%20July%202009_%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect-
GA%20Debate.pdf.  
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promote economic and social development in post-conflict situations.152 Ecuador requested that 
the international community extend its collective support towards the PBC and its work.153   
However, the World Summit Outcome Document did not recognize an obligation on 
Member States to support the PBC. The PBC operates in three principal configurations to marshal 
resources to be placed at the disposal of the international community. These resources are 
generated from the top 15 providers of assessed contributions to the UN budget, as well as 
voluntary contributions to UN funds.154 Therefore, the PBC does not operate according to any new 
legal obligation for Member States to participate in rebuilding states emerging from conflicts.  
 
3.3.5 Summary on the World Summit Outcome Document 
Similar to the ICISS report, the World Summit Outcome Document recognized the 
responsibility of each individual state to protect its population from mass atrocities. Both 
documents also recognized the responsibility of the international community to encourage and help 
states exercise this responsibility and build a capacity to protect their populations, as appropriate. 
Moreover, both the World Summit Outcome Document and the ICISS report recognized the 
international community’s dual responsibility to use force if a state failed to protect its population, 
as well as rebuild in post-conflict situations.  
By adopting the World Summit Outcome Document, UN Member States politically 
elevated the R2P principle. However, whether the R2P principle, as stipulated in the paragraphs 
138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, was able to overcome the problems 
                                                          
152 Tabar Vzquez, Gustavo Alvarez, Charge d’Affaires of Uruguay to the U.N., Statement at the G.A. Debate on the 
Responsibility to Protect and Informal Interactive Dialogue (July 23, 2009), 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Uruguay_SP.pdf. 
153 Fander Falconi, Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the U.N., Statement at the G.A. Debate on the 
Responsibility to Protect and Informal Interactive Dialogue (July 28, 2009), 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2493-general-assembly-
debate-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-and-informal-interactive-dialogue. 
154 S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
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associated with the pre-R2P humanitarian intervention, and, thus, change existing international law 
is doubtful.  
Although paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document assigned the primary 
responsibility to protect to the state, it was a concept already rooted in international law. Also, 
paragraphs 138 and 139 did not impose any legal penalties on the international community for 
failing to exercise the responsibility to prevent. Therefore, the World Summit Outcome Document 
did not advocate any new responsibility for the international community.  
Further, paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document did not specify 
the scope of the continuum of prevention, reaction, and rebuilding responsibilities. Although 
paragraph 138 stated that genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity 
trigger the application of R2P, it did not specify the severity of atrocities that triggered R2P. Also 
paragraphs 138 and 139 did not indicate how R2P would work procedurally across the 
responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild. The pre-R2P humanitarian intervention debates also 
suffered from similar uncertainties and, thus, the World Summit Outcome Document failed to 
address these dilemmas in humanitarian intervention.   
Particularly, paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document placed R2P under 
the Security Council and called for collective action in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
ethnic cleansing, and war crimes.155 However, no mandatory obligation was imposed on the 
international community to take collective action. Although paragraph 139 called for action 
through the Security Council, it did not, at the same time, prohibit unilateral intervention in cases 
where the Security Council failed to respond. Paragraph 139 also did not advocate any new right to 
intervene in the absence of Security Council authorization.  
                                                          
155 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 127, ¶ 139. 
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The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document attempted to create a political consensus on 
the R2P principle. UN Member States unanimously adopted the World Summit Outcome 
Document in 2005, but the consensus was shallow. The World Summit Outcome Document could 
not overcome a fear by many countries that R2P could possibly undermine the long-standing 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.  
 
3.4 Conclusion    
There are, undoubtedly, a plethora of unanswered questions regarding the R2P principle. 
Yet, R2P represents a noteworthy step forward for the international community in so far as it 
clearly articulates an integrated approach to protecting populations from mass atrocities. This 
chapter analyzed two of the most important documents in the short history of the R2P principle in 
order to examine whether they reflect any substantive doctrinal changes from pre-R2P 
international law.  
Both the ICISS report and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document presented three 
responsibilities under the R2P principle: prevent, react, and rebuild. However, neither document 
could overcome uncertainties in the scope of each of the three responsibilities. Neither document 
specified when to invoke the responsibility to prevent, react, or rebuild. Although the World 
Summit Outcome Document stated that genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes trigger these responsibilities, the parameters or the level required to elicit the 
responsibility is not clear.    
Also, neither document specified what actions states must take in exercising the 
responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild. Not only did the documents lack clarity on how R2P 
works procedurally across the responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild, but also they did not 
provide clear guidance on who takes the decisions, where decisions happen, or how decisions are 
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to be made regarding R2P. These very same issues characterized pre-R2P humanitarian 
intervention debates as well.  
Both the ICISS report and the World Summit Outcome Document allotted the primary 
responsibility to protect civilian populations to the state, which was a concept already embedded in 
international law. Both documents described the international community’s responsibility to assist 
individual states to exercise their respective responsibility to prevent. However, they did not 
impose any legal penalties on states for failure to enforce the responsibility to prevent. Therefore, 
neither document imposed any new legal obligations in international law.  
In terms of the responsibility to react, neither document vigorously supported the idea that 
military intervention without Security Council approval was legal, meaning that they did not 
resolve this controversy from the pre-R2P humanitarian intervention era. Neither the ICISS report 
nor the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document advocated for any new right to intervene or any 
new obligation to react with military force.  
Given this background, the emergence of the R2P principle does not, therefore, provide a 
clear legal break from old problems. Instead, it upholds prior treaty, customary international law 
and best practices by restating pre-established commitments under international law relating to the 
use of force, human rights, and humanitarian protection. Therefore, as described in these two 
seminal documents, the R2P principle does not create new rights or obligations for states in terms 
of the responsibilities to prevent, to react, or to rebuild.  
Both the ICISS report and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document attempted to 
develop a political consensus on questions surrounding humanitarian intervention. Although the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document was able to obtain support from over 150 states, 
considerable disagreements existed among the Member States on R2P. China, Russia, countries of 
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G-77, and members of NAM were cautious about the R2P principle and did not condone any type 
of foreign intervention which would violate state sovereignty and territorial integrity. These 
countries did not agree to advocate any new right to intervene under R2P. Conversely, the United 
States, United Kingdom, and the Western block did not want to limit themselves to the decisions 
of the Security Council on the use of force. These countries reserved the right to use unilateral 
force when and where necessary. Therefore, both documents failed to bridge the political divide 
between sovereignty and the humanitarian intervention through R2P. 
In analyzing the ICISS report and the World Summit Outcome Document, the relationship 
between the R2P principle and the earlier concept of humanitarian intervention appears to involve 
more overlap than separation. Both documents reflected the problems associated with pre-R2P 
humanitarian intervention. This similarity, in turn, raises doubts on whether the R2P principle 
changed existing international law. In fact, the ICISS report noted that there had not yet been a 
sufficiently strong basis to claim the emergence of the new principle in customary international 
law.156 It should be noted that the UN Secretary General also considered paragraphs 138 and 139 
of the World Summit Outcome Document to be firmly anchored in well-established principles of 
international law.157 Moreover, the Secretary General noted that the R2P principle does not alter, 
but reinforces, the legal obligations of Member States to refrain from the use of force except in 
conformity with the UN Charter.158 The commitment undertaken by the Member States through 
the World Summit Outcome Document did not create new human rights or additional obligations 
on states, but merely provided a framework to guide the international community to respond in 
crisis situations.  
                                                          
156 ICISS, supra note 5, ¶ 2.24. 
157 U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
158 Id.  
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However, although analysis of these important R2P documents was necessary, it is not 
sufficient to conclude that R2P has not changed international law. Therefore, it is important to 
make an objective assessment of state practice, as well as UN activities, since 2001, in order to 
understand precisely what such practices and actions tell us about the R2P principle in 
contemporary international law.  
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CHAPTER 4 
OVERVIEW OF THE R2P PRINCIPLE IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND UN 
ACTIVITIES, 2001-2013 
4.1 Introduction 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced 
the R2P principle in 2001 with a view to remedying controversies associated with the concept of 
humanitarian intervention.1 Since then, many events related to the R2P principle have unfolded in 
and outside the UN. During this period from 2001 to 2013, a variety of actors referred to, or tried 
to implement, the R2P principle in a number of different situations, which increased attention paid 
to the R2P principle. While both the UN and the international community tried to use R2P in many 
conflict situations, the UN also made other efforts to utilize and sustain the interest that R2P was 
generating. However, state practice after 2001 did not clarify that R2P resolved the pre-R2P 
humanitarian intervention controversies and did not, thus, reflect change in international law.  
This chapter analyses briefly a number of prominent humanitarian crises that involved 
reference to, and uses of, the R2P principle from 2001 to 2013. This chapter also analyzes the 
UN’s efforts and activities to advance R2P. By analyzing key developments concerning the R2P 
principle, this chapter identifies the elements and problems associated with R2P. Ultimately, 
analyzing how R2P was used or not used since 2001 will help shed light on how state practice and 
UN activities have affected the relationship between the R2P principle and international law. 
 
                                                          
1 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, REPORT 2001: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, ¶ 4.20 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
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4.2 Humanitarian Crises and  the R2P Principle 
Several humanitarian crises that occurred from 2001 to 2013 gained prominent 
international attention. This section briefly analyzes important humanitarian crises from this period 
and prompted appeals to, or uses of, R2P in state practice. By doing such an analysis, this section 
intends to examine how states initiated the use of the R2P principle in actual humanitarian crises 
during this formative period of the principle. 
4.2.1 Darfur (2004): An Inauspicious Start 
The crisis in Darfur was the first major humanitarian crisis that emerged after the ICISS 
articulated the R2P principle. This crisis erupted in 2003, when the Sudanese government backed 
the Janjaweed militias, comprised of Sudanese Arab tribes, in responses to an uprising with a 
campaign of mass killing and displacement.2  
Initially, the African Union (AU) made efforts to solve the crisis in Darfur. By mid-2004, 
the AU had established a small monitoring mission in Darfur, consisting of some 60 monitors, and 
300 troops with a limited mandate to protect civilians.3 A critical restriction on the AU mission 
was its mandate because it was limited to observing the situation on ground. Tragically, the AU 
mission failed to halt the mass killings and displacement of the civilian population in Darfur.4 
However, there were no explicit indications that this AU action invoked or involved the R2P 
principle.  
The UN also took a number of measures to prevent further escalation of violence in 
Darfur.5 On July 30, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556, demanding that the 
                                                          
2 Amnesty Int’l, Looming Crisis in Darfur, AFR 54/041/2003 (July 1, 2003). 
3 Darfur Peace Agreement (Apr. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Darfur_Peac_Agreement-2.pdf. 
4 VICTORIA K. HOLT & TOBIAS C. BERKMAN, THE IMPOSSIBLE MANDATE? MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS 8 (2006). 
5 The United Nations and Darfur: U.N. Fact Sheet, U.N. DEP’T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).  
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government of Sudan disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice militia 
leaders and members who violated human rights and international humanitarian law in the Darfur 
region.6 Although this resolution did not mention the R2P principle, the “responsibility to protect” 
language was mentioned during the debate of the resolution.7  The debate was initiated by the 
Philippines, which expressed that Sudan had failed in its duty to protect its citizens and that 
international action was warranted.8 The United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Chile, and 
Spain invoked the language of Sudan’s “responsibility to protect” the population in Darfur. 
However, these states did not explicitly suggest that the responsibility should pass from the 
Sudanese government to the Security Council.9  
The Sudanese government failed to comply with Resolution 1556, and therefore, on 
September 18, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1564.10 The resolution threatened 
the imposition of sanctions against Sudan if it failed to comply with its obligations to stop mass 
atrocities and protect civilians. It also requested the Secretary General to establish an International 
Commission on Inquiry to investigate violations of human rights in the region.11  
Further action was taken when Secretary General Kofi Annan exercised powers pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564 and appointed an International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur on January 25, 2005.12 After a thorough investigation, the Commission of Inquiry 
established that the government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed were responsible for serious 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law arising to crimes under international 
                                                          
6 S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004). 
7 U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 5015th mtg. at 10-12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5015 (July 30, 2004). 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1564 (Sept, 18, 2004).  
11 Press Release, Security Council Declares Intention to Consider Sanctions to Obtain Sudan’s Full Compliance with 
Security, Disarmament Obligations on Darfur, U.N. Press Release, SC/8191 (Sept, 18. 2004). 
12 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary General:  Rep. of the Secretary General (Jan. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
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law.13 The Commission of Inquiry also identified a number of senior government officials and 
military commanders who may be responsible, under the notion of superior (or command) 
responsibility, for knowingly failing to prevent or repress the perpetration of crimes.14 Referring to 
the international community’s responsibility to protect civilian populations from mass atrocities, 
the report of the Commission of Inquiry stated that “the international community cannot stand idle 
by, while human life and human dignity are attacked daily and on so large a scale in Darfur. The 
international community must take on the responsibility to protect the civilians of Darfur and end 
the rampant impunity currently prevailing there.”15  
By the terms of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was 
entered into by the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the United 
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established with a limited mandate by Security Council 
Resolution 1590.16 However, the humanitarian situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate, 
meaning the UNMIS was ineffective in protecting the Sudanese population.17  
Given the escalation of human rights violations, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1593 and referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC).18 Further, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1672 on April 25, 2006, placing sanctions on individual 
Sudanese officials responsible for crimes against humanity in Darfur.19 However, these measures 
were also inadequate to stop escalation of violence or protect population in Darfur. 
                                                          
13 Id.  
14 Id. ¶ 644. 
15 Id. ¶ 569. 
16 S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 1590 (Mar. 24, 2005); Mission Background, THE U.N. MISSION IN SUDAN, 
http://unmis.unmissions.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
17 Human Rights Watch, Darfur: Donors Must Address Atrocities Fueling Crisis (Sept. 27. 2004), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/09/26/darfur-donors-must-address-atrocities-fueling-crisis. 
18 S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, 
Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release, SC/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
19 S.C. Res. 1672, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006).  
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On August 31, 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706, in which the 
deployment of 17,300 UN peacekeepers to Darfur was authorized.20 This resolution referred to 
paragraphs 138 and 139 on R2P in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.21 Khartoum 
considered Resolution 1706 to be inappropriate interference into Sudan’s internal affairs.22 The 
delegations of China, Qatar, and Russia abstained on the vote, stating that the resolution lacked 
consent from Sudan.23 Although Resolution 1706 authorized the deployment of UN troops, no 
troop deployment took place until July 31, 2007, when the adoption of Resolution 1769 authorized 
a deployment of an UN and AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID).24  
Despite all its efforts to curtail the humanitarian violations, the UN was unable to stop the 
atrocities and protect the civilians in Darfur. The impact of the UN’s peacekeeping and rebuilding 
work by UNAMID still cannot be judged because Darfur continues to face a seemingly endless 
assortment of problems. UNAMID’s efforts remain hampered by lack of resources and support. 
The UN could not take adequate preventive efforts to stop atrocities in Darfur. In spite of having 
full knowledge of the crisis in Darfur, the UN could not react in a timely or adequate way. Even 
today, the UN still cannot stop atrocities in Darfur or carry-out effective peacebuilding efforts with 
any realistic likelihood of long-term success.   
The road to applying R2P in Darfur has been extremely circuitous, even tortuous. One 
reason was a lack of agreement among UN Member States whether the Darfur crisis should even 
be on the Security Council’s agenda. China, Russia, and Pakistan highlighted Sudan’s sovereignty, 
political independence, and territorial integrity.25 While these countries opposed international 
                                                          
20 S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).  
21 Id. pmbl., ¶ 3. 
22 Press Release, Security Council Expands Mandate of UN Mission in Sudan to Include Darfur, Adopting Resolution 
1706, U.N. Press Release, SC/8821 (Aug. 31, 2006). 
23 Id.  
24 S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1769 (July 31, 2007).  
25 Alex J. Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit, 20 
ETHICS &INT’L AFF. 151 (2006).  
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interference in Darfur, they backed action by the AU. However, the United States, United 
Kingdom, and other countries supported international intervention and insisted on actions by the 
Security Council concerning the Darfur crisis. However, these countries did not seek any legally 
binding obligation to protect the population in Darfur. Those Member States, which insisted on 
discussion and action in Darfur, did not take unilateral or collective action in Darfur to protect the 
population, and no one accepted responsibility for the failure to protect.  
As the detailed case study on Darfur in Chapter 5 will further demonstrate, UN Member 
States could not agree on whether or when to invoke the R2P principle, what action should be 
taken, or who should be responsible for implementing such decisions in Darfur.26 Similar problems 
regarding the behavior of the Security Council formed part of pre-R2P humanitarian intervention 
debates. In R2P terms, the Member States failed to recognize their responsibilities to respond to 
atrocities outside their own territories. This lack of political will and actions resulted in the 
international community’s failure to implement R2P in Darfur in a timely and effectively manner.   
Many scholars and critics have described the failure to address the atrocities in Darfur 
effectively as a failure of the R2P principle.27 However, according to Evans, the R2P principle 
itself did not fail in Darfur; rather, it was the international community that failed to implement the 
R2P principle in Darfur.28 Under this view, this failure was not due to any inherent flaw in the R2P 
principle but was directly traceable to political and situational problems encountered among 
Member States in implementing it. Despite the failure by the international community to mount a 
timely and adequate response in Darfur, the crisis represented the first test of the R2P principle and 
                                                          
26 Id.  
27 See, e.g., Georgette Gagnon, Paul Lemmens, Richard Williamson, and David Schaffer, The Collective International 
Responsibility to Protect: The Case of Darfur, 4 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 118, 129 (2005).  
28 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone? 22 INT’L REL. 291-293 
(2008), available at http://ire.sagepub.com/content/22/3/283.full.pdf.23. 
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is, therefore, important in analyzing the R2P principle in international law. Chapter 5 will explore 
the Darfur crisis in more detail. 
4.2.2 Kenya (2007): Fulfilling the Responsibility to Prevent  
The December 2007 election in Kenya between Mwai Kibaki, the president of Kenya 
representing the Party of National Unity (PNU), and the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, 
representing the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), was fiercely contested.29 Kenya has 48 
tribes, with three of them - the Kikuyu, the Luo, and the Luhyia - comprising almost 65% of the 
population.30 PNU supporters are usually from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru tribes, while ODM 
supporters are typically from the Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin tribes.31 Kibaki won the election by a 
two percent margin. ODM immediately accused the government of manipulating the election, and 
this accusation was later confirmed by national and international observers.32 Widespread violence 
erupted, and the violence continued for months. Thousands of people were killed, and many more 
were displaced. Kenya, once seen as a model for African democracy and stability, lurched into 
violence with deleterious human, political, and economic consequences.33  
The diplomatic response to the ethnic violence that erupted in the aftermath of the 
December 2007 election in Kenya involved references to, and use of, the R2P principle. World 
leaders attempted to exert diplomatic pressure on the Kenyan government. The United States 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband issued a joint 
statement urging Kenya’s political leaders stop the violence and pledged diplomatic and political 
                                                          
29 Int’l Crisis Group, Kenya in Crisis (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-ofafrica/ 
kenya/137_kenya_in_crisis_web.ashx. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 Id.  
33 Michelle Gavin, Policy Options Paper-Kenya, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 2008), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15727/policy_options_paperkenya.html. 
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resources to help end the crisis and support reconciliation.34 In the first days of the post-election 
violence, a coordinated diplomatic effort by the UN (with Kofi Annan as the UN envoy), the 
Kenyan government, and various ethnic groups helped reached a power-sharing agreement which 
prevented a possible long-term campaign of mass atrocities. Under the agreement, Kibaki would 
maintain the presidency, while Odinga would become the prime minister. The prime minister has 
considerable powers and can only be dismissed by parliament. The cabinet positions in the 
government were split between the ODM and PNU, and both the president and the prime minister 
had to agree before a minister could be removed from office. Two deputy prime minister portfolios 
were also created with each party appointing one. Finally, the newly-formed cabinet agreed to 
work out a new constitution that would address some of the long-standing grievances within 
Kenyan society that inflamed the post-election violence.35 Progress has been slow, and 
implementation of the agreement has taken longer than anticipated. The Kenyan political leaders 
delayed the much-needed constitutional reform. At the same time, however, it is a promising sign 
that violence has not erupted again in Kenya. 
Based on this successful diplomatic intervention, Annan later observed that: “I saw the 
crisis in the R2P prism with the Kenyan government’s inability to control the situation or protect 
its people. I knew that if the international community did not intervene, things would go hopelessly 
wrong. The problem is when we say ‘intervention,’ people think military, when in fact that’s the 
last resort. Kenya is a successful example of R2P at work.”36  It was widely acknowledged that the 
UN-led diplomatic efforts prompted the two Kenyan leaders to come to an agreement.37  
                                                          
34 Stephan Kaufman, US and British Leaders Call for End to Kenyan Violence, GLOBAL SECURITY (Jan. 2, 2008), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/01/mil-080102-usia01.htm. 
35 Q&A: Kenya Peace Deal, BBC (Apr. 13, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165962.stm. 
36 ALEX BELLAMY, GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS 54 (2011). 
37 Id. at 55. 
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The tools employed by the international community were not coercive, but instead offered 
the type of support that the Kenyan government needed to reach a practical resolution. Initially, the 
UN had sent Kofi Annan to help mediate a settlement. The regional and the international 
community gave unified support to this approach.38 In addition, the international community, in 
particular, the United States and the United Kingdom, applied pressure on Kenya’s political elite 
by threatening the possible imposition of criminal liability on those who fostered violence. 
Moreover, those countries also threatened the government of Kenya with possible embargoes on 
foreign aid and investment.39 This early intervention was supported by the highest levels of 
international politics and helped to avert another possible mass atrocity.  
In the Kenyan situation, the responsibility to prevent was effectively fulfilled by the 
international community. In particular, there was a show of political will in support of effective 
measures. Therefore, the international responses to the Kenyan crisis, unlike those in Darfur, 
proved that implementation of R2P can serve its purpose. 
4.2.3 Burma (2008): Controversy over the Scope of R2P’s Application 
In May 2008, the devastating Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy delta region of Burma, 
leaving many Burmese severely affected.40 Foreign humanitarian workers and foreign aid missions 
sought to enter the country to lend assistance to the recovery, but the Burmese authorities 
obstructed the entrance of these organizations.41 This behavior caused intense debates in the 
international community on whether the crisis in cyclone-struck Burma could be considered a R2P 
situation.  
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Joanna Harrington, R2P and Natural Disasters, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 141, 142 (W. Andy Knight & Frazer Egerton eds., 2012). 
41 Id. at 142. 
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In response to Cyclone Nargis and the subsequent resulting humanitarian emergency, 
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner proposed that the Security Council invoke R2P to 
authorize the delivery of aid, even without Burma’s consent.42 Kouchner’s call was supported by 
Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, who stated that the international community should use all possible means to support and 
get financial and other aid to victims of Burma’s cyclone.43 When the European Union met to 
discuss the French proposal to invoke R2P, France’s Junior Minister for Human Rights, Rama 
Yade, told reporters that “we have called for the responsibility to protect to be applied in the case 
of Burma.”44 The possibility of forceful intervention was reiterated by French Ambassador to the 
UN, Jean-Maurice Ripert, who claimed that France “could send men” to Burma because the 
French navy was in the vicinity conducting operations off the cost of Burma.45 
Kouchner’s proposal was rejected by China, India, and ASEAN, all of which argued that 
the R2P principle did not apply to natural disasters.46 The British government rejected Kouchner’s 
argument as ‘‘incendiary’’ and also agreed that R2P did not apply to natural disasters.47 The 
British did not want to bind themselves to an obligation by extending the R2P principle to natural 
disasters. Many humanitarian organizations, including the UN Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, also criticized Kouchner's interpretation of R2P. Edward Luck, Special 
Adviser on R2P to the UN Secretary-General, noted that the R2P principle did not apply to the 
humanitarian aid controversy in Burma because placing restrictions on the delivery of aid does not 
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constitute one of the four crimes stipulated by the R2P principle: genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing.48 
It is doubtful whether the R2P principle should have applied to the humanitarian 
emergency in Burma, especially since the World Summit Outcome Document does not expressly 
apply the R2P principle to natural catastrophes. During the negotiation of the World Summit 
Outcome Document, UN Member States could not agree on such a reference in paragraphs 138 
and 139.49 Although the ICISS report had recommended that a clause on natural catastrophes be 
included, the World Summit Outcome Document did not reveal any agreement that the R2P 
principle applied to natural disasters.50  
Proponents of applying the R2P principle to the situation in Burma attempted to connect 
R2P with the broad concept of human security.51 However, there was no agreement within the 
international community whether to equate the R2P principle with all human security concerns. 
Many developing countries feared that the R2P principle could be expanded so far that it would 
become an excuse for states to interfere in their domestic affairs. Therefore, many countries, 
including both proponents and critics of the R2P principle, could not agree whether to apply the 
R2P principle to the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Burma.  
4.2.4 Georgia (2008): A Controversial Attempt to Appeal to the R2P Principle 
In August 2008, Georgia’s government launched a military attack against South Ossetia 
aimed at reinstating the constitutional order.52 Russia, which had troops in the region as part of a 
joint peacekeeping mission, responded to the attacks by sending forces into South Ossetia and, 
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soon thereafter, launched attacks across Georgia. The Russian troops routed the Georgian army. 
Later, a French-brokered ceasefire led to the cessation of hostilities, and Russia recognized the 
independence of South Ossetia and another breakaway province, Abkhazia.53 Among the 
justifications offered by Russia for its intervention in Georgia was the claim that its action was 
consistent with the R2P principle.54 The Russian leadership claimed that the attacks by Georgia 
amounted to genocide, which warranted intervention on the basis of R2P.55  
However, Bellamy noted that R2P advocates generally saw the Russian argument as an 
obvious case of misappropriating the R2P principle, and he cited three reasons for this view, a 
view shared by the New York-based Global Center for R2P. First, protection of a state’s own 
citizens residing outside its territory is more likely to be considered within the purview of the right 
to self-defense rather than falling under the responsibility to protect.56 Second, the scale of Russia 
intervention into Georgia was disproportionate to the goal of protecting the people of South 
Ossetia. The R2P principle is applicable within the borders of the state that has the responsibility to 
protect the population within its territory. As stated in paragraph 139 of the World Summit 
Outcome Document, when and if the state fails to uphold its responsibility, either due to an 
inability or unwillingness, then the responsibility becomes one in which the international 
community acts collectively.57 Third, the R2P principle does not provide justification for the use of 
force in the territory of another state without the approval of the Security Council.58  
The Russian military operations in Georgia were also not carried out in accordance with the 
terms of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. To comply with these terms, evidence was 
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first required that civilian populations were threatened by mass atrocity crimes. Russia should have 
worked through the UN and first used appropriate diplomatic means to help protect those people 
assumed to be at risk. Force should only have been considered as a last resort, and with the 
approval of the Security Council. The Russian government had not satisfied these prerequisites.  
It is unclear whether the threat to Russian citizens located in Georgia qualified as actual or 
imminent mass atrocities on a scale relevant to the R2P principle, or even whether the actual threat 
warranted military force. At what point the responsibility to react should be invoked, and at what 
level military measures should be taken in implementing the R2P principle, are questions that still 
cause problems for the R2P principle. Similar uncertainty over when force could be used existed in 
the pre-R2P debates about humanitarian intervention. Russia’s invocation of R2P in its attempt to 
justify its military actions in Georgia only served to further highlight uncertainties and aggravate 
controversies over the R2P principle.  
4.2.5 Gaza (2008): Another Dispute About When R2P Applies 
On December 26, 2008, responding to attacks by Hamas, Israel launched an air and land 
attack on Hamas in Gaza. This attack was carried out by Israel upon the expiration of a six-month 
ceasefire brokered by Egypt between Hamas and Israel.59 Hamas responded by launching rockets 
into southern Israel. As the crisis unfolded, the World Council of Churches and Oxfam 
International reminded the parties of their responsibility to protect civilians.60  
The R2P principle was applied to this crisis, most notably by Richard Falk, UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, but also by others who claimed that crimes 
committed in Gaza had reached the threshold warranting R2P application. As the International 
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Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect noted, indiscriminate killings of civilians and the use of 
civilians as human shields led several states and civil society organizations to accuse both Israel 
and Hamas of committing war crimes.61 The main question was whether the Gaza conflict met the 
R2P threshold to trigger an international response. In addition, as the international community is 
deeply politicized on the crisis in Gaza, questions arose whether invoking R2P would have 
improved the protection of civilians.  
The UN took several steps to resolve the crisis in Gaza. In a mission mandated by the 
President of the Human Rights Council in April 2009, Richard Goldstone found evidence of 
serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law committed by Israel during 
the Gaza conflict, violations which amounted to war crimes and possibly crimes against 
humanity.62 The fact-finding mission also found evidence that Palestinian armed groups 
committed war crimes, as well as possible crimes against humanity, in their repeated launching of 
rockets and mortars into southern Israel.63 The Goldstone report presented to the Human Rights 
Council recommended that the Security Council adopt a resolution requiring both Israel and 
Hamas to launch independent domestic investigations and report on the findings of these 
investigations and the prosecutions of any perpetrators.64 The report also recommended that, if 
investigations were not underway within six months in either Israel or the territory controlled by 
Hamas, the Security Council should refer the situation to the ICC.65 
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On November 2, 2009, the General Assembly endorsed the Goldstone Report with a vote 
of 114 in favor to 18 against, with 44 abstentions.66 The resolution called upon the governments of 
Israel and the Palestinians to undertake independent and internationally credible investigations into 
the serious violations of international humanitarian and international human rights law reported by 
the fact-finding mission.67 The resolution also requested that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
transmit the Goldstone report to the Security Council and report back to the General Assembly.68  
The question whether R2P applied in Gaza was discussed both within and outside the 
UN.69 At the 2009 General Assembly debate on R2P, several governments raised the issue of 
Gaza. Qatar highlighted the importance of prioritizing the protection of civilians under foreign 
occupation and also stressed the focus on civilian protection required under the R2P principle.70 
The Iranian delegation pointed out R2P’s selective application and highlighted that the R2P 
principle tends to apply situations where it best suits Western interests.71 Palestine stated that the 
R2P principle required the Security Council to take steps to protect vulnerable populations on a 
non-selective basis.72 Criticizing the double standard demonstrated by certain Western states, 
Palestine joined Iran in its disappointment over the seemingly selective basis of the R2P 
principle’s application.73 Palestine pointed out that those who called for interventions in other 
crises situations had not called for R2P application to safeguard the civilian population in Gaza.74 
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In the case of the ongoing Gaza conflict, neither the UN nor the international community 
has taken effective and timely action under the R2P principle.75 The political division on whether 
R2P applied to the crisis in Gaza deepened the political and legal uncertainty about when the R2P 
principle is activated.  
4.2.6 Sri Lanka (2009): Yet Another R2P Application Controversy 
Sri Lanka had been experiencing a crisis and domestic armed conflict between the 
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) since 1984. This conflict intensified 
at the beginning of 2009, creating a humanitarian catastrophe, which came to an end by mid-2009. 
According to the proponents of R2P, the large number of civilian deaths produced by the military 
actions that ended the conflict signaled the failure of the government of Sri Lanka to protect its 
population, and led to calls for the international community to step in. However, the UN 
experienced controversy on the application of R2P to the Sri Lankan situation.  
Many R2P advocates argued the government of Sri Lanka failed to fulfill its primary 
responsibility to protect its populations from mass human rights violations. Such a failure, 
advocates contended, required a R2P response.76 Mexico’s Permanent Representative to the UN 
was among the many delegates who voiced a concern about Sri Lanka’s responsibility to protect its 
population.77 Writing in the Washington Post, James Traub, Director of the Global Center for 
Policy, described Sri Lanka as exactly the kind of cataclysm that states vowed to prevent when 
they adopted R2P.78 Russia and China, however, took the opposite position and maintained that the 
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Sri Lankan situation was a domestic issue which did not warrant international intervention.79 
Despite many calls for the application of R2P, Sri Lanka successfully resisted attempts to have the 
matter placed on the Security Council’s agenda as an R2P issue. 
A panel of experts established by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon criticized the UN for 
its grave failure in handling the situation in Sri Lanka during the final stages of the conflict.80 The 
panel worked for eight months, reviewed about 7,000 documents, including internal UN exchanges 
with the government of Sri Lanka. In November 2012, Ban himself issued the panel’s report in 
which he acknowledged the failure of the UN system to meet its responsibilities to respond to the 
human rights violations in Sri Lanka.81 “The United Nations system failed to meet its 
responsibilities,” the Secretary General concluded in releasing the report on accountability issues 
stemming from the final months of the 2009 war in Sri Lanka.82  
The report was particularly critical of the Security Council’s failure to respond to the crisis: 
“In particular, the Security Council was deeply ambivalent about even placing Sri Lanka on its 
agenda, a situation that was not already the subject of a UN peacekeeping or political mandate; 
while at the same time no other UN Member State mechanism had the prerogative to provide the 
political response needed, leaving Sri Lanka in a vacuum of inaction.”83 The report added that UN 
action in Sri Lanka was not supported by the majority of Member States. “In the absence of clear 
Security Council backing,” the report stated, “the UN’s actions lacked adequate purpose and 
direction. Member States failed to provide the Secretariat and UN Country Team with the support 
required to fully implement the responsibilities for protection of civilians that Member States had 
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themselves set for such situations.”84 According to the report, a number of UN senior staff at its 
New York headquarters chose not to speak up about the Sri Lankan government’s and LTTE’s 
“broken commitments and violations” of international law as they thought this non-confrontational 
approach would be the only way to increase UN humanitarian access.85  
The UN has acknowledged its own failure to adequately or on a timely basis implement the 
R2P principle in Sri Lanka, which again raises doubts about the UN’s leadership in defining and 
implementing R2P. The situation in Sri Lanka also reflected clear political divisions on whether 
the R2P principle applied to Sri Lanka. Some Member States called for the Sri Lankan crisis to be 
defined and addressed as a R2P situation; other Member States clearly refused. As a whole, UN 
Member States did not behave as if R2P was a legally binding obligation. This political division 
regarding the applicability of the R2P principle, together with the UN’s failure to address 
adequately the issues through an R2P approach, amplified doubts about whether R2P formed part 
of international law.  
4.2.7 Libya (2011): The Security Council Acts under R2P 
Muammar Gaddafi, who came to power in a successful coup in 1969, ruled Libya until 
2011.86 Gaddafi’s regime ruled the country with a totalitarian fist and was criticized internationally 
for its human rights violations.87 After the 1988 bombing of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, the UN imposed severe sanctions against Libya until the regime acknowledged 
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responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing.88 These sanctions brought significant hardships to the 
Libyan people. Aggravating the unrest in Libya, Gaddafi forces killed prisoners in Abu Salim 
prison to regain control of an internal situation in 2006, and all attempts to aid and assist the 
victims were mocked by Gaddafi.89 The regime appointed a commission ostensibly to inquire into 
the Abu Salim massacre but, typical of the Gaddafi regime, the findings were never revealed.90 
Subsequent protests that took place were fiercely suppressed by the Gaddafi regime with extremely 
disproportionate violence.91 Gaddafi and his son threatened the protesters and urged regime 
supporters to attack and kill them.92  
Given the situation in Libya, the regional organizations took a number of measures to 
prevent further escalation of violence and help the Gaddafi regime protect its population. The AU, 
the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and League of Arab States (LAS) strongly 
criticized and condemned all forms of human rights violations in Libya and called for a mediated 
solution to the conflict.93 In fact, the LAS moved to suspend Libya’s membership in the 
organization.94 Given this crisis situation in Libya, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011, which recalled Libya’s “responsibility to protect,” referred 
the situation to the ICC, and imposed financial sanctions as well as an arms embargo.95  
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Despite imposition of several non-military measures by the Security Council, the threat to 
civilians continued in Libya. Therefore, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on March 
17, 2011.96 Resolution 1973 marks the first time the Security Council linked an authorization to 
use military force with the R2P principle. The resolution authorized UN Member States, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to 
protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya, specifically those civilians in Benghazi.97 The 
resolution noted the failure of all prior diplomatic measures against Libya.98 The Security Council 
stressed the need to explore other possible solutions in Libya.99  The Security Council demanded 
that the Libyan authorities comply with the state’s primary obligations under international law to 
take all measures to protect civilians, meet their citizens’ basic needs, and ensure the rapid and 
unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance.100  
Following passage of Resolution 1973, a coalition of states spearheaded by the United 
States, France, United Kingdom, and NATO commenced military action. A short time later, 
NATO announced that it would take over all military aspects of Resolution 1973.101 The increased 
attacks by NATO struck the Gadhafi’s family compound and killed Gadhafi’s youngest son and 
three of his grandchildren.102 Russia immediately criticized NATO’s attack as a disproportionate 
and excessive use of force.103 On August 22, 2011, some five months after NATO’s initial military 
intervention, Tripoli was liberated, and Gaddafi was executed. 
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On September 16, 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2009, and established the 
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which took the task of rebuilding efforts in 
post-Gaddafi Libya.104 The peacebuilding efforts taken by UNSMIL have been far from successful 
as it has not been able to restore peace in the country. While Libya continues to be wracked by 
violence and economic stagnation, the post-Gaddafi militias are in the spotlight as never before.105 
The Libyan intervention raised many questions regarding the R2P principle. First, the 
Security Council was careful in framing the Libyan crisis in terms of the R2P principle. Security 
Council Resolution 1973 stood Libya apart from previous cases of humanitarian intervention (e.g., 
Kosovo) conducted without Security Council authorization of military force. However, there was 
no unanimity within the Security Council for military intervention in Libya. Although the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1973, members of the Security Council were significantly divided on 
the resolution.106 The Security Council members which abstained during the vote on the resolution 
(i.e., Germany, India, Brazil, Russia, and China) highlighted the importance of exhausting all 
peaceful means prior to using military force.107 They further stated that many questions had not 
been answered in the resolution, including how the authorized military measures would be 
enforced, who would enforce them, and what the limits on the military engagement would be.108  
In fact, they believed the need to use military force had not yet been reached in Libya. China stated 
that it had not blocked the action with a negative vote out of consideration for the wishes of the 
LAS and the AU.109 India insisted on giving more time to the Gadhafi regime to stop its 
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atrocities.110 Russia stated that it would not support Resolution 1973 because non-military 
measures, it asserted, had not yet been exhausted.111 Therefore, although Resolution 1973 
authorized military intervention to protect the civilians in Libya, some Security Council members 
did not believe they were subject to a legal obligation to take action under the R2P principle.  
The Libyan crisis also raised uncertainty about the mandate granted under Resolution 1973, 
especially how it invoked the R2P principle. The resolution “authorized the Member States that 
have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures 
to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libya.”112 This broad 
mandate did not specify any specific parameters. For example, what constitutes a threat of attack? 
At what exact point should Member States take all necessary measures to protect populations, after 
100 deaths, 1,000 deaths? What are the limits of military actions taken to uphold the R2P 
principle? 
Most importantly, the issue of regime change became highly controversial after NATO’s 
intervention took place in Libya. Once under way, NATO interpreted the broad mandate given 
under Resolution 1973 as permitting regime change in Libya. This strategy was highly criticized 
by the Member States of the Security Council.113 Although Russia and China had not used their 
veto power to waylay Resolution 1973, they later regretted not using the veto when they had the 
opportunity to do so.114  
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Although NATO, with the UN mandate, acted in a timely and successful way in 
overthrowing Gadhafi, the UN could not restore peace and security in Libya. The UN is still 
unable to prevent human rights violations and killings in Libya. Therefore, the “success” of the 
R2P principle in Libya is still open to debate. Given the importance of, and the controversies 
created by, the use of the R2P principle in Libya, this thesis further analyzes the Libyan case study 
in Chapter 6. 
4.2.8 Côte d’Ivoire (2011): Another Military Intervention Authorized by the Security Council 
under R2P 
The post-independence power struggle in the 1960s in Côte d’Ivoire was exacerbated by 
debates over nationality laws and eligibility conditions for elections. From independence in 1960 
until his death in 1993, Felix Houphouët-Boigny served as president.115 In 1993, Henri Konan 
Bedie became president, but was overthrown by the country's first military coup in December 1999 
in which Robert Guéï assumed control of the country.116 Laurent Gbagbo challenged Guéï during 
the presidential election held in October 2000, which in turn led to civil and military unrest.117 
Following a public uprising, Guéï was promptly replaced by Gbagbo.118 Meanwhile, the 
opposition leader, Alassane Ouattara, was disqualified from contesting elections by the country's 
Supreme Court, because of his alleged Burkinabé nationality.119 While Gbagbo continued to hold 
political power in the country, competition for the presidency in Côte d'Ivoire between Gbagbo 
and Ouattara continued throughout 2002 to 2010.120 During this period, government forces were 
able to secure the control of the main city, Abidjan, but rebel forces took control of the northern 
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part of the country.121 Unrest escalated during the 2010 presidential elections.122 While the 
Constitutional Council of Côte d'Ivoire declared Gbagbo the winner of the 2010 election, the UN 
declared Ouattara the winner of the presidential elections.123 With these events, the already 
existing violence worsened in the country, quickly creating the potential for atrocities involving 
civilians.  
Given the inability of the government of Côte d'Ivoire to control the crisis after presidential 
election held in 2000, the regional bodies, such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the AU made efforts to resolve the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, after 
the efforts by ECOWAS and the AU to break the stalemate were unsuccessful, the French 
government stepped in to resume the negotiations.124  
In order to prevent further violence in Côte d'Ivoire, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1479 on May 13, 2003.125 This resolution established the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire 
(MINUCI) and mandated the mission to complement the peace efforts of ECOWAS. In June 2003, 
26 military liaison officers were authorized by the Security Council for initial deployment in Côte 
d'Ivoire under Resolution 1479.126 As the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued to pose a threat to 
regional and international peace and security, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1528 on 
February 27, 2004.127 This resolution established the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), 
effective as of April 4, 2004, with a mandate to facilitate the implementation of the 2003 peace 
agreement signed by each of the parties to the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire.128 In accordance with the 
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resolution, UNOCI took over the mission assignment from MINUCI.129 The Security Council 
authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means within its capabilities and areas of deployment to 
protect civilians in Côte d'Ivoire.130 
In response to escalating Ivorian post-election violence in 2010, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1975 on March 30, 2011.131 The resolution cited “the primary 
responsibility of states to protect civilians,” called for the immediate transfer of power to Ouattara, 
and reaffirmed the mandate of the UNOCI to “use all necessary means to protect life and 
property.”132 Resolution 1975 also authorized targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his close 
supporters.133 As a result, UNOCI and the French troops used military force to help Ouattara’s 
forces oust Gbagbo from power and change the regime in Côte d’Ivoire.  
Although the UN and French operation successfully removed Gbagbo from power, there 
was no clear strategy for post-intervention reconstruction and rebuilding in the country. Although 
the UN has spent financial and other resources on rebuilding efforts in Côte d’Ivoire, progress has 
been alarmingly slow.134 The UNOCI and Ouattara’s government are still unable to restore peace 
and justice in Côte d’Ivoire.135  
The UN and the regional bodies were actively involved in resolving the conflict in Côte 
d'Ivoire from its early stages. Although many have claimed that the UN and French actions in Côte 
d’Ivoire amounted to a successful implementation of R2P, many questions about R2P were raised 
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by the intervention. As Bellamy and Williams note, the episode in Côte d’Ivoire highlighted some 
of the unresolved challenges regarding the politics of the R2P principle.136  
Although Resolution 1975 authorized UN Member States take all necessary means to 
protect civilians, Bellamy and Williams claimed that the use of force under the R2P principle by 
UN peacekeepers and French troops “blurred the lines between civilian protection and regime 
change.”137 Therefore, although the military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was carried out with the 
authorization of the Security Council, its primary purpose was seemingly a politically motivated 
overthrow of Gbagbo. The Security Council resolution provided no indication that UN Member 
States meant to have a legal right to use force to engage in regime change in order to protect 
civilians. In fact, UN Member States were cautious about the intentions behind the Security 
Council’s authorization of military intervention under Resolution 1975. During the vote on the 
resolution, India and China insisted that UN peacekeepers use the mandate only to the extent 
necessary to protect civilians.138 India stated that the UNOCI should not get involved in a civil 
war, but carry out its mandate with impartiality while ensuring the safety and security of 
peacekeepers and civilians.139  
Although UN and French troops ousted Gbagbo in the military intervention and 
temporarily prevented post-election violence, they were not able to restore peace and justice in the 
country, nor properly carry out any rebuilding efforts. The UN has allocated significant resources, 
financial and otherwise on the rebuilding efforts in Côte d’Ivoire. However, rebuilding progress 
has been inadequate. Despite all efforts by the UN and regional entities, the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire 
                                                          
136 Bellamy & Williams, supra note 120, at 837. 
137 Id. 
138 U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6508th mtg. at 3, 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 6508 (Mar. 30, 2011). 
139 Id. at 3, 6. 
  
138 
 
continues to produce gross human rights violations.140 Given the importance and controversial 
nature of the application of the R2P principle in Côte d’Ivoire, this thesis analyzes the crisis in 
Côte d’Ivoire more in-depth in Chapter 7.  
4.2.9 Syria (2013): A Major Crisis for the R2P Principle’s Credibility 
The next humanitarian crisis that arose in the period under review and put the R2P 
principle in the spotlight was the emergence of civil war in Syria. Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad and many of the Syrian governing elite belong to the Alawite minority group, while the 
majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims.141 The Shabiha militia, predominantly from Alawite 
minorities, enjoyed many privileges and supported the Assad regime.142 There are many 
opposition groups in Syria who rebelled against the Assad regime starting in 2011. The Syrian 
National Council (SNC) is the most significant opposition group in Syria, which is also considered 
as the umbrella group with a Sunni majority.143  
Initial protests in Syria occurred in the middle of February 2011, calling for the abolition of 
emergency law, legalization of a multi-party political system, release of political prisoners, and the 
removal of corrupt local officials.144 As the conflict spread to nearly every city in Syria, the 
government responded to the unrest and repealed the emergency laws. Severe anti-government 
protests broke-out in the middle of March 2011 in the southern province of Dar’a, after a group of 
children accused of painting anti-government graffiti on public buildings were detained and 
tortured by government forces.145 Syrian armed forces responded violently by attacking protesters 
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and firing at a funeral procession.146 Continuous protests also erupted in other cities including 
Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Idlib.147 This crisis situation continued throughout Syria, and 
Assad’s forces retaliated against the protesters with extreme brutality. On December 28, 2011, the 
Syrian forces opened fire on thousands of anti-government protesters in Hama, killing many 
civilians.148 On March 2012, the main opposition group, the SNC, formed a military council to 
organize and unify all armed resistance.149  
In addition, there were concerns regarding the involvement of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah 
in the Syrian civil war. British Foreign Secretary William Hague said that Iran and its militant 
Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, were "propping up" Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and giving him 
increased support.150  He highlighted that, since November 2012, the regime had been able to go 
on the offensive not because it was stronger, but because those backing it - Iran, Russia, and 
Hezbollah - were directly helping it either through weapons, planning operations, or financial 
assistance. During a June 30, 2013, ministerial meeting, the European Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council condemned Hezbollah's involvement in the conflict and reiterated the need to 
find a political settlement.151 On the other hand, the Syrian rebels were supported by Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, Qatar and the United States.152 
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Given the escalation of violence, in April 2011, the Member States of the Security Council 
considered a press statement proposed by the EU.153 However, the statement could not be issued 
because there was no agreement on the content among Member States. Russia and Lebanon 
objected to the content of the statement, stating that such a press statement would be an undue 
interference in the internal affairs of Syria.154  
In October 2011, the United Kingdom, France, and Portugal tabled a draft resolution at the 
Security Council proposing an arms embargo and setting up a new sanctions committee.155 
However, the resolution could not be adopted because of Russian and Chinese vetoes.156 Brazil, 
India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained during the vote.157 Again, on February 4, 2012, 
proposed Resolution S/2012/77 on Syria could not be adopted because of Russian and Chinese 
vetoes.158 On July 19, 2012, another draft resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was 
introduced at the Security Council.159 The resolution was cosponsored by the delegations of 
France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States. This resolution was also 
vetoed by Russia and China, while Pakistan and South Africa abstained.160 Russia reiterated its 
position that it would not accept any resolution that threatened sanctions.161 However, none of 
these resolutions referred to the R2P principle.  
The Security Council has been divided over how to respond to the Syrian crisis. The 
Member States have also been divided on how to interpret the crisis situation. Key objections 
                                                          
153 Neil MacFarquhar, Push in U.N. for Criticism of Syria is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/world/middleeast/28nations.html?_r=0. 
154 Id.  
155 S.C. Res. 612, U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011).  
156 U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011). 
157 Id.  
158 Press Release, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text 
Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan, SC/10536 (Feb. 4, 2012). 
159 S.C. Res. 538, U.N. Doc. S/2012/538 (July 19, 2012). 
160 Press Release, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria That Would Have Threatened Sanctions, 
Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation, U. N. Press Release SC/10714 (July 19, 2012).  
161 Id.  
  
141 
 
against proposed resolutions stressed the importance of non-intervention in internal affairs and 
emphasized opposition to using force to effect regime change. As permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, both Russia and China had vetoed three resolutions designed to respond to the 
Syrian crisis.  
Given threats of external intervention, Assad’s government threatened to unleash chemical 
and biological weapons if the country faced a foreign attack.162 In August 2012, the Syrian military 
restarted chemical weapons testing at a base on the outskirts of Aleppo.163 The unrest in Syria 
continued throughout this period and, on August 21, 2013, a chemical attack occurred in the 
opposition-controlled and disputed area of Ghouta, in Damascus.164 The area was struck by rockets 
containing chemical agents, believed to have been sarin.165 Hundreds were allegedly killed in the 
attack. A team of UN chemical weapons inspectors confirmed that the nerve agent sarin was used 
in the attack on Ghouta.166 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon told the Security Council that he 
believed the attack constituted a war crime.167  
With alleged chemical weapons possession and use by the Assad regime, the United States, 
United Kingdom, and France openly declared their readiness to take military action against the 
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Assad regime, even without Security Council authorization.168 In fact, throughout the Syrian crisis, 
these countries believed Assad was the main cause for the Syrian crisis and demanded that Assad 
step down.169 
The legal position of the United Kingdom’s threats of military action against Syria was set 
out in a government note dated August 29, 2013.170 According to this note, the UK government 
asserted that military intervention is permissible under international law in exceptional 
circumstances where the UN Security Council is unwilling or unable to act in order to avert a 
humanitarian catastrophe, subject to three conditions: the need to have sufficient evidence of large-
scale humanitarian distress which requires urgent assistance; absence of any alternative other than 
the use of force if lives are to be saved: and the proposed use of force be proportionate to the 
situation.171  
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s official response to questions posed by 
the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on the legality of humanitarian intervention 
without Security Council authorization reconciled the British legal position on the use of force in 
Syria with R2P as specified in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.172 However, it 
recognized that the World Summit Outcome Document had not addressed the question of 
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unilateral intervention.173 It reiterated that unilateral use of force to address humanitarian 
catastrophes is permitted under international law, even if the Security Council does not authorize 
such action.174 
After the chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta, the United States threatened to take military 
action without Security Council authorization.175 The United States position on the use of force in 
Syria was not based on humanitarian intervention or R2P. The United States justified the potential 
use of force as a response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons.176 The United 
States had not abandoned the option of using force without Security Council authorization, and 
President Obama stated that he decided the United States should take military action against Syria, 
but that he would seek authorization from Congress before taking action.177  
As the threat of military action hung in the air, Russia and the United States brokered a 
Syrian chemical weapons destruction plan. Both Russia and the United States transmitted to the 
Security Council a framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons agreed to in Geneva 
on September 14, 2013.178 On September 27, 2013, the Member States of the Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 2118 demanding verification and destruction of the chemical 
weapons stockpiles in Syria.179 The resolution also called for the full implementation of the 
September 27, 2013, decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
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(OPCW), which contained special procedures for the expeditious and verifiable destruction of 
Syria’s chemical weapons.180  
Despite the rising death toll, increased internally-displaced persons, and worsening refugee 
problems, the Security Council has been paralyzed over Syria, unable to agree to serious measures 
to alleviate the human suffering. Although the legal positions of the United States and United 
Kingdom permitted the unilateral use of force, and, thus, openly threatened the Assad regime with 
military intervention, there was no indication or political willingness for such use of unilateral 
force once the chemical weapons destruction plan emerged. Given the Security Council’s failure to 
protect civilian populations, there have been claims that the R2P principle failed in Syria.181 The 
prominence of the Syrian civil war in debates about the R2P principle requires more detailed 
attention, which Chapter 8 of this thesis undertakes. 
4.3  Other UN Activities Relevant to the R2P Principle 
Section 4.2 examined a number of humanitarian crises between 2001 and 2013 that 
affected the R2P principle. In addition to being involved in responding to these crises, UN bodies 
were also involved in other R2P-relevant activities after the 2005 World Summit. This section 
briefly analyzes these activities, which include resolutions adopted by the Security Council, the 
work of the Special Advisor to the Secretary General on R2P, debates in the General Assembly, 
and reports from the Secretary General. 
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4.3.1 Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006) on Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict 
 
On April 28, 2006, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674 on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.182 Resolution 1674 contained the first official Security 
Council reference to R2P, and it “reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”183 The resolution also 
underscored the Security Council’s readiness to address gross violations of human rights, 
especially those mass atrocities that may constitute threats to international peace and security.  
The resolution received broad support within the Security Council during its six months of 
debate. China called for a renewed focus on the root causes of conflict.184 However, some Security 
Council members criticized the resolution and argued that the World Summit Outcome Document 
only committed the General Assembly to deliberate about R2P.185 Russia stated that it was clearly 
premature to advance R2P in Security Council documents.186 Recalling the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, Russia stressed the requirement of a detailed discussion at the General 
Assembly on R2P before addressing its implementation.187 Egypt stated that civilian protection 
efforts should not compel Member States to flout the UN Charter and criticized Kofi Annan for 
supporting preventive measures without highlighting the necessity of the host state’s consent.188 
                                                          
182 S.C. Res. 1674, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).  
183 Id. ¶ 4. 
184 Press Release, Effective Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Requires Stronger Partnerships, U.N. Press 
Release SC/8575 (Dec. 9, 2005). 
185 U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5319th mtg. 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5319 (Dec. 09, 2005). 
186 Id. at 18. 
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 6. 
  
146 
 
However, during the vote on the resolution, the new non-permanent members of the Security 
Council - Slovakia, Qatar, Ghana, Congo, and Peru - voiced their support for the R2P principle.189  
During the Security Council open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict 
held on June 28, 2006, many governments reacted positively to the R2P reference in Resolution 
1674.190 Some governments commented on the connection Resolution 1674 made between the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict and the R2P principle.191 More governments expressed 
their support for the R2P principle and urged the Security Council to consider ways to 
operationalize it. Briefing the Security Council on the situation of the protection of civilians 
around the world, Jan Egeland, the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, used the R2P framework to highlight the Security Council’s 
obligation to take predictable action to protect civilians under threat and referred to the Security 
Council's reaffirmation of R2P in Resolution 1674.192  
Apart from the reference to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document, Resolution 1674 emphasized the importance of preventing armed conflicts and their 
recurrence. It identified the steps needed to prevent atrocities. It stressed the “need for a 
comprehensive approach towards preventing atrocities through promoting economic growth, 
poverty eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, 
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for, and protection of, human rights.”193 Further, the 
resolution highlighted the primary responsibility of states to protect their populations, in particular, 
the need to maintain security for civilian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 
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Therefore, the resolution, in addition to reiterating the responsibility of states to protect their 
citizens, emphasized the responsibility states have to protect refugees and IDPs.  
Most importantly, the resolution called for the international community to support each 
state’s responsibility to protect its own population, refugees, and other persons protected under 
international humanitarian law. The resolution requested all states comply with applicable 
international law, as well as with the decisions of the Security Council. However, the resolution 
did not create any legal obligation for states to comply with it provisions. The resolution, therefore, 
merely re-iterated long-standing obligations each state has under international law to protect its 
own population during armed conflict.  
Interestingly, Resolution 1674 only discussed states’ and the international community’s 
responsibility to prevent harm to civilian populations during armed conflict. It did not discuss 
other, more contentious issues concerning the R2P principle. For example, it did not address how 
the responsibility to react should be implemented in protecting civilians in an armed conflict or the 
responsibility to rebuild after armed conflicts end. Therefore, although the Security Council 
referred to the R2P principle in the context of protecting civilians in armed conflicts, it failed to 
address controversial issues regarding the responsibilities to react and rebuild. 
4.3.2 Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General on R2P 
 
At the end of August 2007, the UN Secretary General appointed Edward Luck as a Special 
Adviser to focus on the R2P principle, and Luck served in this capacity until July 2012.194 Luck's 
primary task was to focus on the conceptual development of R2P, as well as consensus building 
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and assisting the General Assembly in its ongoing consideration of R2P.195 Luck undertook a 
broad consultative process to develop proposals for consideration by the UN Member States.196 He 
attempted to broaden the support for R2P and encouraged developing countries in Asia and Africa 
to voice their support for the R2P principle during UN debates.197 In August 2008, the Stanley 
Foundation published a policy brief by Luck entitled “The United Nations and the Responsibility 
to Protect.”198 The report contained recommendations to advance the R2P principle. In the brief, 
Luck argued that Member States currently agreed upon the goals of the R2P principle but not on 
the means to achieve them.199 The brief represented Luck’s efforts in operationalizing the R2P 
principle within the UN system. Throughout 2008, Luck spent much of his efforts on trying to 
consolidate the support of Member States and civil society for the R2P principle.  
Luck worked closely with the Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, 
Francis Deng, to develop a revised mechanism to implement R2P within the UN system. Even 
though these two Special Advisors played an important role in coordinating with other UN organs 
in promoting the R2P principle, they were not tasked to fill perceived gaps associated with R2P. 
The Special Advisors were primarily focused on garnishing much needed political will to accept 
and implement the R2P principle. However, they were not successful in achieving this goal. Some 
countries, including China, Russia, and countries of Group of 77 and Non Aligned Movement 
(NAM) were not willing to accept R2P as a principle that affected their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. On the other hand, other countries, in particular the United States, United Kingdom, and 
European democracies, insisted on the need for intervention in crisis situations to protect civilian 
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populations. The Special Advisors were not able to bridge this divide in their individual and 
collaborative efforts. Unfortunately, the Special Advisors were not tasked to address long-debated 
issues associated with R2P, including when to invoke the R2P principle; what actions are required 
of states when invoking R2P; how R2P works procedurally across the responsibilities to prevent, 
react, and rebuild; and how to implement the R2P principle successfully in conflict situations. 
4.3.3 UN Secretary General’s Report on Implementing R2P (2009) 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s report on “Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect” was released on January 12, 2009.200 This report outlined measures and actors involved in 
implementing the R2P principle. 
The Secretary General urged the General Assembly to take the first step by carefully 
considering the strategy for implementing the R2P principle described in the report. He requested 
that Member States take note of his report to help inform the General Assembly’s consideration of 
the R2P principle.201 Further, he insisted that “the task ahead is not to reinterpret or renegotiate the 
conclusions of the World Summit Outcome Document, but to find ways of implementing its 
decision in a fully faithful and consistent manner.”202   
Most importantly, the report tried to address the actual implementation of R2P, which is a 
critical aspect of the principle. According to the report, the ways in which the R2P principle can be 
implemented are identified in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document 
and are consistent with existing international law: (a) the primary responsibility rests with the state 
itself; (b) the international community may provide assistance if requested by the states concerned; 
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(c) the Security Council may take measures in a manner consistent with Chapters VI, VII, and VIII 
of the UN Charter.203  
The report also highlighted the international community’s responsibility to assist states in 
fulfilling their responsibilities to their populations.204 The report enumerated several steps, such as: 
(a) encouraging states to fulfill this responsibility; (b) helping states exercise this responsibility; (c) 
helping states build their capacity to protect and assisting states under stress before crises and 
conflicts break out.205 These measures have to be taken with the consent and cooperation of the 
state. However, the report failed to define more precise guidance on implementation of the R2P 
principle, such as when the international community should take the above measures, what level of 
assistance should be extended by the international community, or what happens when a state 
refuses assistance.  
Further, the report identified the international community’s responsibility to react in a 
timely and decisive manner to states experiencing mass atrocities.206 The report cited two steps 
outlined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. The first is the responsibility to use 
peaceful means to protect populations.207 The second is a wide range of non-peaceful measures 
that may be used if two conditions are satisfied: (1) if peaceful means are inadequate; or (2) state 
authorities fail to protect their own populations. The report outlined measures that the international 
community could use prior to the exercise of non-peaceful measures. These measures include 
diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, and restraint by the five permanent members of the 
Security Council from using their vetoes in situations where there is a manifest failure to protect 
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populations from mass atrocities.208 Further, when exercising non-peaceful measures, the 
international community should take actions through the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.209 By requiring action be taken through the Security Council, the report 
operationalized R2P by grounding it in existing international law. 
Although the report was well received by UN Member States, it was met with much 
criticism. Welsh argued that the report’s focus on capacity building may have been a prudent 
strategy for securing a buy-in from reluctant states, but came at the cost of overlooking questions 
about how resources will be mobilized in non-peaceful efforts to protect vulnerable populations, 
especially after more peaceful means have failed.210 Further, Welsh noted that the Secretary 
General clearly favored prevention over reaction because he believed preventive measures were 
more likely to be integrated into a state’s domestic affairs.211 Thakur argued that the report ignored 
many key questions that required urgent clarification, such as when should R2P be activated as an 
international responsibility; who makes these decisions; and on what basis should such decisions 
be made.212 Thakur asserted that “we seem to be recreating the 2005 consensus instead of 
operationalizing and implementing the agreed collective responsibility.”213 
4.3.4 General Assembly’s First Interactive Debate on R2P (2009) 
Based on the UN Secretary General’s 2009 report on Implementing R2P, the General 
Assembly’s first informal, interactive debate on R2P started on July 23, 2009, and continued from 
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July 24-28, 2009.214 The debates were preceded by a presentation by UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon about his report on implementing R2P. Ban endorsed the concept of "sovereignty as 
responsibility,” indicating that sovereignty and responsibility are “mutually reinforcing 
principles.”215 The Secretary General reiterated that his report seeks to position the R2P principle 
squarely within the UN’s domain and within the UN Charter. He highlighted the responsibility to 
prevent as the most important element of the R2P principle. Ban articulated the hope that states 
will strengthen their respective capacities for early warning and prevention in order to ensure an 
early and flexible response in country-specific situations. Force should only be utilized as a last 
resort and in conformity with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter.216 
The General Assembly debate on R2P provided an opportunity for UN Member States to 
have a dialogue on how they intended to fill the gaps in preventing mass atrocities. Generally, 
Member States included practical examples of how governments were already at work in 
enhancing R2P in their own regions and at national levels.217 Member States also raised concerns 
regarding the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council and stressed the 
need to come to a consensus in the event of mass atrocity crimes.218   
At the international level, UN Member States recommended strengthening the early 
warning systems by bolstering the offices of the Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide 
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and on R2P.219 The Member States also suggested establishing an inter-agency mechanism within 
the UN to assess early warning monitoring information.220 The Member States also proposed that 
the work of the Peacebuilding Commission be linked to the preventative aspects of the R2P 
principle, emphasizing that the lack of post-conflict reconstruction makes the return to conflict 
nearly inevitable. The Member States also stressed the need to increase support for political 
processes at the regional and sub-regional level, as well as strengthening existing structures and 
creating regional standby forces for rapid response.221  
Generally, there was constructive involvement by countries that had been skeptical about 
the R2P principle. However, some delegations expressed caution about R2P. Emphasizing that the 
R2P principle as endorsed in 2005 was not to be renegotiated, a number of Member States 
maintained that the scope of the principle should remain limited to the four crimes.222 Benin and 
Lesotho noted the need for specifying the term “clear threats to international peace and security” in 
order to invoke the R2P principle.223 Chile expressed its concerns that some countries may misuse 
R2P to justify coercive, unilateral interventions.224 Chile also highlighted the risk posed by 
selective application of R2P.225 Sudan called for the General Assembly to be the sole body to 
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authorize the use force and stated that assigning the Security Council to control R2P is equivalent 
to “giving the wolf the responsibility to adopt a lamb.”226 
The Chinese perspective on R2P had not changed from its previous stance.227 China noted 
that the implementation of the R2P principle should not contravene the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. The delegation of China added that: 
[T]he 2005 World Summit Outcome Document gave a very prudent description of the R2P 
principle and the document strictly limited the scope of its application to four serious 
international crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. However, experience in the past few years shows that there is still controversy 
over the meaning and implementation of the R2P principle. The government of a given 
state has the primary responsibility to protect its own citizens. The international community 
can provide assistance, but the protection of its citizens ultimately depends on the 
government of the state. This is in keeping with the principle of state sovereignty. Although 
the world has undergone profound and complex changes, the basic status of the purposes 
and principles of the UN Charter remains unchanged.228 
Therefore, even though there was a positive reply from most UN Member States towards the R2P 
principle, the General Assembly debate on R2P did not clarify or resolve controversies associated 
with the R2P principle. 
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4.3.5 UN Secretary General’s Report on Early Warning, Assessment, and R2P (2010) 
UN Secretary-General Ban released a report on “Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect” on July 14, 2010.229 The report mentioned the lessons learned in the 
1990s.230 The report noted the findings by the UN Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, which stated 
that “there was not sufficient focus or institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis” at 
headquarters and that there was “an institutional weakness in the analytical capacity of the United 
Nations.”231 Given this conclusion, in order to strengthen the UN early warning capacity, the 
report called for improvements in “its capacity to analyze and react to information” and in the flow 
of information within the UN system and to the Security Council, including on human rights 
issues.232 The report highlighted the situation of Srebrenica, and stated that the lack of sufficient 
information sharing was “an endemic weakness throughout the conflict.”233  
The report, however, noted that, over the past decade, there had been several efforts within 
the UN system to address some of these gaps, at least in specific issue areas.234 Therefore, focusing 
on the present capabilities of the UN system, the report found no shortage of information. The 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO), the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the United Nations High Commission 
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for Refugees (UNHCR) all possessed information analysis capabilities and early warning 
mechanisms.235 
However, the report identified several major information gaps, including insufficient 
information sharing and analysis among the UN branches and Member States. It also identified a 
need for assessment tools and increased capacity to ensure both efficiency and system-wide 
coherence in developing responses to R2P situations under Chapter VI, VII, and VIII of the UN 
Charter.236 The report outlined the importance of the “two-way flow of information” between the 
UN and regional and sub-regional organizations that can help close the identified gaps.237 Here, 
the report highlighted the need to develop responses to R2P situations within the UN Charter 
framework and, thus, was not intended to create a new international legal framework for R2P’s 
implementation. The suggestions in this report seem to focus on processes rather than the 
substantive problems with R2P.   
The report called for an informal, interactive dialogue to be held in the General Assembly 
in 2011 on the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in implementing R2P.238 
Furthermore, the report proposed new internal procedures to expedite and regularize the process by 
which the UN considers its response to situations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing.239 The report concluded by stating that, while “early warning does 
not always produce early action, however, such early action is highly unlikely without early 
warning.”240 Early action must be well-informed, which emphasizes the need for sophisticated 
early warning and assessment capabilities.  
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4.3.6 UN Secretary General’s Report on the Role of Regional and Sub-Regional 
Arrangements on Implementing R2P (2011) 
Secretary-General Ban released a report on June 27, 2011, entitled, “The Role of Regional 
and Sub-Regional Arrangements on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.”241 The report 
emphasized the need for the Security Council and regional and sub-regional organizations to 
support and lend legitimacy to each other in implementing R2P. The report highlighted the role 
that the regional and sub-regional organizations perform in protecting populations from mass 
atrocities. It recognized the advantage regional organizations have in preventing as well as reacting 
to mass atrocities. Further, the report established the need for more collaboration among these 
actors, including the areas of best practices and lessons learned, peer review, early warning 
information analysis, and coordination on sanctions or punitive measures.242  
The report emphasized that regional and sub-regional arrangements can assist state 
capacity-building in preventing mass atrocities structurally and operationally.243 The report defined 
structural prevention as changes in domestic contexts that reduce conditions which cause mass 
atrocity crimes, whereas operational prevention relates to more directly forestalling imminent 
threats. The report noted the importance of having a full range of preventive tools at the 
international community’s disposal that can be used to respond to crises early and with greater 
flexibility.244  
The report highlighted the importance of collaboration between regional and sub-regional 
arrangements and other UN organs, such as the Security Council and the Peacebuilding 
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Commission.245 However, the report does not impose or identify any legally binding obligation on 
regional and sub-regional organizations to assist states or collaborate with the UN. The Secretary-
General requested that Member States consider long-term discussions between the Security 
Council and regional and sub-regional organizations in line with their respective commitments to 
collective action as stipulated in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document.  
The Secretary General’s report on the Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements 
on Implementing R2P only addressed preventive efforts. It did not deal with how regional and sub-
regional entities should implement responsibility to react measures. Neither does it discuss issues 
regarding the scope of R2P. Therefore, apart from encouraging states to protect their own 
population and regional and sub-regional entities to prevent mass atrocities, the report did not 
address critical issues associated with the R2P principle.  
4.3.7 UN Secretary General’s Report on the Responsibility to Protect - Timely and Decisive 
Response (2012) 
Another report from the UN Secretary General, entitled “Responsibility to Protect - Timely 
and Decisive Response,” was released on July 25, 2012. It discussed the broad range of non-
coercive and coercive tools available and the role of actors at the international, regional, national, 
and local levels in implementing these tools.246 The report emphasized the importance of 
preventing mass atrocities, but noted that, in cases in which preventive measures proved 
inadequate and the threat to populations remained imminent, the international community had a 
responsibility to take collective action to protect civilians. The report emphatically stated that there 
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is never a question of whether R2P applies to a situation, but how best to implement the 
principle.247  
Primarily, the report emphasized the state’s responsibility to do everything possible to 
prevent the commission of these crimes and violations on its territory, or under its jurisdiction, and 
to stop them whenever they occur.248 The report noted that “the state responsibility may entail an 
element of response, such as suppressing incendiary rhetoric targeting a minority group, or 
disrupting arms shipments that may be used to commit genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.”249 However, the report focused on the international responses to help 
states to prevent atrocities. It discussed the international community’s commitment to help states 
build capacity to protect their populations and assist those which are under stress, and to do so 
before crisis and conflicts break-out.250 It also emphasized the importance of gathering 
information, in particular, through a commission of inquiry. However, the report did not discuss 
any legal consequences of the international community’s failure to extend such assistance.  
The report highlighted the preference for addressing situations first with the appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of 
the Charter.251 The report noted the non-coercive responses stipulated in Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter, including negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.252 
The report asserted that, only after exhausting all non-coercive measures, Member States 
should take timely and decisive collective action in accordance with the UN Charter to protect 
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populations.253 Such collective measures may be authorized by the Security Council, under 
Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. The report named some possible coercive measures, but added 
that, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, only the Security Council can authorize the use of 
force. Toward this end, the report specifically stated that “the coercive military force can be 
utilized in various forms, through the deployment of United Nations-sanctioned multinational 
forces for establishing security zones, the imposition of no-fly zones, the establishment of a 
military presence on land and at sea for protection or deterrence purposes, or any other means, as 
determined by the Security Council.”254 However, the Security Council’s failure to respond to a 
crisis in a timely and adequate manner does not give rise to any breach of a legal obligation. 
Therefore, both the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react are categorized squarely 
within the UN Charter, and, thus, R2P creates no new rights or obligations under international law. 
In fact, the report clearly stated that the R2P principle is a concept based on fundamental principles 
of international law as set out, in particular, in existing international humanitarian, refugee, and 
human rights law.255  
In regards to UN peacekeeping missions, the report described their usual deployment as 
based on the principle of receiving the consent of the host state.256 The report stated that 
peacekeeping missions have a broad range of mechanisms aimed at supporting peaceful political 
transitions and building a host nation’s capacity to protect civilians.  Thus, the report identified the 
responsibility to rebuild as part of peacekeeping missions.257 However, since they are mandated 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect civilians, peacekeeping missions may use force as 
a measure of last resort in situations where civilians are under imminent threat of physical harm.  
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While the report addressed a wide range of issues, it failed to address key issues that 
surround the R2P principle. Although the report highlighted the international community’s 
responsibility to assist host states in its responsibility to protect civilian populations, the report 
made clear that R2P created no new legally binding rights or obligations. The report clearly 
specified the Security Council as the only body that could authorize the use of force, yet it did not 
address the situation where the Security Council failed to take a decision. Therefore, overall, the 
report offered nothing new concerning R2P.  
4.3.8 UN Secretary General’s Report on the Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility 
and Prevention (2013) 
 On July 9, 2013, UN Secretary-General Ban published his fifth report on R2P, “State 
Responsibility and Prevention.”258 The report focused on the responsibility of states to protect their 
populations by developing the necessary national capacity to build societies resilient to mass 
atrocities. The report identified, in varying degrees, six risk factors in situations where atrocities 
were committed. It discussed preventive measures available to governments, with over 40 
examples that have been implemented by Member States.259 The report also outlined targeted 
measures, such as establishing early warning mechanisms or designating an atrocities prevention 
or R2P focal point to prevent atrocities.260  
 However, the report indicated that these outlined measures are not new. Many states had 
already implemented these policy options. Therefore, the report introduced nothing new to the 
responsibility to prevent. Rather, the report, to some extent, attempted to clarify the scope of the 
responsibility of individual states in protecting their populations. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
From its inception in 2001 until 2013, the R2P principle has become ubiquitous in debates 
and responses to humanitarian emergencies. The R2P principle has also encountered political 
resistance from the beginning. However, whether R2P has remedied problems associated with pre-
R2P humanitarian intervention debates, and represents a change in international law, is doubtful.  
 First, the ICISS report did not clarify when to invoke the R2P principle. However, after the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, a consensus emerged that the R2P principle should be 
applicable to four crimes, namely: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. In practice, even within the consensus on these four crimes, states have contested when 
the R2P principle applies. Efforts to apply R2P beyond these four crimes have been widely 
rejected by a majority of Member States. In the case of Burma, for instance, some states argued for 
the application of the R2P principle to cases where a government fails to provide or permit 
humanitarian relief in the wake of natural disasters. Opponents of the application of the R2P 
principle in Burma argued that crimes against humanity are defined under international law to 
encompass a host of inhuman acts which intentionally cause great suffering to any civilian 
population, especially when there is prior knowledge of the action and/or attack.261 These 
opponents claim that restricting life-saving humanitarian aid to victims of a natural disaster does 
not rise to the level of crimes against humanity and, therefore, does not trigger R2P.262 Further, 
Russia appealed to R2P to justify its military action in Georgia. In that case, Russia’s claim of 
civilian abuse by the Georgian government in South Ossetia was not factually verified, and there 
was no agreement on such a claim among other Member States. The rejection of R2P’s application 
to the Burma and Russia-Georgia incidents reinforced the general consensus that the application of 
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R2P should be confined to the four crimes specified in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document.   
Moreover, the incidents that occurred from 2001 to 2013 describe strong support for the 
position that only the Security Council can authorize the use of military force under the 
responsibility to react. Except in the case of Russia’s use of force in Georgia, no incidents occurred 
during the period under review where any state used force under R2P without Security Council 
authorization. However, neither the ICISS report nor the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
expressly addressed whether international law permitted the unilateral use of force to address mass 
atrocity. Neither did either document prohibit such unilateral use of force without Security Council 
authorization. Although Russia, China, and many other states stressed the need for the Security 
Council to authorize the use of force under R2P, some states, in particular the United States and 
United Kingdom, justify the unilateral use of force under international law as a response to 
humanitarian atrocities.  
In addition, there was no agreement among the Member States on what actions, if any, 
should be taken when R2P is actually invoked. For example, the use of force in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Libya raised doubts about how, and to what extent, the use of force should be carried out. In both 
cases, criticisms were leveled against the excessive use of force. Excessive use of force under the 
responsibility to react is also one of the apparent reasons behind the unwillingness of Security 
Council members to take action in Syria.  
There has been a clear emphasis on the state’s primary responsibility to protect its 
populations from mass atrocities. In fact, this responsibility is grounded in long-standing 
international law. However, the ICISS report and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
emphasized the international community’s responsibility to assist other states in their conflict-
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prevention efforts.263 The responsibility of the international community to help prevent human 
rights violations in another state is clearly specified under international law.264 In fact, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide noticeably specified the 
international community’s undertaking to prevent occurrences of genocide.265 Therefore, the 
concept of the international community’s responsibility to help prevent human rights violations in 
another state already existed in international law and is not a new idea introduced by the R2P 
principle. On the other hand, state practice did not demonstrate any desire to create or impose legal 
obligations on states to provide assistance to other states to help with the responsibility to prevent, 
to participate in actions under the responsibility to react, or contribute to the responsibility to 
rebuild.    
 There was also no consistency in the application of the R2P principle in various other crises 
that occurred during this period. Although some cases have been identified as possible cases of 
mass atrocities, there were political refusals to apply the R2P principle. This variation suggests that 
R2P remains heavily dependent on political decisions of states rather than on the operation of legal 
principles. For example, there was no consensus among the Member States on whether to invoke 
R2P in Sri Lanka. In fact, the UN acknowledged its own failure in meeting its responsibilities in 
Sri Lanka. A similar situation was seen in the R2P controversies connected to Gaza. The political 
decisions on the application of R2P in different crises were influenced by disagreements over state 
sovereignty and the use of force.  
A similar political division over sovereignty and the use of force existed under the pre-R2P 
humanitarian intervention debate. The four crimes identified in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
                                                          
263 ICISS, supra note 1, ¶ 3.3. 
264 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].  
265 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260 
(III)A.  
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Document as cases in which R2P should be exercised are similar to the emphasis on grave and 
systematic violations of human rights as the required trigger for pre-R2P humanitarian 
intervention. Although many countries emphasize the requirement for Security Council 
authorization of the use of force, some Member States continue to argue that international law 
includes the right to use force for humanitarian purposes without Security Council authorization. 
This disagreement also characterized pre-R2P debates in international law about humanitarian 
intervention. Moreover, there is no consensus on what actions should be taken when states exercise 
the responsibility to react, and similar problems arose with humanitarian interventions before 
articulation of the R2P principle. 
Both Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that the emergence and evolution of the R2P principle have 
not changed international law from what existed before the R2P principle appeared in 2001. The 
analysis has mentioned what problems associated with the R2P principle also formed part of the 
controversies in international law about humanitarian intervention. To further explore the use of 
the R2P principle after its articulation in 2001, the next chapters analyze in detail, four case 
studies: Darfur, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Syria. 
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CHAPTER 5 
   DARFUR 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of four chapters that critically analyze key R2P case 
studies. These case studies probe at a deeper level of detail how state and other actors 
used the R2P principle. To achieve this objective, the case studies analyze state practice 
within and beyond the UN regarding the responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild. By 
doing so, the case studies examine how the R2P principle has been applied and what 
problems have emerged from this application. Ultimately, the case studies help determine 
whether state practice reveals if the R2P principle represents a change in international 
law. 
This chapter focuses on violence and atrocities in Darfur, the first major 
humanitarian crisis that developed after the ICISS articulated the R2P principle in 2001. 
The challenges faced in Darfur were urgent and critical, yet the international community 
failed to take timely action in response to mass atrocities in Darfur. This tragic failure to 
respond was much criticized and considered by many to be a significant failure in terms 
of the R2P principle.  
5.2 Background to the Crisis in Darfur 
Darfur is situated at the western corner of Sudan and shares borders with Chad in 
the west, Libya in the northwest, and the Central African Republic in the southwest.1 
                                                          
1 Sudan Profile, BBC (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094995. 
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Known as the homeland of the Fur ethnic tribe, Darfur is home to many other ethnic 
tribes as well. In addition to the Fur, the Masalit and Zaghawa are the other main black 
African ethnic groups. Other large ethnic groups in Darfur are of Arab or migrant Arab 
descent and include the Rizeigat, Mahariya, Iraqat, and Beni Hussein tribes.2 The 
northern part of Darfur is dominated by the traditional camel-herding Nordic Abbala 
tribe, while the eastern and southern parts are inhabited by the cattle-herding Baggara 
tribe.3 Thus, Darfur consists of an incredibly diverse variety of tribes and smaller ethnic 
groupings.4  
Once an independent Muslim sultanate, Darfur was ruled by the Daju and the 
Tunjur tribes from 1856 to 1916.5 After 1916, Darfur was incorporated into the Sudan, 
which was already under British rule.6 Under British rule, Darfur was marginalized and 
lacked sufficient infrastructure, economic, or educational development to cope with the 
advances in other parts of the country. Sudan gained independence in 1956. A small elite 
in Khartoum, who had gained wealth and power, ruled Sudan and further marginalized 
Darfur with a divide-and-rule strategy that suppressed any potential opposition.7  
In the mid-1980s, the economically deprived population in the north of Darfur 
faced extreme hardships because of a drought that started in the mid-1970s. All attempts 
                                                          
2 Ibrahim Fouad, Introduction to the Conflict in Darfur/West Darfur, in EXPLAINING DARFUR 12 (Agnes 
van Ardenne-van der Hoeven, Mohamed Salih, Nick Grono, and Juan Mendez eds., 2006). 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Darfur Sultanate: 1596-1916, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/darfur1.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
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at agricultural cultivation were rendered impotent by the drought.8 The drought 
conditions caused thousands of Darfuris to walk across the country to Khartoum seeking 
food. Declaring them as refugees from Chad, the Sudanese government trucked them to 
Kurdufan, where there was no food or water for them to survive and, as a result, most of 
them died. In the meantime, an Arab militia, later called the Janjaweed, was formed with 
the blessing of the government in Khartoum, and it fought against local African farmers 
to gain access to more pastures.9  
From 1987 to 1989, local tribes fought with Arab-origin groups for water and 
grazing land. These conflicts deepened the division among non-Arab tribes and Arab-
origin groups. The Arab-origin groups with the support of government-backed Rizaiqat 
militiamen attacked many non-Arab ethnic villages. The Sudan Liberation Army 
retaliated against one of these attacks against ethnic Dinka villages in western Bahr al-
Ghazal and killed Rizaiqat militiamen. In March 1987, Rizaiqat militiamen and Arab 
townspeople attacked a Dinka village in al-Da’ien and killed thousands of ethnic Dinka 
as apparent revenge for Sudan Liberations Army’s killing of Rizaiqat militiamen.10  
Omar Hassan al-Bashir, supported by the Arab militia, came to power in Sudan in 
1989. The government of Sudan started implementing policies that created a binge of 
hatred against African tribes in Darfur and caused Arab militias to further arm 
themselves. The enactment of new administrative boundaries by the government of 
                                                          
8 Human Rights First, About the Crisis, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/darfur/about/background.asp (last visited Nov. 30, 
2013). 
9 Id.  
10 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United 
Nations Secretary General:  Rep. of the Secretary General 21 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at  
http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.  
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Sudan in 1993 frustrated African farmers in Darfur even more. By 2001, more local 
tribesmen joined local paramilitaries to fight against Janjaweed militias.11 
Although tensions and violence in Darfur were increasing, these problems 
remained localized because western Sudan was politically and economically sidelined by 
the central government in Khartoum.12 However, two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) began launching continuous 
attacks against the Sudanese government in early 2003.13 The aim of the SLA and JEM 
was to force the government of Sudan to address economic issues and political problems 
experienced by non-Arabs in Darfur.14 The government’s response was a series of brutal 
attacks against ethnic African tribes. The government launched attacks against civilians 
using both conventional military forces and Arab militias.15 By late 2003, the escalating 
violence was not limited to Darfur, but extended to neighboring regions as well.  While 
ground attacks were carried-out by the militia, the government’s Air Force launched 
aerial bombardments, including with cluster bombs. The government-backed Janjaweed 
militia, which was largely composed of fighters of Arab background, together with 
government military, paramilitary, and police personnel, employed genocidal tactics 
against civilians, including aerial bombing, shelling, ground attacks, kidnapping, torture, 
and extra-judicial executions.16  
                                                          
11 Int’l Crisis Group, Conflict History: Sudan, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=101 (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2013).  
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 11. 
16 Human Rights First, supra note 8.   
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By the end of 2004, the situation in Darfur worsened when the government 
decided to withdraw local police and other officials, ostensibly claiming the inability to 
guarantee their safety.17 With the removal of the local police and all vestiges of legal 
protection, the Janjaweed filled the power vacuum with its own atrocities. Comparing the 
Darfur atrocities with those that occurred in Rwanda, observers claimed Darfur was 
“Rwanda in slow motion.”18  
Darfur was characterized by the UN, as well as most Western states, as the most 
serious humanitarian emergency in the world.19 According to the BBC, tens of thousands 
of deaths were reported, and many more Darfur citizens fled their homes.20 Constant 
harassment by the government of Sudan meant virtually all humanitarian work was either 
prohibited or diminished to the point of total ineffectiveness. The humanitarian situation 
in Darfur deteriorated into tragedy, and the livelihood of the population was devastated. It 
was clear that the harm was serious enough to merit an international response, including 
with possible military intervention, and there was an urgent need to stop human 
suffering.21 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Id.  
18 Scott Straus, Rwanda and Darfur: A Comparative Analysis, 1 GENOCIDE STUDIES AND PREVENTION 41, 
45, 46 (July 2006). 
19 Paul Williams & Alex Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, 36 SEC. 
DIALOGUE 127 (2005). 
20 UN's Darfur Death Estimate Soars, BBC News (Mar. 14, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4349063.stm. 
21 Human Rights First, supra note 8.   
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5.3 Darfur, the Genocide Question, and the R2P Principle 
For many analysts, Darfur represented an important test case for R2P, a test which 
the R2P principle is generally reckoned to have failed.22 Many experts argue that the R2P 
principle failed to generate sufficient political will to mount and sustain a robust 
response, including the deployment of appropriately mandated peacekeepers to protect 
the Darfur civilian population.23 Others took the criticism farther and argued that the R2P 
principle itself has its own inherent shortcomings.24 Critics of R2P argued that the 
attention paid to the R2P principle caused outside actors to focus on the conditions for the 
deployment of peacekeepers, rather than the conflict’s underlying causes.25  
As the violence and massacres continued in Darfur, much attention focused on 
whether the crisis should be called “genocide.”26 According to Jamal Jaafary, Senior 
Research Assistant with the Public International Law and Policy Group in Washington, 
D.C., whether genocide was committed in Darfur received such attention because, from a 
legal point of view, applying the term genocide to a crisis situation is not simple.27 Eric 
Reeves, an advocate for Darfur, added that a finding of genocide would have been a 
political hazard for the Security Council and for states.28 Explaining the importance of 
                                                          
22 DAVID MEPHAM, DARFUR: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 46 (2007); Cristina Bedescu & Linnea 
Bergholm, Responsibility to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down, 40 SEC. DIALOGUE 287 
(2009). 
23 MEPHAM, supra note 22, at 46; LEE FEINSTEIN, DARFUR AND BEYOND: WHAT IS NEEDED TO PREVENT 
MASS ATROCITIES 84 (2007). 
24 ALEX BELLAMY, GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS 53 
(2011).  
25 Roberto Bellioni, The Tragedy of Darfur and the Limits of Responsibility to Protect, 5 ETHNOPOLITICS 
327 (2006). 
26 Scott Straus, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 123 (Jan. 2005). 
27 Int’l Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Darfur, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/37-the-crisis-in-darfur/268-darfur-the-question-of-
genocide (last visited Dec. 10, 2013).  
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the genocide question in Darfur, John Hefferman, a Senior Communications Associate 
with Physicians for Human Rights, explained that there is no need for genocide to occur 
in order to take action under R2P.29 However, he stated that, in order to apply the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention), it was important whether genocidal acts were committed in Darfur.30  
Whether crimes of genocide had been committed in Darfur is important for R2P 
analysis because genocide is one of the crimes stipulated in both the ICISS report and the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document that justifies the international community to 
take action under the R2P principle. Of the four crimes widely recognized as within the 
R2P principle, genocide is considered the most serious. Identifying a crisis as genocide 
heightens the responsibility of the international community to act. If genocide had 
occurred in Darfur, then there was a clear failure of the Security Council and states to 
implement R2P. Also, those states that are parties to the Genocide Convention have 
international legal obligations to respond. 
Therefore, under both the R2P principle and other international legal rules, 
determining whether the acts of genocide have occurred increases the pressure for the 
international community to mount some response. Thus, whether the “genocide question” 
distracted the international community from applying the R2P principle to the atrocities 
in Darfur, and whether the controversy in Darfur involved genocide, played into the 
ambiguity about when thresholds are crossed concerning the four crimes that R2P 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 Eric Reeves, Darfur Mortality Update (Mar. 11, 2005), 
http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=thread
&order=0&thold=0sudanreeves.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
29 Int’l Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 27. 
30 Id.  
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addresses. These concerns need further analysis in order to understand how the genocide 
question affected the politics of the R2P principle in the Darfur crisis.  
In 1944, a Polish-Jewish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, described Nazi policies of 
organized murder, including the brutal and systematic destruction of European Jews as 
genocide.31 He formed the word "genocide" by combining geno-, from the Greek word 
for race or tribe, with -cide, derived from the Latin word for killing.32 In proposing this 
new term, Lemkin had in mind "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves."33 In 1945, the International Military Tribunal held at 
Nuremberg, Germany, charged Nazis leaders with “crimes against humanity” and the 
word “genocide” was included in the indictment.34  
The Genocide Convention, adopted in 1948, identified five characteristics of 
genocide: “(1) killing members of a particular ethnic group; (2) causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group; (3) forcibly transferring children of a group to 
another group; (4) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction; and (5) imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group.”35  
The Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide subsequently informed 
international legal efforts against this problem. For example, the Rome Statute 
                                                          
31 Holocaust Encyclopedia, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007043 (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2013). 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 174 
 
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 defines the crime of genocide 
as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group: “(1) killing members of the group; (2) 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (3) deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part; (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (5) forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.”36 
With the escalation of violence in Darfur, Nichlas Kristof, a columnist for the 
New York Times, published a number of articles claiming that the crimes carried out in 
Darfur were nothing less than genocide.37 Secretary of State Colin Powell used the word 
“genocide” in reference to Darfur.38 The U.S. House of Representatives also adopted a 
resolution labeling the Darfur crisis as genocide.39 Citing the Genocide Convention, the 
resolution called for the Bush administration to consider multilateral or unilateral 
intervention to prevent genocide.40 However, interpreting U.S. international obligations 
differently, Secretary of State Powell stated that, in addition to providing humanitarian 
relief, the United States had already pressured the government of Sudan to stop abuses 
and that merely applying the “genocide” label would not create legal obligations to 
                                                          
36 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, July 17, 1998, A/CONF.183/9. 
37 Nicholas D. Kristof, Dare We Call It Genocide? N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/16/opinion/dare-we-call-it-genocide.html; Nicholas D. Kristof, The 
Secret Genocide Archive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/23/opinion/23kristof.html.   
38 Straus, supra note 26, at 123; Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, 
Khartoum and Arab Militias Are Responsible, Powell Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html.  
39 Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, ¶ 3, Pub. L. No. 109–344, 120 Stat. 1869; Minority Rts. 
Group Int’l, State of the World's Minorities 2006 – Sudan (Dec. 22, 2005), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abdd712.html. 
40 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian 
Intervention after Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 31 (Sept. 2005). 
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provide more assistance or apply more pressure.41 Interestingly, however, in June 2009, 
General Scott Gration, President Barack Obama’s Special Envoy for Sudan, concluded 
that the situation in Darfur was not genocide.42 
According to Straus, the proponents of applying the “genocide” label to the 
Darfur crisis highlighted two points: “first they claim the events that occurred in Darfur 
met the general standard for genocide: the violence targeted ethnic groups and such 
violence was systematic and intentional, also those acts received government support; 
and, second, they claim that under the Genocide Convention, using the term triggers an 
international intervention to halt the violence.”43  
The UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, appointed by the UN 
Secretary General to determine whether genocide had occurred in Darfur, concluded in 
2005 that “it had found a pattern of mass killings and forced displacement of civilians 
that did not constitute genocide, but that represented serious crimes that should be sent to 
the ICC for prosecution.”44 The Commission alleged that, although genocide had not 
been committed, "it should not be taken in any way as detracting from the gravity of the 
crimes perpetrated in that region," and that "international offenses such as the crimes 
against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less 
serious and heinous than genocide."45 While the Commission said that no evidence of 
                                                          
41 Id. 
42 Eric Reeves, Obama and Sudan: The Futility of Mere Hopefulness, SOUTH SUDAN NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 
2, 2011), http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/analyses?start=201). 
43 Straus, supra note 26, at 128, 129. 
44 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, 
supra note 10. 
45 Id. ¶ 89; Warren Hoge, U.N. Finds Crimes, Not Genocide in Darfur, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 1, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/01/international/africa/01sudan.html?_r=0. 
45 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, 
supra note 10, ¶ 459.  
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organized governmental acts of genocide existed, it suggested some government officials 
and other people might have acted "with genocidal intent."46 The Commission strongly 
suggested that the Security Council should refer the Darfur atrocities to the ICC. It said 
the crimes in Darfur met the jurisdictional terms of the 1998 treaty that created the 
court.47  
Some Member States supported the Commission’s recommendation, while China, 
Russia, and several other states invoked the primacy of the responsibility of the state. 
These countries argued that it would be premature to take collective action in Darfur, as 
the government of Sudan had not manifestly failed to exercise its responsibility to protect 
the people in Darfur.48 The Bush administration had frequently pushed for action against 
Sudan, charging that Sudan’s involvement in violence against black African tribes 
amounted to genocide.49 At the same time, the United States initially objected to referring 
the atrocities in Darfur to the ICC, opposition rooted in the Bush administration’s 
position on the ICC.50  
So far, the Holocaust and Rwanda are the only two incidents that are generally 
recognized as genocidal events. Other occurrences in Armenia, Bosnia, Cambodia, or the 
Democratic Republic of Congo are documented as mass killings but not universally 
described as genocide. However, although hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed, 
tens of thousands were displaced in camps, and their infrastructure and livelihoods were 
destroyed, the international community could not agree whether to frame Darfur as 
                                                          
46 Id. ¶ 520. 
47 Id. ¶¶ 647, 648. 
48 Straus, supra note 26, at 123. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
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genocide and take timely action to halt what was labeled as the worst humanitarian 
disaster on the planet.51 Thus, this controversy about whether genocide occurred in 
Darfur caused problems for the application of the R2P principle in Darfur. 
5.4 The Application of the R2P Principle in International Responses to the Darfur 
Crisis 
After it erupted, regional and international entities addressed the Darfur crisis in 
various ways. The African Union (AU) undertook several measures to try to prevent mass 
killings, and the UN adopted a number of resolutions urging all parties involved in the 
conflict to take the necessary steps to prevent and end the violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. Some of the resolutions highlighted the responsibility of 
the government of Sudan to protect its citizens. Other resolutions tried to garner 
international support to solve the conflict diplomatically. In addition to monitoring the 
situation in Darfur throughout the conflict, the UN established peacekeeping forces, with 
the goal of ending the mass atrocities and safeguarding civilian lives.  
Despite all the measures taken by the AU and the UN, they failed to protect 
civilians or solve the Darfur crisis. Therefore, how the AU and the UN responded to the 
Darfur crisis is worth analyzing to understand how state practice handled the R2P 
principle during this crisis. 
 
   
                                                          
51 Id. 
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5.4.1 Responsibility to Prevent  
 From the beginning of the crisis in Darfur, the UN and the international community 
acted to prevent atrocities. The AU supported a number of measures, including ceasefire 
agreements and negotiations, to bring peace to Darfur. The UN also made various 
attempts, which included, for example, the adoption of resolutions calling for the 
cessation of violence and threatening to take more stringent actions to prevent further 
escalation of violence in Darfur.  
 As stipulated by the ICISS report and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, 
the primary responsibility to prevent atrocities is with the individual state. The ICISS 
report points out that “state sovereignty implies responsibility,” and the primary 
responsibility to protect its population lies with each individual state.52 Similarly, the 
World Summit Outcome Document spells out the international community’s 
responsibility to assist a state in fulfilling its responsibility to prevent atrocities in its 
territory.53   
 As Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Sudan and 
head of UN peace support operations, stated, the government of Sudan had the primary 
responsibility for protecting the population of Darfur and ending the crisis.54 Bellamy 
argues that Pronk implied that the crisis had barely gone beyond the first level of 
responsibility identified by the ICISS.55 Pronk further argued that, “if the government is 
                                                          
52 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, REPORT 2001: THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, ¶ 2.29 (2001), available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
53 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, ¶ 138, G.A Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).  
54 U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5027th  mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 5027 (Sept. 2, 2004).  
55 Bellamy, supra note 40, at 46. 
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unable to fully protect its citizens by itself, then it should request and accept the 
assistance from the international community.”56 Therefore, the government of Sudan bore 
the responsibility to prevent mass atrocities against its populations and protect them from 
such violence.  
 For years, the AU made efforts to seek an international and political solution to the 
crisis in Darfur. The first agreement which sought to end the Darfur crisis was the 
N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, signed on April 8, 2004, between the 
government of Sudan, the SLA, and the JEM.57  This pact, however, was rushed and not 
fully accepted by AU Member States. The agreement allowed the AU to deploy ceasefire 
monitors and troops for the protection of the civilian population. Under this agreement, 
by mid-2004, the AU established a small monitoring mission (AMIS) consisting of some 
60 monitors and 300 troops.58 The mission’s goal was to monitor and observe compliance 
of the parties to the humanitarian ceasefire agreement signed in N’Djamena, contribute to 
the improvement of the general security situation in Sudan, provide a secure environment 
for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the safe return of refugees, and protect the 
civilian population in Darfur.59  
Attempting to implement the mandate with a limited number of troops and 
resources was a challenge for AMIS, and, rather than protecting civilians, AMIS had to 
protect its personnel from rebels and the Janjaweed militia.60 Therefore, AMIS could not 
                                                          
56 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 5027, supra note 54, at 3.  
57 Darfur Peace Agreement (Apr. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Darfur_Peac_Agreement-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).  
58 Bellamy, supra note 40, at 40.  
59 Darfur Peace Agreement, supra note 57.  
60 Max W. Matthews, Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: The Responsibility to Protect 
and the Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT’L & COM. L. REV. 145 (2008). 
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achieve its objectives for many reasons, including, but not limited to, AMIS’ restricted 
mandate and acts of violence directed against it. Another major drawback with the AMIS 
effort was the limited number of troops and the inadequate financing of this military 
force. The AMIS force was too small and, because there was no proper mechanism for 
raising money, it was grossly underfunded by the AU. The African countries that 
deployed troops could not afford the cost of the deployment. Financial support for AMIS 
was far from adequate, and the necessary financial and logistical resources were not 
available for AMIS to carry out a successful mission.61 The AU effort, however well-
intended, did not have sufficient strength to undertake its mandate, and these factors 
hindered the effective performance of AMIS.62 
AMIS failed in its responsibility to prevent further atrocities and to protect 
civilians in Darfur. Given this failure, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that the 
world’s peacekeeping strategy in Darfur was not working and that AMIS had failed to 
protect civilians.63 Therefore, it was clear that, with regard to AMIS, the responsibility of 
the international community to prevent violence against civilians in Darfur had failed.  
While AMIS struggled to protect civilians in Darfur, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1547 on June 11, 2004, establishing the UN Advance Mission in the Sudan 
(UNAMIS).64  The resolution was based on the recommendation of Secretary General 
                                                          
61 World is Responsible for Ending Terrible Violence in Sudan, Annan Says, U.N. NEWS CENTER (Sept 24, 
2004), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?cr=&cr1=&newsid=12044#.UqqShzKA1dg. 
62 Matthews, supra note 60, at 145; Alex de Waal, Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect, 
83 ROYAL INST. INT’L AFF. 1041 (2007), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2007/83_61039-1054.pdf. 
63 UN Admits Sudan Policies Failing, INNER PRESS SERVICE (Dec. 22, 2004), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2004/12/politics-un-admits-sudan-policies-failing/; Bellamy, supra note 40, at 44. 
64 S.C. Res. 1547, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1547 (June 11, 2004).  
 181 
 
Annan, and aimed to strengthen the peace efforts of AMIS.65 UNAMIS was mandated to 
facilitate interactions with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an 
envisaged UN peace support operation.66 The Secretary General also appointed Pronk as 
his Special Representative for the Sudan and head of UNAMIS. Pronk was responsible 
for leading the UN peacemaking support to the AU-mediated discussions on the conflict 
in Darfur.67 Special Representative Pronk and UNAMIS were deeply engaged in Darfur 
over the subsequent months, particularly in supporting the AU and its mission in Sudan, 
by participating in the Abuja peace talks, and establishing a UN assistance cell in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, which supported deployment and management of UNAMIS.68 
However, during the adoption of Resolution 1547, some UN Member States 
refused to discuss the Darfur situation.69 The conflict in Darfur proved a very contentious 
issue among the Member States on the Security Council.70 Some Member States, such as 
Pakistan, China, and Algeria, and countries with close ties to Sudan, were not in 
agreement with any Security Council discussion concerning Darfur.71 The Sudanese did 
not want the Darfur crisis to be a UN issue either.72 Abdallah Baali, the Algerian 
Ambassador to the UN, conceded there was "disagreement about whether or not we 
should address the situation concerning Darfur, but we got a letter from the Secretary 
General last week saying we cannot ignore the western part of Sudan, and so we reached 
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an agreement to include it."73 Pakistan reminded the Security Council that Sudan is an 
important member of the AU and has all rights and privileges under the UN Charter, 
including sovereignty, political independence, unity, and territorial integrity.74 As a 
result, Pakistan, China, and Russia argued that the scale of human rights violations in 
Darfur was not sufficient to declare that Sudan failed in performing its responsibility 
towards its population.75 In essence, they defended the behavior of the government of 
Sudan. The views of these Member States also clearly indicated their anxiety over 
possible intervention against a sovereign state.  
As a response to the escalating crisis in Darfur, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1556 on July 30, 2004, assigning additional tasks to UNAMIS.76 The 
resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded that the government 
of Sudan disarm the Janjaweed militias, apprehend and bring to justice its leaders and 
their associates who incited and carried out violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, as well as other atrocities in Darfur. The resolution highlighted the 
government of Sudan’s primary responsibility to protect human rights while maintaining 
law and order and protect its population within its territory. Further, it declared that all 
parties to the conflict in Darfur are obliged to respect international humanitarian law.77 It 
also called on the government to fulfill all the commitments made in the joint 
communiqué issued by itself and the UN Secretary General on July 3, 2004, particularly 
by facilitating international humanitarian relief by means of a moratorium on all 
restrictions that might hinder the provision of assistance and access to the affected 
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populations.78 It requested the government in Khartoum, among other measures, to 
advance an independent investigation, in cooperation with the UN, of human rights 
violations and international humanitarian law.79 
The resolution also requested the Secretary General to consider further actions, 
including measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter, in the event of non-compliance.80 
According to Article 41, the Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, including 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations. Endorsing the deployment of international monitors by the AU, the resolution 
also urged the international community to support those efforts by providing personnel 
and other assistance, including financing, supplies, transport, vehicles, command support, 
communications, and headquarters support.81  
Resolution 1556 was adopted by 13 votes in favor to none against, with 2 
abstentions (China, Pakistan), and many states expressed support for immediate action to 
stop atrocities in Darfur. During the vote on Resolution 1556, the United States favored 
possible sanctions, including an arms embargo and travel ban on identified officials of the 
government of Sudan.82 However, Pakistan opposed any threat of sanctions against 
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Sudan and argued that such actions would violate Sudanese sovereignty.83 The Arab 
League, China, and Russia also opposed any sanctions against Sudan.84 These Member 
States believed that the primary responsibility of safeguarding the Darfur population 
remained with the government of Sudan.85 They also feared that any discussion on Darfur 
in the Security Council would lead to possible military intervention.  
Given Sudan’s failure to comply with earlier resolutions, the Security Council, on 
September 18, 2004, adopted Resolution 1564.86 Recalling prior Resolutions 1502 
(2003), 1547 (2004), and 1556 (2004), Resolution 1564 threatened the imposition of 
sanctions against Sudan if it failed to comply with its obligations on Darfur. An 
international inquiry was also established to investigate violations of human rights in the 
region.87  
During the vote on Resolution 1564, Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Russia 
abstained. These four countries expressed reservations about the threat of sanctions.88 
They were skeptical about the legitimacy of enforcement measures against Sudan.89 
Algeria argued that the Security Council should respect Sudan’s sovereignty.90 Russia, 
China, and Pakistan opposed the sanctions, stating that the situation in Darfur had 
improved.91 Brazil voted in favor of the draft on the understanding that the resolution 
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could save lives. Brazil also expressed its belief that the Security Council’s excessive use 
of Chapter VII ran the risk of misleading all parties, including international public 
opinion, to think that a peaceful resolution and diplomatic measures were not among the 
steps proposed by the Security Council.92  
Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States, who had co-
sponsored the text along with Germany, Romania, and the United Kingdom, said that:  
[T]he government of Sudan had failed to fully comply with Resolution 1556. This 
text reflected the wishes of some delegations to recognize that the government of 
Sudan had met some of its humanitarian obligations. But nobody should be under 
the illusion that the government of Sudan had done so voluntarily.  It had done so 
with great reluctance and long delays, under significant pressure from the 
international community.93  
Bellamy noted that the resolution was, in fact, toned down to secure adoption by the 
Member States of the Security Council, but, importantly, the United States did not oppose 
the Security Council’s assumption of the responsibility to protect the people of Darfur.94  
On November 19, 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1574 at a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya.95 Recalling Resolutions 1547 (2004), 1556 (2004), 
and 1564 (2004), the resolution expressed its concern about the growing insecurity and 
violence in Darfur and highlighted the government of Sudan’s responsibility to protect its 
population. The resolution offered nothing new from previous resolutions and reiterated 
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its call for the government and rebel groups to respect human rights. The resolution 
welcomed political efforts to resolve the conflicts in Sudan and reiterated its readiness to 
establish a mission to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement.96 
The resolution extended the mandate of UNAMIS for additional three months until 
March 10, 2005. 
On January 9, 2005, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in which an 
interim period was established.97 The CPA was meant to end the Sudanese Civil War 
between forces in north and south Sudan, develop democratic governance countrywide, 
and share oil revenues. The CPA further set a timetable by which South Sudan would 
have a referendum on its independence. However, the CPA did not address the conflict in 
Darfur. On March 24, 2005, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was 
established with a limited mandate under Security Council Resolution 1590.98 Under this 
resolution, the Security Council established UNMIS for an initial period of six months 
with up to 10,000 military personnel, as well as an appropriate civilian component, 
including up to 715 civilian police personnel.99 Further, the resolution requested UNMIS 
closely liaise with AMIS with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to 
foster peace in Darfur.100  
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However, Resolution 1590 did not involve deployment of UNMIS in Darfur and 
invited the Secretary General to investigate the type of assistance UNMIS could provide 
to AMIS.101 During the negotiations of the resolution, the Security Council remained 
divided on the question of whether UNMIS could be redirected to Darfur.102 While the 
United States sought direct authorization of UNMIS to deploy in Darfur, some Member 
States including China, Russia, and Algeria opposed this idea.103  
Human rights violations and atrocities continued throughout 2005 and into 2006, 
and the UN took a number of actions aimed to help prevent violence and protect civilian 
lives in Darfur. Security Council Resolution 1674 was adopted unanimously on April 28, 
2006, reaffirming Resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) concerning the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, and Resolution 1631 (2005) on co-operation between the UN 
and regional organizations.104 Referring to the R2P principle, Resolution 1674 reaffirmed 
the provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the 
responsibility to protect populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity.105 The Security Council highlighted the importance of 
preventing armed conflicts through a comprehensive approach involving economic 
growth, eradication of poverty, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good 
governance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.106 Referring to the 
responsibility to prevent all forms of violence committed against civilians in armed 
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conflict, in particular women and children, the resolution stressed the importance of 
employing all feasible measures to prevent such violence.107  
Given the limited mandate and the resources allocated to UNMIS, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1679 in 2006, in which UNMIS was authorized to take over 
the limited peacekeeping operations of AMIS.108 Invoking the R2P principle, Resolution 
1679 recalled Resolution 1674, specifically the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict.109 The resolution stressed the R2P principle more than previous resolutions by 
emphasizing the requirement to focus on the reconstruction and development of Darfur. 
In the resolution, the Security Council expressed concern over the consequences of the 
prolonged conflict on the civilian population in Darfur and reiterated that all parties had 
to end the violence immediately.110  
There was also a concern that the conflict might affect the rest of Sudan and 
neighboring Chad, with the Security Council noting the deteriorating relations between 
the two countries. The Security Council applauded political efforts, led by the AU, to 
resolve the crisis in Darfur. Furthermore, the efforts of AMIS were welcomed, despite 
exceptionally difficult circumstances. The Security Council envisaged a follow-on UN 
operation in Darfur with African participation.111 The resolution also requested that, 
within a week of any assessment mission returning from assignment, Secretary General 
Annan submit recommendations on the mandate, structure, strength, cost, and potential 
                                                          
107 S.C. Res 1674, supra note 104, ¶ 19.   
108 S.C. Res 1679, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1679 (May 16, 2006).  
109 Id. pmbl. 
110 Id.  
111 Matthews, supra note 60, at 137.  
 189 
 
participants of the anticipated UN operation in Darfur.112 After the adoption of 
Resolution 1679, China said it would not support any further resolutions against Sudan 
under Chapter VII authority, unless approval of the government of Sudan was first 
obtained.113  
On April 30, 2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1755 
extending the UNMIS mandate until October 31, 2007.114 Despite many efforts by the 
UN to bring peace and stability in Darfur, violence continued between the government of 
Sudan and rebel groups.  By the end of 2007, the number of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) within Darfur spiked to more than 2.4 million.115 In the meantime, the November 
2008 ceasefire offer by the Sudanese leader was rejected by rebel groups.116 As the 
violence continued, in March 2010, the government of Sudan and JEM signed a ceasefire 
agreement in which President Bashir declared the cessation of Darfur’s war. However, 
clashes between government forces and rebel groups continued in Darfur.117  
For its part, UNMIS has continued to support the implementation of the CPA by 
providing logistical support to the parties, monitoring and verifying their security 
arrangements, and offering assistance in a number of areas, including governance, rescue, 
and development.118 On July 9, 2011, the mandate of the UNMIS formally ended 
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following the conclusion of the 78-month interim period set up by the government of 
Sudan and SPLM during the signing of the CPA on January 9, 2005.119  
However, UNMIS failed to achieve the targeted results for the same reasons that 
undermined AMIS. These included, but were not limited to, the restricted mandate of 
UNMIS, disturbing activities by rebel groups, and a deficiency of resources, including a 
lack of troop contributions.120 The entire UNAMIS and UNMIS’ preventive efforts in 
Sudan were based on the consent of the government of Sudan and, therefore, it 
functioned under this constraint. Without the consent or cooperation of the government of 
Sudan, neither UNAMIS nor UNMIS could effectively support the responsibility to 
prevent. As a result, UNMIS faced numerous obstacles in implementing its mandate and 
the government of Sudan paid no interest in cooperating with it.121 
In particular, UNMIS had a limited role in providing the necessary security for 
civilians, so that, from the start of UNMIS’ operation, security in Darfur remained 
unsettled.122 The warring parties did not have a positive attitude or trust towards UNMIS, 
and they did not have confidence that UNMIS could provide security. UNMIS had no 
robust mandate to punish violators or effectively enforce the law, which resulted in less 
respect and credibility for UNMIS.123 Moreover, countries that pledged troops did not 
fulfill their pledges, while those which offered troops failed to meet the deployment 
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plans. These problems slowed down UNMIS’ plans for protecting civilians. In addition, 
financial contributions were slow, and UNMIS was regularly underfunded.124  
Throughout the entire crisis, China and Russia maintained the importance of 
respecting the primacy of Sudan’s sovereignty.125 Both countries behaved in ways that 
significantly limited the mandate of UNMIS. For example, China opposed UNMIS’ 
human rights budget, while Russia delayed sending radio broadcasting equipment that it 
had pledged.126 In terms of other Security Council members, France was more focused on 
the effects of displaced persons in nearby countries, such as Chad, than the problems 
within Darfur itself.127 The United States and the United Kingdom, meanwhile, insisted 
that the Security Council impose sanctions against the government of Sudan.128  
These divisions within the Security Council, accompanied by various other 
factors, such as absence of a status-of-forces agreement and other constraints imposed by 
the government of Sudan, delayed the deployments under UNAMIS and later UNMIS. 
The slow, non-committal, and inadequate response by the international community 
marked an abject failure to prevent atrocities against the civilian population in Darfur 
under the R2P principle. 
5.4.2. Responsibility to React 
The international community, in particular the UN, took a number of measures 
concerning Darfur invoking the responsibility to react under R2P with a view to 
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protecting civilians from further atrocities. This section analyzes the UN’s 
implementation of the responsibility to react, which includes the Secretary General’s 
appointment of the Commission of Inquiry into the Darfur situation, referral of the matter 
to the ICC, and imposition of sanctions against Sudan.  
5.4.2.1 Commission of Inquiry  
The situation in Darfur worsened towards the end of 2004 and the beginning of 
2005, and, as analyzed above, UNMIS failed to protect the population in Darfur.129 In his 
monthly report on Darfur to the Security Council, Secretary General Annan noted, in 
November 2004, the cease-fire breaches by all parties, a failure to disarm militias, and an 
escalation of violence in Darfur.130 Given the rapid escalation of violence, Pronk, the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General to Sudan, noted the importance of 
deploying international peacekeepers into the region in order to stabilize the situation.131 
The Secretary General, acting pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564,   
appointed an International Commission of Inquiry, which assembled in Geneva and 
began its work on October 25, 2004. The Commission presented its report on Darfur to 
the Security Council on January 25, 2005.132 The Commission took as its starting point 
two irrefutable facts regarding the situation in Darfur: “firstly, according to UN estimates 
there are 1.65 million internally displaced persons in Darfur and more than 200,000 
refugees from Darfur in neighboring Chad; secondly, there has been large-scale 
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destruction of villages throughout the three states in Darfur.”133 The Commission 
conducted independent investigations to establish additional facts and gathered extensive 
information on multiple incidents of violations affecting villages, towns, and other 
locations across North, South, and West Darfur. The conclusions of the Commission 
were based on the evaluation of the facts gathered or verified through its investigations. 
Based on a thorough analysis of the information it gathered, the Commission 
established that the government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed militia were responsible 
for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to 
crimes under international law.134 In particular, the Commission found that government 
forces and affiliated militias were conducting indiscriminate attacks, including the killing 
of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape, and other 
forms of sexual violence, pillaging, and forced displacement throughout Darfur. These 
acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and, therefore, amounted to 
crimes against humanity.135 
Interestingly, as discussed above, despite the findings of “widespread and 
systematic” violence against the people of Darfur, the Commission concluded that the 
government of Sudan had not committed genocide.136 According to the Commission, 
although gross violations of human rights had been perpetrated by the government and 
militias under its control, a finding of genocide required clear and convincing evidence of 
two elements: first, the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or 
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mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical 
destruction; and second, on the basis of a subjective standard, the existence of a protected 
group being intentionally targeted by the authors of criminal conduct.137 The Commission 
concluded that the crucial element of genocidal intent was missing, at least as far as 
central government authorities were concerned. However, the Commission also 
recognized that, in some instances, individuals, including government officials, might 
have committed acts with genocidal intent.138  
Bellamy noted that the Commission’s report ignited debate about where to 
prosecute accused war criminals.139 The European Union, including the United Kingdom, 
argued that the matter should be referred to the ICC.140 Although Nigeria insisted on 
having an AU tribunal, the European Union rejected this proposal.141 However, the 
United States argued that the Security Council should create a special tribunal in Arusha, 
Tanzania, to indict and prosecute war criminals from the conflict in Darfur.142  
5.4.2.2 Referral to the International Criminal Court 
The Rome Statute provides provisions to use the ICC instead of having to set up 
new ad-hoc tribunals in situations where mass atrocities have taken place outside the 
Rome Statute system and no domestic investigation of these crimes was taking place. 
Under the Rome Statute, the Security Council can refer situations in which genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, or crime of aggression appear to have been 
                                                          
137 Id. ¶ 500. 
138 Id. 
139 Bellamy, supra note 40, at 17. 
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
142 Peter Heinlein, UN Security Council Deadlocked Over Darfur, VOICE OF AMERICA (Mar. 18, 2005), 
available at www.voanews.com/english/2005-03-18-voa10.cfm. 
 195 
 
committed in any state, regardless whether it has ratified the Rome Statute, under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.143 Under Chapter VII, the Security Council has the authority to 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken, in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.144  
On March 31, 2005, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1593. It referred the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC and requested all Member States to co-operate fully.145 The 
delegations of Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States abstained on the vote on the 
resolution. Sudan, which is not a state party to the Rome Statute, refused to recognize the 
court's jurisdiction, stating that "the ICC has no place in this crisis at all."146  
Following the vote on Resolution 1593, the United States, although it abstained, 
extended its strong support for penalizing those responsible for crimes and atrocities in 
Darfur and ending the climate of impunity.147 Highlighting the importance of serving 
justice in Darfur, the United States noted that the violators of international humanitarian 
law and human rights must be held accountable.  However, the United States also 
expressed its fundamental objection to the ICC exercising jurisdiction over the nationals 
of a state that is not party to the Rome Statute, including its government officials. 
Expressing its disagreement on referring the Darfur crisis to the ICC, the United States 
                                                          
143 A/CONF.183/9, supra note 36, ¶ 13. 
144 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
145 S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); Press Release, Security Council Refers 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release, SC/1593 
(Mar. 31, 2005). 
146 Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International 
Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release, SC/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
147 Id.  
 196 
 
said a better mechanism would have been Security Council creation of a hybrid tribunal 
in Africa.148 
Abstaining on the vote, Algeria stated that the AU was best equipped to carry out 
a tribunal because it could provide peace, while also satisfying the need for justice.149 
While it preferred a regional solution to the problem, Brazil agreed with the resolution, 
but objected to the United States’ view on the selective jurisdiction of the Court.150  
Explaining its abstention on the vote on Resolution 1593, China noted that it had 
followed the situation in Darfur closely and supported a political solution.151 Like the rest 
of the international community, China deplored deeply violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights and believed that the perpetrators must be brought to 
justice. China expressed its disagreement with referring the Darfur crisis to the ICC 
without the consent of the government of Sudan. China preferred that the perpetrators 
stand trial in Sudanese courts, which had recently begun to take action against people 
involved in human rights violations in Darfur.  In addition, as China is not a party to the 
Rome Statute and has major reservations regarding some of the Statute’s provisions, 
China found it difficult to endorse the Security Council authorization of that referral.152 
Consequently, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir in March 2009 and again in July 2010, and he faces 10 counts of war crimes, 
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crimes against humanity, and genocide in the decade-old Darfur conflict.153 Contrary to 
the Commission of Inquiry, the ICC’s pre-trial chamber said that there were legal 
grounds to believe President al-Bashir was responsible for three counts of genocide 
against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups, including genocide by killing, 
genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and genocide by deliberately 
inflicting conditions of life meant to destroy each target group.154 But, the ICC prosecutor 
has not been able to arrest al-Bashir.155 The ICC also issued arrest warrants for defense 
minister Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein, acting North Kordofan governor Ahmed 
Haroun, and militia leader Ali Kushayb, all of whom remain at large.156 Even though 
Security Council Resolution 1593 referred the Darfur crisis to the ICC, it did not impose 
any obligations on UN members to provide assistance in arresting the individuals sought 
by the ICC. Therefore, referring the crisis to the ICC has not served the purpose of 
Resolution 1593, and makes this referral an ineffective step in fulfilling the responsibility 
to react. 
5.4.2.3 Imposition of Sanctions 
The Security Council was never able to authorize military intervention in Darfur, 
but it continuously followed the situation in Darfur and often debated the imposition of 
non-military sanctions. Bellamy noted that the sanctions debate was complicated by two 
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inter-related debates: “first, there was a debate about whether to refer the case of Darfur 
to the ICC. Second, the conclusion of the peace agreement for the south of Sudan 
initiated a debate about whether the UN force created to police the peace agreement 
would be a Chapter VI or Chapter VII mission, and whether it would also deploy in 
Darfur.”157 According to Bellamy, in both debates, the United States attempted to further 
its case for stronger measures to protect civilian populations in Darfur.158     
On March 29, 2005, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1591, which 
imposed sanctions against Sudan over Darfur.159 The resolution expressed its deep 
concern for the security of humanitarian workers and their access to population in need. 
The resolution also condemned the continued violations of the N’Djamena Ceasefire 
Agreement by all sides in Darfur.160 The resolution established a committee consisting of 
all members of the Security Council to identify individuals who threaten the peace and 
stability in Darfur and violate international humanitarian or human rights law.161 The 
resolution placed travel embargoes and asset freezes on those individuals identified by 
the committee.162 During the vote on the resolution, Algeria, Russia, and China abstained 
and stated their objections to the use of international sanctions. They expressed their 
belief that the resolution failed to recognize the progress made by the government of 
Sudan.163  
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The Security Council adopted Resolution 1672 on April 25, 2006, placing 
sanctions on those individual Sudanese officials responsible for crimes against humanity 
in Darfur.164 The Security Council imposed travel and financial sanctions on four 
Sudanese individuals for their involvement in the Darfur conflict.165 Sanctions on 
individuals are one of the reactive measures short of military force included within the 
R2P principle. China, Qatar, and Russia abstained during the vote on Resolution 1672 as 
they had reservations about the application of sanctions to the individuals concerned.166  
5.4.2.4 Peacekeeping and the Use of Force  
The Security Council, by its Resolution 1590 of March 24, 2005, established 
UNMIS to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the 
government of Sudan and the SPLM, and to perform certain functions relating to 
humanitarian assistance and the protection and promotion of human rights. However, 
UNMIS was not provided with peacekeeping troops for Darfur until the adoption of 
Security Council Resolution 1706 on August 31, 2006, in which the deployment of 
17,300 UN peacekeeping troops to Darfur was mandated.167 Acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, the Security Council authorized UNMIS to use any means it deemed 
necessary to protect civilians. The resolution referred to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
World Summit Outcome Document.168 The Security Council also decided that UNMIS’ 
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mandate would, among other things, support implementation of the N’Djamena 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.169   
The mandate of Resolution 1706 met resistance from Khartoum, which delayed 
the deployment of the peacekeeping force. Sudan, refusing to participate at the Security 
Council session, expressed its strong objection to the resolution, and China, Qatar, and 
Russia abstained.170 While expressing their support for the content of the resolution, they 
stated that the resolution lacked the consent from Sudan.171 This situation demonstrated 
certain Member States’ reluctance to authorize the use of force as a non-consensual 
means to protect civilians.  
However, the deployment of troops in Darfur required the consent of the 
government of Sudan, and the lack of this consent blocked implementation of the R2P 
principle.172 The R2P framework encourages the international community to work with 
the government of the country where the mass atrocities are taking place, especially 
because the state has the primary responsibility of protecting its own citizens.173 
Although the Security Council authorized peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians, it 
never materialized because of the Sudanese opposition to the peacekeepers. In fact, some 
Member States, such as China and Russia, abstained on resolutions that referred to 
Darfur. Similar anxiety over the use of force against sovereign states could be seen 
during pre-R2P humanitarian intervention debates as well.  
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5.4.3 Responsibility to Rebuild 
The international community, in particular the UN, took a number of measures 
invoking the responsibility to rebuild in connection with Darfur. This section analyzes 
UN’s efforts in rebuilding Darfur. 
The ICISS report defined the responsibility to rebuild as a post-intervention 
obligation to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with 
recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation, all of which should address the causes of the 
harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.174 The rebuilding activities have to 
take place after prevention efforts have failed and reaction has started to take place.175 
According to the ICISS report, rebuilding efforts need to follow-up any military 
intervention and not be stand-alone activities.  
In Darfur, no military intervention took place. The Member States could not agree 
on an effective arms embargo or asset freeze against the government of Sudan. However, 
the Security Council authorized deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission with the aim 
of restoring necessary security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian 
assistance; facilitating full humanitarian access throughout Darfur; helping the 
government protect civilians; monitoring, observing compliance with, and verifying the 
implementation of various ceasefire agreements; and contributing to a secure 
environment for economic reconstruction and development. 
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With the objective of restoring peace and justice in Darfur, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
and with the consent of Sudan, the resolution authorized the establishment of an AU-UN 
hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID).176 Comprised of 19,555 military personnel, 6,432 
police, 3,772 police personnel, and 19 police units with up to 140 personnel, UNAMID 
was mandated to protect internally displaced persons (IDPs), civilians, and humanitarian 
workers by any means necessary.177 UNAMID was also authorized to assist in the peace 
process, monitor agreements, and promote human rights and the rule of law.178 
Resolution 1769 reflected acceptance of the responsibility to rebuild by emphasizing the 
need to focus on finalizing preparations for reconstruction and development.179 
Resolution 1769 emphasized there was no military solution to the conflict in Darfur. 
From 2008 to 2013, the Security Council adopted various resolutions extending the 
UNAMID mandate.180 
While many countries supported the peacekeeping efforts in Darfur through 
UNAMID, others expressed opposition to exerting pressure or imposing sanctions on 
Sudan. China emphasized that the purpose of the UNAMID resolutions was to authorize 
the hybrid operation, rather than exert pressure or impose sanctions.181 China requested 
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all parties abide strictly by the tripartite approach between the UN, the AU and the 
government of Sudan and avoid misinterpretation of the mission. China’s insistence 
highlighted the division between protecting sovereignty and the use of force, which was 
also a concern during the pre-R2P humanitarian intervention controversies. Russia 
pointed out that peace could only be achieved through a comprehensive political 
settlement.182 Russia expressed its hope that the UNAMID operation would help move 
that process forward, while also assisting with protection of the vulnerable, in full 
recognition of Sudan’s sovereignty.   
UNAMID formally took over the mission from AMIS on December 31, 2007. 
Despite efforts by UNAMID, the situation in camps with IDPs worsened and insecurity 
loomed inside the camps. Humanitarian workers could not assist IDPs because they were 
also subjected to brutal attacks by government-backed militia. Even though violence 
erupted again in 2008, the government of Sudan claimed the conflicts were tribal 
skirmishes. The attacks by the JEM in West Darfur in early 2008 were aggravated when 
Sudan supported the attempted coup d’état in Chad in February 2008. Throughout 2008 
and 2009, fears of battles between the JEM and the Sudanese government continued. 
However, by the end of 2009, the violence lessened, though low-level violence and 
insecurity continued in Darfur.183 UNAMID could neither adequately protect the 
civilians, nor could it contribute to security for humanitarian assistance or the promotion 
of human rights and the rule of law. Thus, UNAMID could not successfully support for 
the rebuilding process in war-torn Darfur.  
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Although high expectations were placed on UNAMID, it was not given adequate 
attention and support. Despite the enormous expenditure of resources in the operations, 
UNAMID’s capacity was deployed very slowly, and the overall resources remained 
insufficient. By January 2008, only approximately one-third of the anticipated force was 
on the ground in Darfur, and equipment and training were woefully underfunded.184 
Although the government of Sudan consented to the establishment of UNAMID, it 
emphasized its demand that African troops and police be sent to Darfur. However, 
countries which pledged troops and other resources cited opposition by the government 
of Sudan, arguing that it continuously undermined the intentions and actions of the 
international community.185 The government of Sudan, in fact, objected to the 
deployment of Scandinavian engineers in Darfur.186 Therefore, UNAMID was not able to 
carry out its expected tasks in Darfur, which undermined the fulfillment of the 
responsibility to rebuild.   
UNAMID was dependent on international donor contributions for everything for 
finance, military personnel, military equipment, training, and infrastructure. Although the 
Security Council takes the decisions about establishing, maintaining, or expanding a 
peacekeeping operation, the financing of UN peacekeeping operations is the collective 
responsibility of all UN Member States. Every Member State is legally obligated to pay 
their respective share towards peacekeeping in accordance with the provisions of Article 
17 of the UN Charter.187 The General Assembly apportions peacekeeping expenses based 
on a scale of assessments under a formula that Member States themselves have 
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established and, under this formula, the five permanent members of the Security Council 
are required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.188 The approved budget for UNAMID 
for the period of July 1, 2013 - June 30, 2014 is estimated at $1,335,248,000, and the 
Member States are obligated to contribute their respective amount.189 Continued and 
uninterrupted funding is important for UNAMID to operationalize and help rebuild 
Darfur. However, the UN Peacekeeping Fund has not allocated resources to Darfur 
rebuilding efforts.190 
UNAMID also depended on the government of Sudan’s assistance in terms of 
logistics and access. Even at times when UNAMID’s peacekeeping forces were supposed 
to be on the ground, there was no effective cooperation with the Sudanese government.191 
Sudan continuously obstructed UNAMID deployment by objecting to non-African 
troops, with the exception of troops from China and Pakistan.192 Sudan obstructed other 
areas of needed cooperation, including on small, seemingly inconsequential matters, such 
as port access, landing rights, flight restrictions, or monitoring and reporting status.193 
More seriously, Sudanese forces attacked UNAMID personnel repeatedly throughout the 
first quarter of 2008. UNAMID was not even given a mandate to disarm the Janjaweed or 
other militia. Thus, UNAMID simply monitored the government’s disarmament 
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exercises.194 In addition, JEM rebels rejected any Chinese troop assistance despite a 
Chinese offer of logistical support.195  
UNAMID is still unable to secure civilian protection, and life is still very harsh 
for millions of people who have been displaced by the conflict in Darfur.196 In fact, 
UNAMID itself has come under attack by rebel forces and government-backed militia.197 
The roads in Darfur are not safe for aid organizations, and humanitarian flights to Darfur 
have been restricted.198  Many international not-for-profit organizations have pulled out 
for their own security. The already difficult situation on the ground has more recently 
been exacerbated by an accelerating civil war in neighboring Chad, where most of the 
refugee camps are located.199 
Again, the international community, through UNAMID, has failed to protect the 
civilians in Darfur from mass atrocities in its peacekeeping and rebuilding efforts, largely 
for the same reasons that meant AMIS, UNAMIS, and UNMIS failed in their missions. 
UNAMID could not perform its tasks because of a severely restricted mandate, a woeful 
lack of financial and military contributions, and a lack of effective planning. Most 
importantly, the division and rancor among the Member States on the Security Council 
were also a factor in the failure of the international community to fulfill the responsibility 
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to rebuild in Darfur. After more than a decade of the Darfur crisis, the international 
community has been unable to protect the civilians in Darfur or engage in effective 
rebuilding efforts, meaning the international community has failed to shoulder its 
responsibilities under the R2P principle. 
Although the conflict in Darfur had become less severe by 2013, the region 
remains volatile. As the violence in Darfur continued in varying degrees, people could 
not return home and rebuild their lives. The rival tribes reportedly renewed festering 
antagonisms over minerals in northern Darfur, displacing civilians when fighting broke 
out over a mine.200 According to the International Rescue Committee, over 1.4 million 
people in Darfur still live in refugee camps.201 Some 300,000 remain in camps across the 
border in eastern Chad, reluctant to return home because of ongoing insecurity, loss of 
property, and fear of oppression.  These refugees remain dependent on humanitarian aid 
for survival, but, as the world's interest in Darfur continues to fade, thousands more 
Darfuris are fleeing new violence.202 Darfur remains subject to ongoing violence, and, 
thus, faces an uncertain tomorrow, where the international community still appears 
unable to find a way forward.   
5.5 Conclusion  
The crisis in Darfur represented the first test of the R2P principle. Since the 
beginning of the conflict in 2003, Darfur has been associated with the R2P principle, and 
many states in the international community have sought an active role in addressing the 
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crisis. As described previously, on several occasions the Security Council used the R2P 
principle as a guide in adopting resolutions and taking action. Resolutions 1672, 1674, 
1679, 1706, and 1769 all referred to the R2P principle in highlighting the importance of 
protecting civilians from mass atrocities and human rights violations.203 Notwithstanding 
these resolutions and subsequent actions to quell the crisis, however, the UN could not 
develop or support effective prevention, reaction, or rebuilding efforts in Darfur.  
5.5.1 Responsibility to Prevent  
Under the ICISS report and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the 
primary responsibility to protect civilian population rests with the individual state.204 
However, state practice during the Darfur crisis revealed disagreement on whether Sudan 
had fulfilled the responsibility to protect the civilian population in Darfur. The view of 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and like-minded states was that the government 
of Sudan had failed in its responsibility to prevent atrocities and protect its civilians, and 
this failure then triggered the international community’s responsibility to protect the 
civilian population in Darfur. However, other countries, such as Russia, China, India, and 
Pakistan argued that the extent of human rights violations in Darfur was not sufficient to 
prove Sudan was failing to uphold its responsibility towards its population.205 The 
reluctance of these countries to accept the government of Sudan’s inability to stop 
atrocities revealed their emphasis on state sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial 
integrity.  
                                                          
203 S.C. Res. 1672, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006); S.C. Res 1674, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 1674 (Apr. 28, 
2006); S.C. Res 1679, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1679 (May 16, 2006); S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 
(Aug. 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1769 (July 31, 2007). 
204 ICISS, supra note 52, ¶ 2.29; 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 53, ¶ 138.  
205 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 4988, supra note 69 at 4. 
 209 
 
However, the UN made a number of efforts to fulfill the responsibility of the 
international community to prevent atrocities and protect the civilian population in 
Darfur. These efforts demonstrated that the international community recalled the 
disturbing failures in Rwanda and other crises. This state practice, at least in the UN 
context, revealed that states were making efforts to fulfill their preventive responsibility 
to stop atrocities in Darfur. Nevertheless, these UN activities did not embrace the 
framework of R2P.  
However, the UN’s efforts in taking preventive actions in Darfur were not 
supported by some states, especially those which argued that the Sudanese government 
had not failed in its responsibility to protect civilians. China and Russia were the main 
obstructionists, along with Algeria and Pakistan, which at times held rotating seats on the 
Security Council. These countries had been known for their faithful support of the 
Sudanese leadership, and they have remained obstinate in their position on any 
intervention in Sudan. However, abstentions on certain resolutions that proposed 
preventive measures to stop further escalation of violence in Darfur meant that those 
states did not block actions to prevent atrocities in Darfur. If they were not actually 
interested in preventing such violence, those states could have vetoed the resolutions that 
intended to prevent atrocities in Darfur. In turn, their abstentions on those resolutions 
represented an acceptance that atrocities were, in fact, committed in Darfur. Therefore, 
such abstentions could be interpreted as those states choosing to follow the responsibility 
not to veto (R2NV) concept for political and moral reasons. This possibility does not 
mean, however, that this behavior affected international law.  
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5.5.2 Responsibility to React 
State practice in Darfur revealed no general agreement among Member States on 
whether genocide had occurred in Darfur. While Russia, China, and likeminded countries 
as well as the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, claimed that Sudan had not 
committed genocide, the United States and allies described the violence in Darfur as 
genocide. Despite well-reported mass atrocities in Darfur, the reluctance of some states to 
accept that genocide has been committed in Darfur revealed unwillingness by those states 
to take military action against a sovereign state. Alternatively, this reluctance also reveals 
a willingness to uphold sovereignty and non-intervention, even in cases of mass 
atrocities. The Darfur crisis, therefore, has not apparently changed international legal 
thinking in the area of sovereignty. As a result of this tug-of-war between Member States, 
the UN could not offer timely or effective intervention in Darfur. This inability to take 
timely intervention in Darfur was also a result of the controversy about whether Security 
Council authorization is required on the use of military force for humanitarian purposes. 
Again, there was no agreement among Member States on this issue.  
Although the Security Council could not reach an agreement on whether genocide 
had been committed in Darfur, it still imposed non-military sanctions against Sudan with 
a view of stopping further violence and protecting the civilian population. There was also 
disagreement among Member States on whether accused war criminals should be referred 
to the ICC or to a regional body to be prosecuted. In fact, a number of Member States 
abstained on the ICC referral.206 They abstained on the grounds of sovereignty, non-
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intervention, and the territorial integrity of Sudan.207 However, these abstentions again 
revealed the recognition of a negative obligation not to block R2P-based actions or states’ 
willingness to follow the RN2V concept. Also, state practice on ICC referral suggests a 
synergy between the R2P principle and international criminal law. Non-opposition to the 
ICC referral, therefore, suggests not only states’ acceptance of mass atrocities being 
committed in Darfur, but also a limitation of sovereignty and non-intervention in cases of 
such atrocities being committed by states. 
5.5.3 Responsibility to Rebuild  
As a result of continued resistance from the Sudanese government, the efforts of 
the UN in deploying peacekeeping mission in Darfur were delayed. In fact, the 
deployment of troops to Darfur required the consent of the government of Sudan, and the 
failure of Sudan to give its consent blocked the peacekeeping deployment.208 There was 
general agreement among UN Member States regarding the requirement that Sudan 
consent to such a deployment, and this agreement again revealed a wide acceptance of 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
Although a formal military intervention had not taken place in Darfur, the 
Security Council established UNAMID to restore peace and justice, a move which 
Member States unanimously supported. Under the ICISS report, the responsibility to 
rebuild is triggered only after military intervention has taken place.209 However, the 
Member States’ support for UNAMID’s rebuilding efforts revealed that there was general 
agreement that rebuilding could take place even without military intervention. Some 
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Member States, however, insisted that all parties strictly abide by the terms of the 
resolution and avoid any misinterpretation. This state practice caste uncertainty over the 
role of UNAMID operations in Darfur. UNAMID operations were carried out slower 
than expected because, on one hand, it had to depend on international donor contributions 
and, on the other hand, it had to depend on the government of Sudan’s logistical 
assistance. Despite efforts by UNAMID, neither the security nor economic situations in 
Darfur have improved.  UNAMID has, therefore, failed in its efforts to protect civilian 
population in Darfur. Thus, state practice in Darfur on the responsibility to rebuild 
suggests that this responsibility has had the least impact of the three R2P responsibilities. 
In fact, this state practice was anticipated in the ICISS report’s deep skepticism about 
political support for post-conflict rebuilding efforts.  
Although the R2P principle became a leading way to discuss humanitarian crises, 
state practice throughout the Darfur crisis revealed deep disagreements about the R2P 
principle, which in turn produced a failure under all three responsibilities of R2P. The 
UN has still not been able to achieve its intended goals of protecting the civilian 
population and bringing peace to Darfur, as there has been no consensus on many vital 
issues among the Security Council members. The Member States could often not reach 
agreement on whether or when to take preventive efforts, or when to intervene in order to 
protect civilians, or even what actions, if any, the UN should take in response to the 
Darfur conflict.  
Although the Security Council was restricted in taking actions in Darfur without 
the consent of Sudan, it still managed to take some actions. However, it did so only on 
the basis of abstentions from Member States that disagreed with the actions that the 
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Security Council was willing to take. Therefore, many scholars and critics have argued 
that Darfur constituted a failure of the R2P principle.210 Grono stated that the 
international community failed to speak with one unified voice, and that this failure 
demonstrated one of the challenges facing the international community as it attempts to 
operationalize R2P.211 However, Evans noted, “while the R2P principle had not failed in 
Darfur, the international community had failed to implement the R2P principle in Darfur 
as there is no clear guideline on the use of force under the R2P principle.”212 
The Member States failed to recognize their fundamental responsibilities to 
respond to atrocities outside their own respective territories and, in particular, they were 
not willing to consider a right to take military action against Sudan. While many parties 
have worked towards applying the principle, the ongoing violence in Darfur has revealed 
many of the weaknesses in R2P. These failures are not only due to inherent problems that 
may exist in the R2P principle but can also be traced to political and situational problems 
encountered in its implementation. The Darfur crisis revealed the divide among Member 
States on state sovereignty and intervention, as well as the uncertainties about the scope 
of taking actions against sovereign states, all of which were problems which had already 
been associated with pre-R2P humanitarian intervention. In fact, the states were divided 
on whether R2P was triggered at all in Darfur. The state practice in Darfur suggests that 
not much has changed with the advent of R2P. Thus, the Darfur crisis demonstrated the 
R2P principle had not changed international law.  
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CHAPTER 6  
    LIBYA 
6.1 Introduction 
The uprising in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) caught the attention of the 
international community in 2011. The challenges faced in Libya were urgent, critical, potentially 
deadly, and involved limited options to protect civilian lives in Libya. After the Gaddafi regime 
refused to comply with diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis, the Security Council eventually 
decided to authorize the use of military force. This authorization to use military force constituted 
the first time the Security Council authorized military action under R2P, which makes the Libyan 
crisis a seminal event in the history of R2P.    
With a view to protecting civilian populations in Libya, and framing its response in terms 
of the R2P principle, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011.1 The 
resolution condemned the use of lethal force by the Gaddafi regime against protesters 
participating in the Libyan civil war, and imposed a series of international sanctions in response. 
Nearly three weeks later, on March 17, 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, 
which authorized military intervention in Libya under the R2P principle.2 The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) responded to this authorization. However, the use of military force 
under the R2P principle in Libya caused great controversy that damaged the principle in the 
Security Council and beyond.  
The military intervention in Libya sparked tense arguments about the scope, meaning, 
and implementation of Resolution 1973. One of the key controversies that erupted was about 
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how and why NATO used force under the Security Council authorization and, more specifically, 
how this application of military force adversely affected perspectives about the R2P principle. In 
particular, the use of force to effect regime change in Libya took a high toll on R2P. In addition, 
there have been serious problems with post-intervention rebuilding in Libya. In contrast to the 
Darfur crisis, which has widely been considered a disaster for the R2P principle, the Libyan case 
study concerned a humanitarian crisis in which the R2P principle played a more prominent, but 
still very controversial role. Thus, this chapter analyzes the state practice connected to the Libyan 
crisis within and beyond the UN under the responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild, in order 
to determine how this crisis affects the relationship between the R2P principle and international 
law. 
 
6.2 Background to the Conflict in Libya 
Libya was initially a part of the Roman Empire and, through the centuries, was invaded 
by a series of rulers and empires. Finally, in 1959, Libya gained its independence from Italy.3 
Ten years later, Colonel Muammar al Gaddafi led a successful coup and came to power.4 
Gaddafi rejected the political party system and ruled the country with a new system called 
Jamahiriya, or a state of masses, which combined elements of communism and capitalism.5 In 
1977, Gaddafi declared a people’s revolution in the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya and led the country to totalitarianism.6  
                                                          
3 Libya Profile, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13754897 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
4 Id.; Libya: Timeline of Key Events since February 2011, INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS (Apr. 8, 2011), 
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The Gaddafi regime was infamous for its human rights violations and abuses.7 Human 
rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), 
frequently criticized the Gaddafi regime for the systematic repression of any party or person 
opposing the regime. Gaddafi, in effect, refused to allow any freedom of expression, stripped 
away any semblance of freedom of association and assembly, banned independent political 
activities, and detained political activists and opponents.8 The Gaddafi regime did whatever it 
wanted, all the while thumbing its nose at the international community. In 1996, for example, the 
forces of the Gaddafi regime apparently killed prisoners in Abu Salim prison to regain control of 
an internal situation, and all attempts to aid and assist the victims were mocked by Gaddafi. The 
regime appointed a commission to inquire into the Abu Salim massacre but, typical of the 
Gaddafi regime, the findings were never revealed.9 
This continuous suppression by the Gaddafi regime eventually produced a series of 
protests in 2011, and these protests linked with the Arab Spring movement that toppled 
governments in Tunisia and Egypt. The first of these protests originated against the regime in 
Libya’s second largest city, Benghazi.10 The demonstration was initiated by members of the 
“Abu Salim Families Organizing Committee,” calling the Gaddafi regime to account for the 
deaths of the Abu Salim prisoners in 1996. These protesters, and others throughout Libya, also 
demanded respect for human rights and freedom in Libya.11 On February 17, 2011, the protesters 
started a second round of demonstrations against the regime, and Gaddafi used extremely 
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disproportionate violence to quell the gathering of protestors.12 The death toll increased as the 
protests moved into neighboring cities. The regime imposed media blackouts and internet 
outages, and the international community, including a large number of Libyans living and 
studying abroad, could not piece together a picture of the crisis.13  
Saif al Islam, Gaddafi’s son, threatened all those civilians who spoke of a possible civil 
war. He declared that “rivers of blood” would flow over Libya if the violence did not stop.14 In 
his speech of February 22, 2011, Gaddafi referred to the protesters as “cockroaches and rats” and 
urged his supporters to attack them. Anyone who took-up arms against Libya, Gaddafi warned, 
would be executed.15 By February 24, 2011, the insurgents increased their violent activities, and 
the crisis turned into internal armed conflict.16 On February 25, 2011, Gaddafi delivered yet 
another speech and ordered his factions to continue their fight against the dissidents.17 Kinsman 
described Gaddafi’s threats to protestors as “chillingly similar to radio broadcasts before the 
massacre in Rwanda.”18 Gaddafi said, “We will march to cleanse Libya, inch by inch, house by 
house, home by home, alley by alley, person by person, until the country is cleansed of dirt and 
scum.”19 On February 26, 2011, former Minister of Justice Mustafa Abdul Jalil formed an 
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interim opposition government called the National Transitional Council.20 At that time, 
thousands of civilians had been massacred, while tens of thousands of Libyans had fled to 
neighboring Egypt and Tunisia.21 This escalation of violence by the Gaddafi regime warranted 
international attention. 
6.3 Application of the R2P Principle in International Responses to the Libyan Crisis 
The dramatic death toll early in the crisis was an ominous gauge of the brutality to come, 
and drew instantaneous attention to the crisis and the Gaddafi regime’s behavior from individual 
states and regional and international actors. After the crisis erupted in Libya, the international 
community, primarily the African Union (AU), League of Arab States (LAS), Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC), European Union (EU), and the UN launched several diplomatic 
measures in a bid to bring the crisis to a rapid but peaceful conclusion. When peaceful measures 
failed, the use of military force authorized by the Security Council prevented further atrocities 
and led to Gaddafi’s overthrow. However, this use of force generated much criticism and 
controversy. In addition, the UN could not restore peace and security in Libya after the military 
intervention. 
6.3.1 Responsibility to Prevent 
The government of Libya had the primary responsibility to prevent mass atrocities and 
protect its population. However, Gaddafi’s regime governed the country and carried-out these 
atrocities and, therefore, the Libyan government’s responsibility to protect its population was 
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indeed not fulfilled. Therefore, the responsibility to prevent atrocities and protect the civilian 
population in Libya became the responsibility of the international community.  
The EU took many preventive efforts to stop the escalation of violence in Libya. The first 
response came from Catherine Ashton, the Vice-President of the European Commission and 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who condemned the 
human rights violations in Libya. In a declaration issued on behalf of the EU, Ashton urged 
Libyan authorities to refrain from further use of violence and stated that the EU “condemns the 
repression against peaceful demonstrators and deplores the violence and death of civilians.”22 On 
February 20 and 22, 2011, the EU decided to interrupt any dialogue on an EU-Libya framework 
agreement and terminate ongoing cooperation contracts.23 Highlighting the importance of saving 
the lives of the people in Libya, European Council (EC) president, Herman Van Rompuy, stated 
that the EU “should not be patronizing, but should also not shy away from using its political and 
moral responsibility.”24 Finally, on March 11, 2011, the EU urged Gaddafi to step down.25 
Additionally, as the situation further deteriorated, the EU voted to resume its humanitarian work 
by May 22, 2011, by opening a liaison office in Benghazi.26 
Much of the international community, including the regional and sub-regional friends of 
Libya, condemned the Libyan atrocities. The AU, OIC, and LAS strongly criticized and 
condemned all forms of human rights violations in Libya and called for a mediated solution to 
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the conflict.27 In fact, the LAS moved to suspend Libya’s membership in the organization.28 On 
February 22, 2011, the LAS condemned the Gaddafi regime and its human rights violations and 
suspended the delegation of Libya from participation in Arab League meetings.29 On the same 
day, the OIC requested that Libyan authorities immediately cease all violations.30 On February, 
23, 2011, the Peace and the Security Council of the AU expressed its intention to deploy a 
mission to Libya to assess the situation on the ground and condemned the Gaddafi regime’s 
excessive use of force and human rights violations.31 Although the AU, OIC, and LAS sought to 
use diplomatic and political measures in response to the crisis in Libya, these non-coercive 
preventive efforts were not successful in stopping the escalation of violence. 
The UN system also took number of preventive efforts to stop human rights violations and 
further atrocities in Libya. The first of such responses were made by Navi Pillay, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. In a press release on February 18, 2011, Pillay expressed her 
serious concerns about the situation in Libya and affirmed that the protection of civilians should 
be the principal consideration in maintaining the rule of law.32 
Following Gaddafi’s ominous “inch-by-inch” speech on February 22, 2011, Francis Deng, 
the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor on Genocide, and Edward Luck, Special Advisor on 
the Responsibility to Protect, condemned the attacks against the civilian population and noted 
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that such attacks amounted to crimes against humanity. Further, the two Special Advisors 
reiterated the 2005 pledge in the World Summit Outcome Document by Member States to 
protect civilian populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.33  
In the meantime, some members of Libya’s mission to the UN renounced Gaddafi, calling 
him a genocidal war criminal responsible for mass shootings in Libya.34 Ibrahim Dabbashi, the 
Deputy Permanent Representative of Libya to the UN, called for Gaddafi to step down.35 
Further, Dabbashi said that the Security Council's statement was “not strong enough,” but still “a 
good message to the regime in Libya about stopping the bloodshed.”36 At the same time, Abdul 
Mohammed Shalqam, the Ambassador and the Permanent Representative of Libya to the UN, 
distanced himself from Dabbashi’s remarks, calling Libya's ruler “my friend.”37 
In a press release issued on February 22, 2011, the Security Council condemned the 
Libyan authorities for their violent campaigns against protesters and called on the Libyan 
authorities to end the violence immediately, respect human rights, honor international 
humanitarian law, and carry out its responsibility to protect the people in Libya.38 The Security 
Council used R2P language to caution the Gaddafi regime and endorsed the position that the 
government of Libya has the primary responsibility to protect its population.  
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On February 24, 2011, the Human Rights Council convened a special session on the 
situation of human rights in Libya.39 In her introduction to the session, the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, stated that the Libyan violence was shocking and brutal.40 A 
statement to the Human Rights Council by All Special Procedures Mandate Holders expressed 
the concern that “several hundred people have died, many others have been detained, thousands 
are injured and human suffering continues to rise.”41 During this session, the Human Rights 
Council adopted Resolution S-15/1 by consensus without a vote.42 The resolution called on the 
government of Libya to, “among other things, immediately release all arbitrarily detained 
persons, stop attacks against civilians, cease intimidation, persecution and arbitrary arrests of 
individuals, ensure the safety of all civilians including citizens of third countries, cease blocking 
internet and telecommunications networks and to respect the popular will, aspirations and 
demands of the people.”43 The resolution requested the Human Rights Council to dispatch an 
independent, international commission of inquiry to Libya to investigate all alleged violations of 
international human rights law in the country.44 Further, in an unprecedented move, on March 1, 
2011, the General Assembly suspended Libya’s membership on the Human Rights Council.45  
Despite many diplomatic and non-forceful multilateral actions, the Libyan authorities 
remained adamant. They did not respond to any of the multilateral diplomatic measures taken by 
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the Security Council, other UN bodies, and regional organizations intended to prevent further 
violence against civilians. In the meantime, Gaddafi’s forces continued their murderous 
campaign, violating human rights and international humanitarian norms. 
 
6.3.2 Responsibility to React 
Despite the numerous efforts by the international community to prevent mass atrocities, 
large-scale human rights violations against civilian population in Libya continued. All diplomatic 
and non-coercive measures to stop these violations taken by regional as well as international 
actors failed to persuade the Libyan government to fulfill its responsibility to prevent. In light of 
this failure, the international community decided to react with more forceful measures against the 
Libyan government. 
 
6.3.2.1 Responses Not Involving the Use of Force: Sanctions and Referral to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Given continued human rights violations in Libya, and following on the heels of Human 
Rights Council’s Resolution S-15/1, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970, 
which highlighted the government of Libya’s failure to meet its primary responsibility to protect 
its civilian populations.46 Citing the deplorable and systematic violation of human rights, the 
resolution affirmed that these violations amounted to crimes against humanity and called for an 
immediate end of all forms of hostilities and human rights violations. The resolution demanded 
safe passage for humanitarian and medical supplies and medical personnel into affected areas. 
Most importantly, the resolution imposed a set of coercive measures including an arms embargo, 
a travel ban on the Gaddafi family and key Libyan officials, and the freezing of their overseas 
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assets.47 The resolution further called for a progress review within 120 days.48 Lastly, the 
Security Council also decided to refer the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) for further review.49 
By imposing non-military coercive measures and referring the situation to the ICC, the 
Security Council intended to send a strong message to Libyan authorities to halt the violence. 
However, Member States were not yet willing to endorse more coercive measures against Libya. 
In response to Security Council Resolution 1970, Libya stated that the resolution was premature 
and that it be suspended until alleged claims could be confirmed.50 The Russian delegation stated 
that: “A settlement of the situation in Libya is possible only through political means. In fact, that 
was the purpose of the resolution, which imposes targeted, clearly expressed, restrictive 
measures with regard to those guilty of violence against the civilian population. However, it does 
not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya’s affairs, which could make 
the situation worse.”51 Bolivia stressed that the consensus reached to suspend Libya from the 
Human Rights Council should not be used to promote “unjustified interventions” against 
sovereign States, and Bolivia warned against the selective application of any resolutions against 
States with a “different orientation” from the major powers.52 Lebanon stressed the importance 
of affirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya.53 China supported the resolution, 
taking into account the special circumstances in Libya, but highlighted the importance of 
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affirming Libyan sovereignty.54 Although the resolution was adopted unanimously, there was no 
indication that Security Council members favored using force rather than imposing non-coercive 
restrictive measures. Those Member States historically opposed to the use of force against 
sovereign states for humanitarian reasons expressed doubt that the international community had a 
right to use force.  
In addition to the Security Council’s actions against the Libyan authorities, other regional 
organizations called on the Security Council to take immediate action to stop atrocities in Libya. 
In a statement on March 7, 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council called on the Security Council to 
take all measures necessary to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya.55 
On March 12, 2011, the LAS called on the Security Council to bear its responsibilities and take 
necessary measures to impose a no-fly zone immediately on Libyan military aviation and also to 
establish a no-fire zone.56 Although the AU endorsed the LAS call for an establishment of a no-
fly zone, it did not call for military intervention in Libya.57 In fact, there was no indication that 
AU Member States felt obliged to take any such measures to stop atrocities by the Gaddafi 
regime and protect civilian populations in Libya. 
The human rights violations and mass atrocities in Libya drastically escalated during the 
weeks following the adoption of Resolution 1970.58 The Libyan authorities failed to uphold their 
responsibility to protect the population in Libya. Not only did Libyan authorities ignore the 
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multilateral efforts of the international community to solve the crisis, but they also failed to 
comply with Resolution 1970.  
6.3.2.2 The Authorization to Use Military Force 
On March 17, 2011, Gaddafi announced his intention to attack Benghazi. He warned the 
rebels that his troops were coming to hunt rebels house by house and room by room and that they 
would show no mercy or pity.59 At this point, the international community began to focus its 
attention on possible military intervention.  
The Security Council met on March 17, 2011, to discuss the situation and decide on a 
possible action to stop the ongoing mass atrocities in Libya. During this meeting, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1973, which was tabled by the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Lebanon.60 The resolution authorized the Member States, acting nationally or 
through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect 
civilians under threat of attack in Libya, specifically those civilians in Benghazi. The resolution 
recognized the important role of the LAS in the maintenance of both international peace and 
regional security.61 The Security Council requested that LAS Member States cooperate with UN 
Member States to implement a no-fly zone over Libya.62 The resolution noted the failure of all 
prior diplomatic measures against Libya, and the Security Council stressed the need to explore 
other possible solutions to the Libyan crisis.  The Security Council demanded that Libyan 
authorities comply with their obligations under international law to take all measures to protect 
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civilians, meet their citizens’ basic needs, and ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of 
humanitarian assistance.63 Resolution 1973 also requested that all states deny permission to any 
Libyan commercial aircraft to land in or take off from their territories, unless a particular flight 
had been approved in advance by the committee established to monitor sanctions imposed by 
Resolution 1970. Resolution 1973 further strengthened the asset freeze and arms embargo 
established by Resolution 1970. 
Resolution 1973, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized military 
intervention in three separate ways. First, military force could be used to “protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya."64 Second, the Security Council 
established a no-fly zone and a ban on all flights over Libyan airspace. The Security Council also 
authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, 
to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the flight ban.65 Third, the resolution 
strengthened the arms embargo by authorizing Member States to use all measures commensurate 
to the situation.66 According to Resolution 1973, the purpose of granting authority to “take all 
necessary measures” was to force the Libyan authorities to cease violation of human rights and 
humanitarian law.67 In fact, the resolution considered Gaddafi’s widespread and systematic 
attacks against the Libyan civilian population as possible, even likely, crimes against humanity.68  
Despite the Security Council’s decision to authorize military intervention to halt the 
atrocities in Libya, the Member States of the Security Council were significantly divided on 
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Resolution 1973. During the vote on Resolution 1973, ten Member States - France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, 
Portugal, and South Africa - voted in favor of the resolution, while five Member States - China, 
Russia, Brazil, Germany, and India - abstained.69 The ten Member States which voted for 
Resolution 1973 were clear that the resolution was based on humanitarian considerations. 
Speaking after the vote, the Member States which voted in favor of the resolution agreed that 
strong action was necessary to protect civilians from further harm. Colombia stated that “it was 
convinced that the purpose of Resolution 1973 was humanitarian in nature and conducive to 
bringing about conditions that would lead to the protection of civilians under attack, from a 
regime that had lost all legitimacy.”70 On the other hand, China and the Russia, explaining their 
abstentions, prioritized peaceful means of resolving the conflict and stated that many questions 
had not been answered in regards to provisions of the resolution, including how and by whom 
the authorized military measures would be enforced and what the limits of the military 
engagement would be.  These delegations, however, noted that the resolution included a sorely 
needed ceasefire, which they had called for earlier. China stated that it had not blocked the action 
with a negative vote in consideration of the wishes of the LAS and the AU. By abstaining from 
the vote on the resolution, those five Member States reaffirmed their long-standing opposition to 
the use of force for humanitarian purposes.  
It is important to note that the call for military action by regional organizations in the 
Libyan case played a major role in the Security Council’s decision. Security Council Resolution 
1973 reiterated the collective condemnation of the Gaddafi regime by the LAS, the AU, and the 
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OIC.71 These regional organizations criticized Libya for serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. The resolution supported the March 12, 2011, decision of the 
Council of the LAS to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan air space and the 
creation of safe areas in places exposed to shelling.72  
Statements by UN Member States also referred to a call for action by these regional 
organizations against Libya. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the LAS was 
particularly clear in its demands, including the imposition of a no-fly zone. The United Kingdom 
welcomed the fact that the Security Council had acted swiftly and comprehensively in response 
to the appalling situation in Libya and to the appeal of the Arab League.73 The representative of 
the United States stated that the LAS had called on the Security Council to take more stringent 
measures than what Resolution 1970 proposed. Resolution 1973 was, in fact, an answer to that 
request and a strong response to the deteriorating situation in Libya.74 Statements by Russia and 
China specifically demonstrate that these two countries had not vetoed Resolution 1973 and had, 
therefore, acted in consideration of the wishes of the LAS and AU.75  
Following the passage of Resolution 1973, military action was commenced by a coalition 
of states spearheaded by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and NATO. On March 
22, 2011, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya in response to the Security 
Council’s call to prevent the supply of arms and related materials to Libya.76 Towards this end, 
NATO ships operating in the Mediterranean immediately began blocking the shipment of 
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weapons and mercenaries to Libya by sea.77 On March 24, 2011, NATO announced that it would 
take over all military aspects of Resolution 1973.78 NATO began enforcing the Security Council-
mandated no-fly zone over Libya to prevent the Gaddafi regime from launching further airstrikes 
against Benghazi or other places.79 Attacks by NATO struck the Gaddafi’s family compound and 
killed Gaddafi’s youngest son and three grandchildren. On August 22, 2011, some five months 
after NATO’s initial military intervention, Tripoli was liberated.  
NATO countries strongly believed that the only way to protect civilian populations in 
Libya was to get rid of the Gaddafi regime. Therefore, NATO decided that, absent a complete 
military victory, the protection of civilians in Libya could not be achieved.80 NATO forces, thus, 
increased their attacks against Libyan government forces beginning in October 2011. On October 
20, 2011, Gaddafi was overthrown and assassinated. After several more days of fighting, NATO 
concluded its operation in Libya.81 
 During the military operations in Libya, at least 18 UN Member States that were non-
NATO countries supported NATO as the organization carried out its tasks.82 In the Libyan 
operations, NATO flew more than 26,000 sorties, of which 42 percent were strike sorties which 
damaged or destroyed approximately 6,000 military targets.83 At its peak, NATO utilized the 
efforts of more than 10,000 servicemen and women, 21 NATO ships in the Mediterranean, and 
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more than 250 aircrafts of all types. By the end of the operation, NATO had hailed over 3,000 
vessels at sea and boarded 300 ships for inspection. Eleven vessels were denied transit to their 
next port of call.84 
 The Security Council authorized military intervention in Libya through Resolution 1973 
on the basis of the R2P principle. The Security Council authorization of military force in Libya 
presumptively satisfied the criteria discussed by the ICISS report for military intervention under 
the responsibility to react. As stipulated in the ICISS report, military action against a state should 
satisfy six conditions: just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means, 
and reasonable prospects.85 However, a number of states raised questions about the use of 
military force against Libya. 
Most of the Member States in the Security Council agreed that the situation in Libya was 
deteriorating and that the Libyan authorities were causing a large scale loss of life, including the 
systematic killing of members of rebel groups, in order to diminish or eliminate rebel presence in 
particular areas of Libya.86 Even the delegations which abstained on Resolution 1973 expressed 
concern about the alarming human rights violations in Libya.87 Some Member States, however, 
claimed that there was little compelling evidence to prove allegations against the government of 
Libya.88 India insisted on making an objective analysis of the situation on the ground. It 
expressed dissatisfaction at taking military action with relatively little credible information.89 
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The Member States which abstained during the vote on Resolution 1973 also expressed 
skepticism about the intention behind the use of force against Libya.90 They highlighted the 
importance of having a common object: protecting civilians in Libya. Even China and Russia 
recognized the need to protect the civilians in Libya.91 Brazil stated that its abstention “should in 
no way be interpreted as condoning the behavior of the Libyan authorities or as a disregard for 
the need to protect civilians and respect their rights and that Brazil remained unconvinced that 
the use of force will lead to the realization of the common objective – the immediate end to 
violence and the protection of civilians.”92 This skepticism was heightened when the interveners 
made it clear that they were not going to halt their military campaign in Libya until Gaddafi was 
no longer in power.93 Concurrently, the rebels, with whom NATO had closely worked, refused to 
engage in any negotiations or peace deals with the government of Libya unless Gaddafi vacated 
office.  
Some Member States claimed that the Security Council failed to take all reasonable 
actions to solve the crisis in Libya before authorizing military intervention.94 According to those 
Member States, the need to use military force had not yet arisen in Libya. Russia, for example, 
contended that “the quickest way to ensure robust security for the civilian population and the 
long-term stabilization of the situation in Libya is an immediate ceasefire.”95 China insisted that 
it could not support the resolution because the provisions of the UN Charter on the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts were not being respected. China would not support “the use of force when 
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non-military means were not exhausted.”96 Under the UN Charter, the Security Council 
determines when forceful measures are required. According to international law under the 
Charter, there is no legal sense for China to claim Charter principles are being violated by the 
Security Council exercising its legal authorities. The Security Council is given the legal power to 
decide when peaceful measures have failed and forceful ones are required. India stated that non-
coercive measures were not given adequate time to work before military intervention was 
authorized and stressed the need to allow more time for diplomatic and non-coercive measures to 
work.97 Those Member States which abstained on the vote on Resolution 1973 also pointed out 
that adequate efforts had not been made to peacefully resolve the conflict in Libya.98  
Although Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force to protect civilian populations in 
Libya, some Member States were cautious about the possible misuse of the mandate granted 
under the resolution. They raised questions about the adequacy of information with regard to the 
Libyan situation, as well as the true intention of NATO countries, which spearheaded military 
intervention against Libyan regime. Under these circumstances, Russia, China, and like-minded 
Member States stressed that the authority under Resolution 1973 should strictly be used only 
against legitimate targets and for limited ends.99  
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6.3.2.3 The “Regime Change” Controversy 
As the NATO mission progressed into mid-May, arguments were raised that civilians 
could not be protected without a military victory over Gaddafi.100 Some coalition members 
hoped for a regime change as the preferred outcome of the Libyan intervention. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France made it clear that they wanted Gaddafi out of power.101 
They strongly believed that Gaddafi should be removed from office in order to protect the 
civilian population in Libya. However, despite NATO’s military success against Gaddafi, a 
number of UN Member States significantly criticized NATO for its use of force against Libya. 
These criticisms included accusations that NATO exceeded the mandate contained in Resolution 
1973.  
After a military intervention has been initiated, it should not use more force than 
necessary to accomplish the stated humanitarian objective, and it should be conducted in strict 
compliance with international humanitarian law.102 The use of force should be proportional to 
achieve the stated objective. Under long-standing rules of international humanitarian law, the use 
of military force should only attack legitimate military targets, be proportional, and minimize 
collateral damage to civilians. However, under R2P, the use of force should be proportionate to 
the objective of protecting the civilian population. The ICISS report states that the scale, 
                                                          
100 Robert Parry, New War Rationale: Protect Civilians, CONSORTIUMNEWS.COM (Aug. 27, 2011), 
http://consortiumnews.com/2011/08/27/new-war-rationale-protect-civilians/.  
101 Barack Obama, President of the United States, David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and 
Nicholas Sarkozy, President of France, Libya’s Pathway to Peace, Joint Op-Ed, White House Office of the Press 
Secretary (Apr. 14, 2011).  
102 ICISS, supra note 85, ¶¶ 4.39, 4.40. 
235 
 
duration, and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to 
secure the defined human protection objective.103 
As the Libyan military intervention progressed, Germany, India, and Brazil warned the 
Security Council that military intervention could result in a more hazardous situation than what 
already existed in Libya.104 Therefore, Russia, China, and other like-minded states insisted that 
only a limited use of force was necessary to protect the civilian population.105 Further, India 
highlighted the need to ensure that any military measures would mitigate, not exacerbate, an 
already difficult situation for the people of Libya.106 
The issue of regime change became highly controversial after NATO acted under 
Resolution 1973 in Libya. According to Pattison:  
[T]he first problem concerns the possibility of mission creep. Extending the mandate of 
NATO and thus changing a regime by use of force was not accepted by the international 
community at large. A regime change cannot be reasonably expected under a 
humanitarian intervention as it could cause many casualties. Making regime change the 
primary objective would be also morally problematic as it would most likely fail to meet 
several of the other qualities that are important for the permissibility of an intervention.107  
While Russia and China had not used their veto power against Resolution 1973, they later 
regretted not using it when they had the opportunity to do so.108 According to China and Russia, 
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Western states could not be trusted to stay within the limits of a given R2P mandate to use 
military force.109 BBC correspondent Barbara Plett, quoting the Permanent Representative of 
India to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, referred to NATO as the “armed wing” of the Security 
Council, as India believed that NATO’s role in Libya had moved from protecting civilians in 
Benghazi to overthrowing the government in Tripoli.110 The AU also highlighted the 
requirement that all stakeholders involved in the implementation of Resolution 1973 act with the 
sole objective of the protection of civilians.111  
There was a lack of agreement among the Member States on the parameters and limits of 
the mandate to use military force given under Resolution 1973. During the negotiations of 
Resolution 1973, Member States expressed doubts about what military intervention under the 
R2P principle entailed.112 During the adoption of Resolution 1973, China, Russia, and India, for 
example, clearly stated that the mandate given under the resolution should not be extended to 
implement any agenda for regime change.113 India stated that it did not have clarity about details 
of the military measures, including what countries would participate and with what assets, and 
exactly how these measures would be carried out.114 Brazil stated that it was “not convinced that 
the use of force as provided for in operative paragraph four of the resolution will lead to the 
realization of the common objective which is the immediate end of violence and the protection of 
civilians.”115 Resolution 1973, which mandated the use of force in Libya to protect civilians, did 
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not offer any guidelines on how to interpret, or who would interpret, the Security Council’s 
mandate to use force under the R2P principle and this vagueness was highlighted by India, 
China, and Russia.116 Generally, any Security Council-authorized use of force is subject to the 
laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law, which regulate the use of military 
force in armed conflict whether the reasons behind the use of force are legal or illegal. 
Supporting Resolution 1973, the United States stated that the Security Council had 
responded to the Libyan peoples’ cry for help with the clear purpose of protecting them.117  The 
United States further stated that Resolution 1973 was adopted because the Gaddafi regime did 
not positively respond to the earlier resolutions and continued gross and systematic violations of 
most fundamental rights of the Libyan people.118 The United Kingdom stated that the Libyan 
regime had ignored the previous resolutions of the Security Council, and was on the verge of 
assaulting Benghazi.119 France stated that the Libyan people had been trampled under the feet of 
the Gaddafi regime and earlier measures had not been enough to stop Gaddafi’s atrocities. 
Stressing the international community’s call to protect civilian population in Libya, France stated 
that little time was left to take decisive action as each hour and day passed increased the weight 
on the international community’s shoulders.120 In a press conference held on December 14, 2011, 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that “Security Council Resolution 1973 was strictly 
enforced within the limits, within the mandate. This military operation done by the NATO forces 
was strictly within 1973 and there should be no misunderstanding on this.”121 The Secretary 
General emphasized that the international community had collectively advanced the R2P 
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principle in Libya, and that these actions represented an important victory for justice and 
international law.122  
However, during the May 2011 Security Council meeting on protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, India again raised the question about the parameters of the use of force as 
mandated under Resolution 1973.123 The delegation asked “who watches the guardians?” India 
voiced suspicion about the manner in which the humanitarian imperative of civilian protection 
was interpreted in the actual action on the ground.124 During this meeting, China stated that the 
original intention of Resolutions 1973 was to put an end to violence and to protect civilian 
population in Libya and opposed “any attempt to wilfully interpret the resolution or to take 
actions that exceed those mandated by the resolution.”125 Voicing a similar view, Russia stated 
that it was not clear how and by whom the intervention measures would be enforced and what 
the limits of any subsequent intervention would be.126  
The Libyan intervention, thus, sparked disagreement over the scope of the authority to 
use force under Resolution 1973. While a change in a state’s regime has often been the 
consequence of military intervention, the intervention in Libya was the first case of a Security 
Council-mandated operation that engaged in change of a regime. Thus, one of the main 
criticisms levelled against NATO’s military action was that it used the mandate granted not to 
save the civilian population, but to carry out regime change in Libya. However, Resolution 1973 
did not refer to a regime change, but emphasized that a solution to the crisis must respond to the 
                                                          
122 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon: Opening Remarks at End of Year Press Conference, U.N. NEWS CENTER (Dec. 
14, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1419#.Uq_9ljKA1dg. 
123 U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6531st mtg. at 9, 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 6531 (May 10, 2011).  
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 20.  
126 Id. at 9.  
239 
 
legitimate demands of the Libyan people. It was doubtful whether such demands of the Libyan 
population could be fulfilled while Gaddafi remained in power. While the Security Council 
refrained from any explicit reference to overthrow the Gaddafi regime, it took a number of other 
measures against the Libyan regime. In a previous action, Resolution 1970, the Security Council 
decided on a travel ban and asset freeze, specifically aimed at Gaddafi and his family, and the 
Council also referred the Libyan situation to the ICC.  In Resolution 1973, the Security Council 
further expanded the scope of financial sanctions against Libyan authorities. These measures 
indirectly supported the struggle against the Gaddafi regime by Libyan opposition groups.  
Although Resolution 1973 specifies the goal that any authorization to use force is only to 
protect civilian and populated areas, it does not explain what means may be employed to achieve 
that intended goal. In other words, while there was disagreement over regime change in Libya, 
there was another dispute – what is required in the use of force to “protect civilians” within the 
meaning of R2P? These disagreements sharpened the political and legal focus on the military 
aspect of the responsibility to react, revealing very little consensus on this issue. In fact, this 
broad mandate did not specify any clear parameters: for example, how force authorized by the 
Security Council could be implemented by Member States; when exactly a specified actor could 
take all necessary means to protect the civilians in Libya; what actions should be taken in 
protecting the Libyan civilian populations from mass atrocities; what were the limits of such 
actions; and who monitored the actions?  
Resolution 1973 did not expressly include the goal of changing the regime in Libya. 
Nevertheless, the resolution authorized the military means to achieve the objective of the 
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Security Council mandate to protect civilian population.127 In particular, when the conflict 
escalated, it became clear that civilians could not be protected while Gaddafi remained in power. 
However, regime change was not strictly necessary for the protection of the civilian population. 
Nevertheless, after all possible means to end atrocities and protect the population proved 
pointless, UN Member States considered it necessary to take action to change the Libyan regime 
in order to protect the civilian population.128  
This assertion supported the claim that the safety of civilians could not be guaranteed if 
the Gadhafi regime continued its relentless attacks against the civilian population.129 The United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France supported this assertion. On April 14, 2011, United 
States President Barack Obama, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister 
David Cameron published a joint article in several newspapers.130 The three state leaders pledged 
that NATO would protect civilians and stated that “so long as Gadhafi is in power, NATO must 
maintain its operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime 
builds.”131 They acknowledged that “the duty and mandate under Security Council Resolution 
1973 are to protect civilians and not to remove Gadhafi by force.”132 Nevertheless, they claimed 
that “it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gadhafi in power” and that a genuine 
transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process could only really begin when 
Gadhafi had resigned.133 While these states argued that the mandate of Resolution 1973 did not 
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include the removal of Gadhafi, they also stated that NATO would maintain its operations and 
increase the pressure on the regime as long as Gadhafi was in power.  
However, numerous political actors as well as commentators rejected the idea of regime 
change through military intervention. Amr Moussa, the Secretary-General of the LAS, pointed 
out that the Security Council authorized only the protection of civilians and not regime 
change.134 Naiman stated that the Security Council never approved a military mission to 
overthrow the Libyan government.135 In fact, Russia and China, along with many other states, 
refused to interpret Resolution 1973 as supporting regime change. Ulfstein and Christiansen 
argued that, although NATO actions to protect civilians were clearly within the mandate, 
operations aimed at overthrowing Gadhafi violated the mandate and were an illegal use of force. 
This overstepping of the mandate undermined the credibility of R2P.136 Sands stated that it was 
becoming increasingly hard to justify strikes on the Libyan leader's forces as protective.137 He 
asserted that “military attacks on Gaddafi could only be justified if it could be shown to be 
related to the objective of protecting civilians.” According to Sands, it is difficult in international 
law to argue for a pre-emptive use of force to protect civilians from a possible threat that might 
arise in the future. Pre-emption is a major problem because it is seen as a slippery slope, and 
rightly so.138  
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Regime change through the use of military force is a far-reaching measure that goes 
against many basic concepts of international law, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity of 
states, and non-intervention. Therefore, interpreting Resolution 1973 to grant authorization to 
change the Libyan regime is difficult. However, the mere fact that force was used to protect 
civilian population and, at the same time, contributed to the ouster of Gadhafi does not 
necessarily render NATO attacks illegal. Gadhafi was the supreme commander of all Libyan 
armed forces and he and his commanders attacked civilians in Libya. Therefore, targeting 
Gadhafi cannot be illegitimate under Resolution 1973, or under humanitarian law.139 
6.3.2.4 The “Responsibility While Protecting” Proposal 
After the Libyan intervention, the R2P principle was met with much criticism. Although 
NATO claimed the Libyan intervention a success because it eliminated threats to civilian 
population and did so well within the parameters of R2P, Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South 
Africa (BRICS), and like-minded countries believed the Libyan mission had gone beyond the 
Security Council mandate in ousting the Gadhafi regime.140 The controversy over “regime 
change” under Resolution 1973 stimulated efforts to find a compromise solution to retain needed 
political will for applying the R2P principle in humanitarian crises. The regime change 
controversy revealed two fundamental disagreements among Member States: (1) a disagreement 
over whether, in authorizing military force for R2P purposes, the authorized force is subject to 
substantive limitations or restrictions beyond those imposed by international humanitarian law; 
and (2) a disagreement about post-authorization oversight of the use of military force authorized 
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by the Security Council. In this context, in November 2011, Brazil proposed the “responsibility 
while protecting” (RWP) concept with an aim to address both problems.141 In particular, the 
RWP proposal provides a framework and guidelines for actions taken after the Security Council 
provides a mandate for military intervention.  
The RWP concept was first introduced by the Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff at the 
66th General Assembly in September 2011.142 She highlighted the importance of conflict 
prevention rather than forceful interventions, and underscored that the use of force should be 
implemented as a last resort. She also praised the Security Council for its role in conflict 
prevention.143 President Rousseff’s introduction of RWP was followed by a Brazilian concept 
note in November 2011.144 This concept note clarifies the substance of the initiative and suggests 
complimenting R2P via the key principles of the RWP idea. Primarily, the concept note sets 
forth that, before responding to a crisis with the use of force, it must be clear that the state’s 
primary responsibility to protect its population has not been met and all international efforts to 
prevent the crisis have been exhausted.145 However, even after meeting these preliminary 
criteria, the RWP proposal suggests that a differentiation should be made between military and 
nonmilitary coercion, avoiding the “precipitous use of force.”146  
The Brazilian concept note further states that all peaceful means have to be exhausted 
before authorizing any use of force, and a comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible 
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consequences of military action must also be conducted.147 This latter condition is key in 
creating post-conflict rebuilding efforts. Further, the RWP concept note suggests that any use of 
force must be authorized by the Security Council.148 While RWP highlights that an intervening 
state has the responsibility to follow both the “letter and spirit” of the UN mandate, RWP also 
stresses the importance of the Security Council in ensuring the accountability of the 
interveners.149 In order to achieve this objective, the RWP proposal suggests that the Security 
Council should implement enhanced security procedures enabling it to monitor the interpretation 
of resolutions.150 In addition, the Brazilian concept note states that the use of force must be 
proportional.151 It argues that use of force must be carried out in strict conformity with 
international law, in particular international humanitarian law and the international law of armed 
conflict.152 In fact, the Brazilian concept note states that “the use of force must produce as little 
violence and instability as possible and under no circumstance can it generate more harm than it 
was authorized to prevent.”153 
During the open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict on November 9, 
2011, in which the RWP concept note was introduced, Brazil stressed the importance of aiming 
for a high level of responsibility and accountability while protecting civilian populations.154 
Further, Brazil stated that both R2P and RWP should evolve together. Brazil further stated that:  
[O]ur collective point of departure should resemble the Hippocratic principle of primum 
non nocere - first, do no harm - with which doctors are so well acquainted. That must be 
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the motto of those who are mandated to protect civilians. It would also be most 
unfortunate, ultimately unacceptable, if a United Nations mission established with the 
aim of protecting civilians were to cause greater harm than that that it was enacted to 
prevent.155  
Although RWP proposes limitations on the use of military force, Brazil clarified that those are 
mere guidelines.156 However, Brazil posited that these guidelines must be followed from the 
beginning of the authorization to use force until suspension of such authorization by a new 
resolution.157  
Further, during the February 2012 informal debate on RWP, Brazil argued that order 
between the responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild should be logical and based on political 
prudence.158 Brazil, however, stated that this sequencing does not mean the establishment of an 
arbitrary check-list.159 It emphasized that this procedure, as proposed in the RWP concept, 
should not be perceived as a means to prevent or unduly delay authorization of military action in 
situations established in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.160 During this meeting, Brazil highlighted the 
importance of care and caution when using military force.161  
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Since Brazil proposed its concept note, RWP has gained much attention and been 
subjected to a great deal of discussion within the UN as well as in various other fora. In his 
report on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, the UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon welcomed the RWP concept and stated that the new RWP concept provides a 
useful pathway for continuing dialogue about ways of bridging different perspectives and forging 
strategies for timely and decisive responses to crimes and violations relating to R2P.162 The 
RWP idea has been welcomed by many delegations as a dynamic addition to the R2P principle. 
Two delegations, in particular, India and South Africa, have signaled a strong interest in the 
RWP concept. 
However, not everyone has extended support for the RWP concept. The United States 
argued that RWP manifestly fails to follow what it describes.163 According to the United States, 
“appropriate decision-making in R2P requires not just ‘temporal’ considerations but a 
comprehensive assessment of risks and costs and the balance of consequences.”164 The United 
States further stated that, even in situations where forceful action is required, the possible role of 
diplomacy should not be eliminated.165 The German Permanent Representative to the UN, Peter 
Wittig, stated that the Brazilian RWP approach lacked a precisely-defined concept of its own.166 
He further cited the prescription of step-by-step guidelines, the mandatory exhaustion of all 
peaceful means, and the introduction of exceptional circumstances as time consuming, overly 
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qualifying triggers for the use of force.167 Therefore, in his estimation, the RWP concept limits 
the scope for timely and decisive solutions in situations of extreme gravity.168 According to 
Luck, RWP proposes strict requirements for the use of force, requirements which cannot always 
be justified.169 
 Indeed, RWP suggests guidelines that already exist in the R2P concept. The ICISS report 
proposed criteria that must be fulfilled in a decision to intervene with military force is taken.170 
These six precautionary principles are: (a) Just Cause; (b) Right Authority; (c) Right Intention; 
(d) Last Resort; (e) Proportional Means; and (f) Reasonable Prospects.171 Both the ICISS and 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document made clear these requirements for Security Council 
authorizations to use force under R2P. Also, both documents emphasize the need to exhaust all 
peaceful means to resolve a crisis before taking any decision to undertake military intervention. 
In fact, the responsibility to prevent is considered the most important aspect of R2P. Neither 
document authorized interveners to use excessive force, but rather force that is proportional to 
the situation. Further, states that use military force are bound by international humanitarian law 
and the laws of arms conflict, and thereby are required to use appropriate means in military 
interventions. The RWP guideline on proportionality of force is already embedded in 
international law. Therefore, there is hardly anything new introduced by the RWP concept.  
Under RWP guidelines, it is very unlikely that Western states, in particular, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, and like-minded countries will agree to abide by these 
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guidelines. For instance, the United States and the United Kingdom threatened Syria with the use 
of force even without Security Council approval and, in fact, they did not justify their threat to 
use of force under the R2P principle. On the other hand, if all RWP suggested guidelines are met, 
then the permanent Security Council members should not have to make use of their veto. 
However, it is very unlikely that these Security Council members would agree to jeopardize their 
veto power. Moreover, the RWP concept does not address who decides whether the guidelines 
are met. Use of force decisions are mostly politically motivated, and any decision to authorize 
military intervention will be made on a case-by-case basis. It is questionable whether RWP’s 
one-size-fits-all approach will be suitable for present day crises. Importantly, if the Security 
Council follows the RWP criteria, then it may begin to create a legal duty to intervene. If there is 
such a legal duty to intervene, then the failure to intervene also should have legal consequences, 
to which RWP does not provide an answer.   
 However, RWP is not a hopeless concept. Indeed, RWP guidelines would generally result 
in the justifiable use of military force. Also, RWP could help to improve the transparency of any 
decision-making process on the use of military force. In these regards, the RWP concept not only 
advances the R2P principle, but also improves states’ concern about the use of force. It creates a 
new political standard for states in productive discussions on advancing R2P. Despite these 
positive aspects, the RWP concept has not been able to offer a solution to the existing 
controversies about R2P. Nor has it been able to offer anything new to existing international law 
on the use of military force.  
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6.3.3 Responsibility to Rebuild 
The NATO military intervention in Libya led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime, and many 
hailed this intervention as a successful implementation of the R2P principle.172 Bellamy and 
Williams noted that the R2P principle proved to be robust in the Libyan crisis:  
[T]he international community’s response to the crisis in Libya reflected a new politics of 
protection and had four principle characteristics: first, the Security Council had framed 
this crisis in terms of human protection; second, the Security Council had demonstrated 
the willingness to authorize the use of military force for protection purposes even without 
the consent of the host state; third, the regional stakeholders had become important 
gatekeepers influencing the Security Council and; finally, the international community 
had exhibited a commitment to working through the Security Council to fashion a 
response to a human protection crisis.173  
This positive perspective, however, usually does not include analysis of the third aspect of R2P - 
the responsibility to rebuild. As specified in the ICISS report, the responsibility to rebuild is a 
vital element of the R2P principle.174 However, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document did 
not discuss responsibility to rebuild in its discussion on R2P, and, instead, it proposed creation of 
the Peacebuilding Commission later in the document. The responsibility to rebuild is an 
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important part of the R2P principle because, for example, it requires that intervening actors 
establish and implement a clear post-intervention strategy to rebuild.175  
The main function of an intervention involving military force should be to provide 
security and protection for civilians of the state in which the intervention is taking place. The 
intervening forces are obliged to prevent mass atrocities.176 However, in Libya, post-Gaddafi 
political instability meant the international community could not prevent large-scale violence in 
Libya. The abundance of weaponry in the country made it easy for Gaddafi loyalists’ to engage 
in a killing campaign. In addition, the climate of fear in post-conflict Libya made it difficult for 
groups to relinquish their arms, which complicated post-Gaddafi efforts to prevent significant 
political instability in Libya. 
In addition, the responsibility to rebuild requires post-conflict efforts to achieve justice 
and reconciliation between parties. According to the ICISS report, external support for 
reconciliation efforts should encourage this cooperation through joint development efforts 
between former adversaries.177 Generally, administering punishments for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed in the civil war were needed, but punishing for past violence in 
Libya incited more violence.  
According to the ICISS report, the responsibility to rebuild entails a responsibility to 
encourage economic growth and sustainable development.178 After the fall of the Gaddafi 
regime, the EU lifted its sanctions on ports, oil firms and banks, but the removal of the sanctions 
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did not immediately help the recovery of Libya’s economy.179 Virtually all economic activities, 
especially oil production, witnessed a dramatic decline in 2011.180 Oil is the driving force of the 
Libyan economy, and oil and gas production account for 65 percent of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), 96 percent of exports, and 98 percent of government revenues.181 
There was some recovery in 2012, and oil production recovered faster than expected. However, 
the economy has not reached a point of sustained economic growth. In fact, by 2013, the 
economy only just got back to what it was prior to the uprising.182 In addition, the interim 
government has failed to develop an economic vision or structure.183 It has not done much to 
improve economic policies and enact reforms because politics continue to overshadow the 
economy.184  
On September 16, 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2009, establishing a 
support mission in Libya (UNSMIL).185 Under the resolution, UNSMIL was authorized for an 
initial period of three months: later, its mandate was extended through Security Council 
resolutions.186 As specified in Resolution 2009, UNSMIL was tasked with helping Libyan 
national efforts to restore public security, promote the rule of law, foster inclusive political 
dialogue and national reconciliation, and embark on constitution-making and electoral 
processes.187 The UNSMIL mandate also included assisting national efforts to extend state 
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authority, strengthen institutions, restore public services, support transitional justice, and protect 
human rights, particularly those of vulnerable groups.188 The UN Peacebuilding Fund extended 
its support to UNSMIL to ensure inclusive, transparent and peaceful legislative elections through 
its rapid response capacity.189 In order to address the important liquidity shortage the country 
was facing, in February 2012 the UN Peacebuilding Fund approved a Joint UNSMIL, United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), UN Women Civic Education and Dialogue project 
amounting to US$ 1.9 million.190 The project aimed at empowering women and youth to 
meaningfully participate in the July 2012 elections. In September 2012, the Peacebuilding Fund 
approved a second joint project amounting to US$ 0.5 million to allow South-South exchanges in 
critical peace and state building areas, including transitional justice, constitution reform, women 
and youth empowerment, amongst others.191 
The UNSMIL mandate also included taking immediate steps to initiate economic 
recovery and coordinate support that may be requested from other multilateral and bilateral 
actors, as appropriate.192 In support of these objectives, the Security Council also partly lifted, 
through the resolution, the arms embargo and the asset freeze targeting entities connected to the 
previous regime imposed on Libya under Resolution 1970.193 The Security Council emphasized 
its intention to keep the no-fly zone imposed by Resolution 1973 under review.194 However, UN 
spokesman Eduardo Del Buey stated that UNSMIL was not a peacekeeping mission.195 He 
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observed that “UNSMIL is there to assist the Libyan authorities to help them create the 
necessary institutions to govern the country and ensure the respect of fundamental rights for 
all."196 However, he added that the government of Libya has "the main responsibility of 
disarming and integrating the militias."197  
By end of 2013, a total of 205 UNSMIL international staff members, government-
provided personnel, and national staff members had been deployed, with 175 in Tripoli, 14 in 
Benghazi, 3 in Sabha, 1 in New York, and 12 at the Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy.198 In 
Resolution 66/263, the General Assembly approved an amount of $36,039,100 for UNSMIL for 
2012.199 In Resolution 67/246, the General Assembly approved an additional amount of 
$50,637,200 for 2013.200 The entire amount approved for UNSMIL for biennium 2012-2013 was 
$86,676,300.201 In addition, the Security Council has taken a number of measures to release 
Libyan assets that were frozen during the crisis. Billions of dollars under Gaddafi were frozen by 
the Security Council in March 2011, following his brutal crackdown on protesters.202 However, 
by December 2011, the sanctions against the Central Bank of Libya and its subsidiary, the 
Libyan Foreign Bank, were lifted, clearing the way for the return of more than $40 billion to help 
the new Libyan government to rebuild the country.203 In addition, the United States and the 
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United Kingdom also announced that they would be unblocking most Libyan assets that they 
froze during the crisis.204   
Despite the resources allocated, UNSMIL has not been able to achieve its objectives. 
Libya has staggered into its worst political and economic crisis since the defeat of Gaddafi two 
years ago. Despite Libya’s political transformation, including the swearing in on November 14, 
2011, of Libya’s first democratically constituted government, events have continued to illustrate 
the volatility and precariousness of the situation there.205 The post-intervention challenges faced 
by Libya have been further aggravated by tribal and regional tensions. The security situation 
remains tenuous and continues to be the predominant concern for the Libyan authorities and 
people.206 More than ever, civilians are regularly targeted by renegade militias. In June 2013, 
protests against militia were met with gunfire, and a number of protestors were shot dead, and 
many others were wounded.207 Rule by local militia is also spreading chaos around Tripoli.208 
The ethnic Berbers, whose militia led the assault on Tripoli in 2011, temporarily took the 
parliament building in Tripoli in 2013.209 Government authority in Libya is disintegrating in all 
parts of the country, fuelling doubts of claims of R2P success in Libya in 2011.   
Despite efforts of the Libyan authorities and UNSMIL to end torture and ensure the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system, torture and other mistreatment of civilians has 
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been an on-going and widespread concern in many detention centers throughout Libya.210 
Detainees are frequently held without access to lawyers and infrequent access to families. The 
vast majority of an estimated 8,000 conflict-related detainees are still being held without due 
process.211 According to UNSMIL, since late 2011, there have been 27 cases of death in custody, 
where evidence suggests that torture was the cause of death.212 
Further, foreign diplomats have also come under attack in Libya. The EU Ambassador’s 
convoy was attacked, and the French embassy has also been bombed.213 In September 2013, 
militia members stormed the U.S. consulate building in Benghazi, resulting in the death of four 
Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens.214 This tense situation arose as a result of the 
arrest of Al-Libi, an alleged al-Qaeda operative from his Tripoli home and charging him for 1998 
bombings at the U.S. Embassy in Kenya.215  
As the security and economic situations in Libya were continuously deteriorating, on 
December 9, 2013, Tarik Matri, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the 
Head of UNSMIL, insisted on creating a sustained dialogue between the government and the 
main armed militia.216 UNSMIL has been supporting the efforts of both the new government of 
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Libya and the Libyan people to guarantee the success of the democratic transition in the country, 
a process which has been under way since the fall of the Gaddafi regime.217  
Given the present status of post-Gaddafi Libya, the UN and the international community 
have failed to meet their responsibility to rebuild after the military intervention. Although 
UNSMIL, which was not established as a peacekeeping force, was deployed immediately after 
the fall of the Gaddafi regime, it failed to establish basic security and protection for the civilians 
in Libya. It also failed to achieve any semblance of justice and reconciliation between parties 
involved in the conflict. Further, UNSMIL could not stabilize the economic situation in Libya. 
Therefore, the responsibility to rebuild Libya has not been successfully upheld, and this reality 
creates more doubts about claims of success for the R2P principle in Libya. 
6.4 Conclusion 
 The international community responded to the Libyan government’s failure to prevent 
mass atrocities against its population by first employing a broad range of non-coercive measures, 
such as diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, a travel ban and arms embargo, and the referral 
of the case to the ICC. When it became clear that these non-coercive measures failed to stop the 
mass atrocities, the Security Council authorized the use of force in order to protect civilian 
population. Ongoing debates over NATO’s objectives, as well as the scope of the mandate of 
military intervention, demonstrate that the implementation of the R2P principle, specifically in 
Libya’s case, is of a concern. 
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6.4.1 Responsibility to Prevent 
Regional organizations and the UN agreed that the responsibility to protect the Libyan 
population from mass atrocities was with the Libyan government. Similarly, during the Darfur 
crisis, regional and international actors agreed that the state had the responsibility to protect its 
population. Specifically, there was a general understanding in the international community that 
the Libyan government had failed to protect its own civilian population. Most importantly, in 
both the Darfur and Libyan crises, state practice reflected the obligations of sovereign states to 
their own people. However, during the Darfur crisis, some Member States were reluctant to 
agree that the Sudanese government failed to protect its civilian population.218 
Nevertheless, during the Libyan crisis, Member States agreed that the Libyan government 
had failed to protect its population. This consensus led the international community to take 
preventive actions against the Libyan regime. Early preventive action by the UN and regional 
actors was intended to prevent further atrocities in Libya and give mediators time to secure a 
peaceful resolution. Although such preventive efforts were not successful, the state practice in 
Libya suggests, at least within the UN context, that the international community was trying to 
fulfill their responsibility to prevent atrocities. The preventive efforts by regional and 
international bodies concerning Libya revealed that the international community had 
responsibilities that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty to prevent atrocities. 
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6.4.2 Responsibility to React 
The Security Council decision to take non-coercive measures and then authorize military 
intervention in Libya was supported with both political will and operational capacity. Resolution 
1970, which imposed non-coercive measures and referred the situation to the ICC, was adopted 
unanimously. Although disagreements existed, a similar situation unfolded in the Darfur crisis, 
where the situation was referred to the ICC, even though several Member States abstained. State 
practice in Libya and Darfur on ICC referral, in fact, suggests a synergy between the 
responsibility to react and international criminal law. International criminal law prohibits certain 
conduct, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against humanity. 
Similarly, the R2P principle recognizes a state’s responsibility to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Therefore, referring the 
situations in both Darfur and Libya to the ICC emphasized that the doctrines of sovereignty and 
non-intervention are not absolute in cases of mass atrocities.  
The actions taken by the Security Council under Resolution 1973 were the first with 
regard to military intervention under the R2P principle. Resolution 1973 was not actively 
opposed by Member States. The authorization in Resolution 1973 made Libya stand apart from 
previous cases of humanitarian intervention conducted without Security Council approval, such 
as Kosovo. Although the Security Council had endorsed the principle previously, it was in the 
Libyan crisis that R2P was first implemented by the Security Council through military 
intervention. The Security Council was careful to frame the Libyan crisis in terms of the R2P 
principle. Every decision made by the Security Council regarding the Libyan crisis, including all 
sanctions and the authorization to use military force, was grounded in R2P. The Member States’ 
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reaction to the Libyan crisis appeared shaped and structured by and through the R2P principle. 
Although there was a need to protect the civilian population from mass atrocities in Darfur, there 
was no apparent interest by states or regional organizations to engage in military intervention in 
Darfur. The Security Council decisions regarding the Darfur crisis were not grounded in R2P 
and, in fact, during the Darfur crisis, Member States did not embrace the R2P principle. 
Resolution 1973 meant that Member States, which had otherwise defended state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, were not opposed to military actions against the Libyan 
regime in order to stop mass atrocities. The lack of a veto in the Security Council raises the 
question whether this behavior could be considered as acceptance of the RN2V. However, the 
controversy over regime change after the Security Council authorization of the Libyan 
intervention made future RN2V behavior much more unlikely.   
The regime change controversy that followed NATO’s implementation of the Security 
Council’s authorization of the use of force in Libya centered on the mandate created by the 
Security Council. Under international law, the Security Council has the power to authorize the 
use of force. However, the controversy was not about the Security Council’s legal authority to 
authorize the use of force, but it was about what Security Council authorized. This is different to 
what happened in the Darfur crisis. Given the regime change controversy, certain Security 
Council members with veto power are unlikely to support further use-of-force authorizations by 
the Security Council without tighter parameters and continuous Security Council oversight. On 
the other hand, the United States is unlikely to accept such tighter conditions. Therefore, as can 
be seen in the Syrian crisis, it is unlikely that the Security Council would authorize military force 
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for humanitarian purposes. This, in turn, raises the long-standing question whether a state can 
use force for humanitarian purposes without Security Council authorization.  
6.4.3 Responsibility to Rebuild 
Similar to the ineffective rebuilding process in Darfur, the inadequate and slow 
rebuilding efforts in post-conflict Libya have met with criticism. Immediately after the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime, NATO concluded its operations. UNSMIL, which was created to restore peace, 
justice and rehabilitation, as well as rebuild, has been unable to bring normalcy to the lives of the 
Libyan people. While Libya remains wracked by violence and economic stagnation, the post-
Gaddafi militias are in the spotlight as never before.219 The UN and the international community 
have not been able to stabilize the country. Therefore, although NATO intervention was 
successful in ousting Gaddafi and changing the regime in Libya, post-conflict rebuilding efforts 
have not been able to bring much-awaited peace and stability to the country. 
The relatively little attention given by the international community to the responsibility to 
rebuild in both Darfur and Libya suggests that this responsibility has had the least impact of 
R2P’s three responsibilities. As noted earlier, there was deep skepticism expressed in the ICISS 
report about the responsibility to rebuild aspect of R2P. The ICISS report itself seemed to doubt 
whether a truly effective and sustainable post-conflict rebuilding effort could be viable.220 State 
practice in Darfur and Libya reflects non-acceptance by states of legal obligations under the 
responsibility to rebuild, which is exactly the situation under international law before R2P came 
along. This situation, therefore, affirms the ICISS’s skepticism about the responsibility to 
rebuild.  
                                                          
219 Cockburn, supra note 213.   
220 ICISS, supra note 85, ¶ 5.24.   
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The Libyan case illustrates how humanitarian intervention under R2P emerges when a 
state fails to fulfill its responsibilities as a sovereign. In Libya, the grave human rights violations 
gave the Security Council the necessary leverage to authorize the use of force, and NATO 
recognized the Security Council as the legitimate authority to authorize intervention. However, 
NATO’s use of force in Libya was declared illegitimate by many states because of NATO’s 
alleged abuse of the mandate to change the Libyan regime, and certain Member States distanced 
themselves from the use-of-force authorized by the Security Council. The defining R2P feature 
of the Libyan crisis - the Security Council’s authorization of the use of force - ultimately became 
the most damaging aspect of this crisis for the R2P principle.  
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CHAPTER 7 
        CÔTE D’IVOIRE  
7.1 Introduction 
 Heightened violence and tensions by October 2010 placed Côte d’Ivoire on the list 
of conflicts for which the international community was compelled to find a solution. 
However, unlike many other humanitarian crises, UN peacekeepers were already in Côte 
d’Ivoire at the height of the crisis, though not initially with a mandate to use force to 
protect civilians.1 As explained below, the UN established the United Nations Operations 
in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in 2004 with the support of French soldiers already stationed 
there.2  
An upsurge of violence occurred during and after the presidential election in Côte 
d’Ivoire in 2010.3 With a view to protecting civilian populations in Côte d’Ivoire, and 
framing its response in terms of the R2P principle, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1975 on March 30, 2011.4 The resolution authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means to 
protect civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence in Côte d’Ivoire.5 
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1975 shortly after it authorized the use of force 
for R2P purposes in Libya in Resolution 1973. However, this authorization to use force in 
Côte d’Ivoire sparked serious disagreements about UNOCI’s implementation of Resolution 
                                                          
1 Côte d’Ivoire Background - MINUCI, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minuci/ (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2014).  
2 Côte d’Ivoire Background- UNOCI, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/ (last visited Feb. 8, 
2014).  
3 Côte d’Ivoire Background, supra note 1. 
4 S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 1975 (Mar. 30, 2011).   
5 Id. ¶ 6.  
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1975. The use of force by UNOCI under Security Council authorization ignited 
controversies about UNOCI’s use of force to effect regime change in Côte d’Ivoire, which 
connected to similar problems with the implementation of Resolution 1973 in Libya. 
Individually and collectively, the Libya and Côte d’Ivoire controversies damaged the R2P 
principle. There were also problems with post-intervention rebuilding in Côte d’Ivoire. 
This chapter analyzes how the international community invoked the R2P principle in its 
responses to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and how these R2P-based responses affect the 
relationship between the R2P principle and international law.   
7.2 Background to the Conflict in Côte d’Ivoire  
The West African country of Côte d'Ivoire shares borders with Liberia, Guinea, 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Gulf of Guinea.6 Côte d'Ivoire is made up of several 
distinct tribes, including the Baoule, Bete, Senoufou, Agni, Malinke, Dan, and Lobi tribes.7 
In 1842, the French obtained territorial concessions from local tribes, and the country 
became a French colony until it achieved independence on August 7, 1960.8 However, 
even after achieving independence from France, Côte d'Ivoire maintained strong links with 
France through bilateral defense agreements.9  
From independence until his death in 1993, Felix Houphouët-Boigny served as 
president. The first contested presidential election was held in October 1990, and 
Houphouët-Boigny won with 81% of the vote, beating Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian 
                                                          
6 Côte d'Ivoire Profile, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13287585 (last visited Jan.17, 2014).   
7 Côte d'Ivoire, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/country/cote-divoire.html (last visited Feb. 12, 
2014).  
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
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Popular Front (FPI).10 In 1993, Henri Konan Bédié became president following the death 
of Houphouët-Boigny.11 President Bédié was overthrown by the country's first military 
coup in December 1999, and General Robert Guéï assumed control of the country. As a 
result, the majority of foreign aid and assistance to the country terminated.12  
The post-Boigny power struggle was exacerbated by debates over nationality laws 
and eligibility conditions for elections. Laurent Gbagbo challenged Guéï during the 
presidential election held in October 2000, which in turn led to civil and military unrest.13 
Following a public uprising, Guéï was replaced by Gbagbo. The heated disagreements over 
the presidential election in 2000 resulted in violent clashes between forces loyal to Guéï 
and Gbagbo. An opposition leader, Alassane Ouattara, was disqualified from contesting the 
2000 election by the country's Supreme Court because of his alleged Burkinabé nationality. 
In August 2002, Ouattara’s Rally of Republicans (RDR) opposition party was given four 
ministerial posts in Gbagbo’s government.14   
Many encouraging efforts towards national reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire were 
disrupted by an armed uprising in September 2002. On September 18-19, 2002, a large 
number of disgruntled members of the armed forces took up arms against the Côte d'Ivoire 
government. This uprising was, in fact, the sixth attempted coup against the government in 
the space of less than three years. The uprising began with the government decision to 
demobilize hundreds of soldiers against their will. Although government troops were able 
                                                          
10 Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect, 87 ROYAL INST. OF INT’L AFF. 829 (2011), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/87_4BellamyWilliams.pdf. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 Côte d'Ivoire Profile, supra note 6. 
14 Id.  
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to control the uprising and secure the main city, Abidjan, they were unable to secure 
control of the northern part of the country, and rebel forces loyal to Ouattara acquired 
control of the northern cities of Bouake and Korhogo.15 Against this backdrop of political 
strife, violence continued in Côte d'Ivoire. More than 100 children and staff at the 
International Christian Academy, a missionary boarding school, were counted among those 
caught in the fighting.16 Following the request of the United States Ambassador to Côte 
d'Ivoire, Arlene Renderto, United States Special Forces were dispatched to the country to 
save those who were caught in fighting, including the children at the missionary school.17 
In addition, under defense agreements signed between France and Côte d'Ivoire on August 
24, 1961, to ensure that France would protect Côte d'Ivoire, France deployed a military 
contingent to the country in September 2002.18 The civilian unrest and political 
competition for power in Côte d'Ivoire between Gbagbo and Ouattara continued from 2002 
to 2010.  
The crisis took a turn for the worse with the 2010 presidential election.19 The 
election results led to a tense situation in the country. On December 2, 2010, the head of 
the Ivorian Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI) announced provisional results 
showing that Ouattara had won the election, yet final election results were postponed for 
days.20 Given the delay to the official announcement of the election results, the 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Ivory Coast Conflict, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-
coast-2002.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
18 Jean Nanga, Ivory Coast: A ‘Civil War’ That is French and Neo-Colonial, INTERNATIONALVIEWPOINT.ORG 
(Feb. 7, 2005), http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article553.  
19 Bellamy & Williams, supra note 10, at 830. 
20 Eric Agnero, Ivory Coast Postpones Presidential Runoff Vote, CNN (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/11/10/ivory.coast.runoff/. 
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Constitutional Council stated that the CEI had no authority to announce election results.21 
According to the Constitutional Council, the passing of the deadline meant that only the 
Constitutional Council was authorized to announce decisions regarding election results.22 
With this claim, the Constitutional Council announced that the results in seven northern 
regions were cancelled, and Gbagbo had won the election.23 After Gbagbo was sworn in as 
the president, Ouattara had himself sworn in as the president in Côte d’Ivoire.24 
Ouattara had the support of the UN and many other countries. In response to 
Gbagbo’s demand that French troops leave the country, the UN spokesperson stated that 
the UN did not consider Gbagbo to be the president and that UNOCI peacekeepers would 
continue to support and protect both Ouattara and Ivorian citizens.25 Although Gbagbo had 
been sworn in as the president in Côte d’Ivoire, only Angola and Lebanon recognized 
Gbagbo as the president.26 The United States, African Union (AU), European Union (EU), 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the UN recognized 
Ouattara as the duly elected president. These events sparked violence across the country, 
quickly creating the potential for large scale atrocities among the civilian population.  
Between December 2010 and March 2011, a series of violent events occurred 
between Gbagbo's militias and Ouattara's supporters, mainly in Abidjan, where both sides 
                                                          
21 David Lewis & Tim Cocks, Ivory Coast Seals Borders after Opposition Win, REUTERS (Dec 2, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/02/ivorycoast-election-idAFLDE6B10GL20101202?sp=true. 
22 Id.  
23 Constitutional Body Names Gbagbo Ivory Coast Election Winner, AFP (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h1lqqW8eecnVcdL82ggEDWQRli0Q?docId=CNG.a
5fc0e83efff72426ce88ff122d81b07.751. 
24 Id.  
25 Nico Colombant, UN Spokesman: Gbagbo Not Ivory Coast President, VOICE OF AMERICA (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/un-spokesman-gbagbo-not-ivory-coast-president-112131814/132460.html. 
26 Despite Growing Pressure, Ivory Coast Incumbent Gbagbo Still Has Outside Allies, VOICE OF AMERICA 
(Dec. 26, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/content/despite-growing-pressure-ivory-coast-incumbent-gbagbo-
still-has-outside-allies-112528679/132832.html. 
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had large numbers of supporters.27 On December 16, 2010, clashes between Gbagbo’s 
forces and Ouattara’s supporters in Abidjan and Yamoussoukro resulted in many more 
deaths.28 Atrocities in Côte d’Ivoire continued, and, in January 2011, a series of clashes 
broke out between two rival groups in Duékoué.29  Heavy fighting broke out in western 
Côte d'Ivoire by the end of February 2011.30 Gbagbo’s supporters carried out a number of 
attacks targeting foreign business centers and the UN office in Abidjan in March 2011.31 
By mid-March 2011, Gbagbo had reportedly banned all French and UN aircraft from 
Ivorian airspace.32 Gbagbo’s forces continued to attack pro-Ouattara’s forces, and, by 
March 28, 2011, Gbagbo’s forces launched a country-wide military offensive where 
hundreds of civilians were killed in the Duékoué massacre. However, both pro-Ouattara 
and pro-Gbagbo forces were accused of having participated in this massacre.33 
7.3 Application of R2P in International Responses to the Côte d’Ivoire Crisis  
 From the beginning of the Ivoirian crisis, thousands of civilians have been killed in 
the midst of clashes between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces, and many more have 
been displaced and sought refuge in neighboring countries.34 As the crisis worsened, the 
                                                          
27 Marco Chown Oved, At least 20 Killed in Ivory Coast Clashes, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2010/12/16/ivory_coast_march_over_vote_turns_violent_
3_dead/. 
28 Id.  
29 Ange Aboa, Clashes in West Ivory Coast Have Killed 33, REUTERS (Jan 10, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/10/us-ivorycoast-clashes-idUSTRE7094CZ20110110. 
30 Id.  
31 Gbagbo Youth Riot in Cote d'Ivoire, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 1, 2011),     
  http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201131175529464635.html. 
32 Ivory Coast's Laurent Gbagbo Bans UN and French Flights, WEBCITATION.ORG (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.webcitation.org/5x7SA99J5. 
33 Human Rights Watch, Côte d’Ivoire: Ouattara Forces Kill, Rape Civilians During Offensive (Apr. 9, 
2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/09/c-te-d-ivoire-ouattara-forces-kill-rape-civilians-during-
offensive. 
34 Id.  
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international community offered varying responses under the R2P principle with a view to 
halting further atrocities in Côte d'Ivoire. 
7.3.1 Responsibility to Prevent    
Both the ICISS report and the World Summit Outcome Document recognize the 
responsibility of a state to protect its own population.35 Both documents hold that, when the 
state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or if the state itself is the 
perpetrator, it becomes the responsibility of the international community to act to protect 
civilians.36 Accordingly, the government of Côte d'Ivoire had the primary responsibility to 
protect its population from mass atrocities. There was a disagreement about who was the 
lawful leadership of the government in Côte d'Ivoire. However, it was Gbagbo who 
governed most parts of the country and participated in these atrocities and, therefore, the 
government’s responsibility to protect the population was not being fulfilled. Also, 
Gbagbo’s government could not stop the atrocities or violence carried out by Ouattara’s 
forces. As a result of the government’s failure to protect its population, the responsibility to 
prevent atrocities and protect the civilian population in Côte d'Ivoire became the 
responsibility of the international community.  
Responding to the crisis that followed the September 2002 armed uprising in Côte 
d'Ivoire, ECOWAS convened a meeting on September 29, 2002, in which a contact group 
was established to promote dialogue between the opposition rebels and the government of 
                                                          
35 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, REPORT 2001: THE RESP. TO 
PROTECT ¶ 2.29 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document, G.A Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
36 ICISS, supra note 35, ¶ 2.30. 
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Côte d'Ivoire.37 This contact group was comprised of Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, and Togo, together with the AU. The contact group agreed to put in place an 
immediate arrangement to deploy ECOWAS peacekeeping troops to Côte d'Ivoire.38 
ECOWAS mandated the troops to monitor a proposed ceasefire, ensure the disengagement 
of insurgents from the areas that had fallen under their control, and disarm the rebel groups. 
After much effort, the Ivoirian government and the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire 
(MPCI) signed a ceasefire agreement on October 17, 2002.39 In accepting the cessation of 
hostilities, Gbagbo requested that France assign forces to monitor the ceasefire and help in 
the deployment of the ECOWAS troops.40 
On the basis of the ceasefire agreement, negotiations between the government and 
MPCI resumed on October 24, 2002, in Lomé, under the auspices of the President of Togo, 
Gnassingbe Eyadema.41 The Lomé talks stalled as the MPCI insisted on the resignation of 
Gbagbo. The MPCI also insisted on a review of the Ivoirian Constitution and holding new 
presidential elections. ECOWAS’ effort to break the political stalemate was unsuccessful, 
and the French government made new efforts to resume peace negotiations.42 A round-
table meeting of Ivorian political parties was held in Linas-Marcoussis, France from 
January 15-23, 2003.43 This meeting resulted in the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis 
Agreement on January 23, 2003, by Ivorian political parties. Provisions in the agreement 
                                                          
37 Côte d’Ivoire Background, supra note 1.  
38 Id.  
39 The Acceptance of International Criminal Court Jurisdiction by Côte d'Ivoire, 2, AMERICAN NON-GOV’T 
ORG. COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.amicc.org/docs/Cote%20d'Ivoire.pdf. 
40 Côte d’Ivoire Background, supra note 1. 
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included, among other things, the creation of a government of national reconciliation to be 
led by a prime minister appointed by the president.44  
As early as 2003, the UN also took a number of steps to prevent the escalation of 
the Ivorian crisis. After endorsing the Linas-Marcoussis agreement, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1464 on February 4, 2003.45 This resolution reaffirmed the Security 
Council’s commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and unity of Côte d'Ivoire. 
Resolution 1464 reinforced the importance of non-interference and regional co-operation. 
The resolution noted the decision by ECOWAS to deploy a peacekeeping force to Côte 
d'Ivoire and supported the organization’s efforts to promote a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict.46 The resolution condemned violations of human rights and international law in 
the country, welcomed the deployment of ECOWAS and French forces, and authorized 
ECOWAS and French forces under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to use 
necessary measures to guarantee protection and freedom of movement for Ivorian 
civilians.47 However, this was not an authorization to use military force, nor did the 
resolution make any references to R2P.  
As the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire continued, progress towards breaking the stalemate 
was made at a meeting in Accra in March 2003, with the 10 signatories to the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement.48 During this meeting, Gbagbo agreed to appoint a committee to 
oversee several disputed government positions. On March 10, 2003, Gbagbo issued an 
                                                          
44 Id.  
45 S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 1464 (Feb. 4, 2003).   
46 Id. pmbl. 
47 Id. ¶ 8.   
48 Côte d’Ivoire Background, supra note 1.  
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order delegating authority to the prime minister to implement the work program set out in 
the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, but limited only for a six-month period.49  
In another step intended to prevent further violence in Côte d'Ivoire, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1479 on May 13, 2003.50 This resolution established the UN 
Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) and mandated the mission to observe and facilitate the 
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and to complement the operations of ECOWAS and French 
peacekeeping forces, respectively. In June 2003, 26 military liaison officers were 
authorized by the Security Council for initial deployment in Côte d'Ivoire under Resolution 
1479.51 On November 13, 2003, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1514.52 The resolution extended the mandate of MINUCI until February 4, 2004.53 By the 
end of November 2003, a UN multi-departmental assessment mission visited Côte d’Ivoire 
in order to examine the possibility of transforming ECOWAS forces into a UN 
peacekeeping force.54 However, none of these resolutions made reference to R2P. 
Despite many preventive efforts by the French government and regional and 
international organizations to find solutions to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, rebels launched 
an armed attack in December 2003 on the state television building in Abidjan killing 19 
people.55 In light of this development, the UN Secretary General expressed his hope that 
Member States on the Security Council would give full consideration to the pressing call 
                                                          
49 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d’Ivoire: Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶ 
28, U.N. Doc. S/2003/374 (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3e8c32094.pdf. 
50 S.C. Res. 1479, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1479 (May 13, 2003).   
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52 S.C. Res. 1514, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1514 (Nov. 13, 2003).   
53 Id. ¶ 1. 
54 Côte d’Ivoire Background, supra note 1. 
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by ECOWAS’ leaders for an increase in the troop strength of MINUCI, as well as its 
transformation into a UN peacekeeping mission.56 
As the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued to pose a threat to regional and 
international peace and security, and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1528 on February 27, 2004.57 This resolution 
established the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), effective as of April 4, 2004, with 
a mandate to facilitate the implementation of the 2003 peace agreement signed by each of 
the parties to the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire.58 In accordance with the resolution, UNOCI took 
over the peacekeeping mission from MINUCI and ECOWAS.59 The Security Council 
authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means within its capabilities and areas of 
deployment to protect civilians in Côte d'Ivoire.60 The resolution further mandated UNOCI 
to coordinate with French forces to re-establish trust between all Ivorian political 
factions.61 The resolution also authorized French forces to use all necessary means to 
support UNOCI’s efforts to protect civilians.62 However, the actions taken by France, 
ECOWAS, and the Security Council under Resolution 1528 did not involve any references 
to, or uses of, the R2P principle. 
Despite a robust mandate, UNOCI was not successful in preventing the conflict in 
Côte d'Ivoire from escalating. In November 2004, the Côte d'Ivoire air force launched an 
attack on rebels, and French forces entered the fray after nine of their soldiers were killed 
                                                          
56 U.N. Secretary General, Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the Recommendations of the Security 
Council Mission to West Africa: Rep. of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1147 (Dec. 5, 2003), 
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by an air strike.63 Violent anti-French protests ensued in the country. As a result, on 
November 15, 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1572.64 The 
resolution imposed an arms embargo on the country and threatened further sanctions if 
Ivorian parties did not comply with their political commitments.65 Again, this resolution 
did not make any reference to R2P.  
As the conflict worsened in Côte d'Ivoire from 2005 to 2010, the Security Council 
adopted many other resolutions, primarily extending the mandate of UNOCI, calling for 
parties to cease the violence, and renewing both arms and financial embargos on the 
country.66 As described above, the 2010–11 political crises in Côte d'Ivoire began after 
Gbagbo, the president of Côte d'Ivoire since 2000, was proclaimed the winner of the 
election of 2010, the first election in the country in 10 years.67 The election results led to 
severe tension and violence throughout the country. The country’s Constitutional Council, 
which consisted of Gbagbo supporters, declared the results of seven northern departments 
unlawful and reported that Gbagbo had won the elections with 51% of the vote, instead of 
the 54% winning margin for Ouattara as reported by the Electoral Commission.68 Despite 
the inauguration of Gbagbo, the UN recognized Ouattara as the true winner of the 
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election.69 The Security Council, in a press statement, stated that Ouattara had won the 
November election and was the rightful president of Côte d’Ivoire.70 In doing so, the 
Security Council dismissed the validity of the Ivoirian Constitutional Council’s decision. 
The situation became even more controversial once the UN Secretariat and Security 
Council declared Ouattara as Côte d’Ivoire’s legitimate president, enabling UNOCI to 
reject demands by Gbagbo’s de facto regime. These events raised the grave possibility of a 
civil war, resulting in many thousands of refugees fleeing the country.71 The crisis 
escalated as Ouattara's forces began a military offensive. Ouattara’s forces gained control 
of most of the country including Abidjan.72  
With both Gbagbo and Ouattara laying claims to the presidency, the bitter political 
divisions in the country led to increased violence in Côte d'Ivoire.73 The international 
community took a number of diplomatic measures short of military actions to resolve the 
crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. In the aftermath of the violence following the 2010 election, the AU 
sent Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, to mediate the conflict.74 On January 
25, 2011, the President of Malawi and the AU Chairperson traveled to Côte d’Ivoire to hold 
negotiations with Gbagbo and Ouattara.75 ECOWAS also took a greater interest in solving 
the crisis via diplomatic means, including setting up a high-level delegation to attempt 
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mediation.76 However, all these negotiation efforts were not successful at stopping the 
violence and atrocities in Côte d'Ivoire.  
In the international community’s engagement in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis, civilian 
protection was interpreted as a core goal. Therefore, in his criticism of UN action in Côte 
d’Ivoire, former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, argued that the UN had 
overstepped its authority by overriding the Ivoirian Constitutional Council, that UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had exceeded his mandate by declaring Ouattara to be the 
winner of the elections, and that UNOCI had fallen short of its mandate by failing to 
prevent or stop ceasefire violations by rebels, and by failing to protect civilians in 
Duékoué.77 The source of these failings, he maintained, lay in the abandonment of 
impartiality by the UN and the undue influence exerted by France.78  
West African leaders warned that they would not hesitate to use force even without 
Security Council authorization, if Gbagbo refused to cede power.79 The AU suspended 
Côte d'Ivoire from the organization and also called on Gbagbo to step aside, threatening to 
use military force if Gbagbo did not comply with international norms.80 Threatening 
Gbagbo to cede power seemed to be grounded in democracy norms rather than protection 
of civilians in Côte d'Ivoire.81 Therefore, West African leaders and AU deviated from their 
core objective of protecting civilians and, instead, engaged in an attempt to change political 
power in Côte d'Ivoire. However, Gbagbo continued to ignore the international outcry to 
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stop the violence, and ECOWAS suspended Côte d’Ivoire from all its decision-making 
bodies.82 In the meantime, the AU dispatched to Abidjan a delegation of presidents from 
African states to negotiate directly with Gbagbo.83 The U.S Department of State announced 
that, in order to protect civilians, the United States was discussing the possibility of 
expanding UN forces in Côte d'Ivoire.84 Additionally, the United States and the EU 
imposed a travel ban and an asset freeze on Gbagbo and some of his close associates.85 
France and the United Kingdom rejected ambassadors appointed by Gbagbo and indicated 
that they would only accept credentials from Ouattara’s envoys.86 
On December 23, 2010, the UN Human Rights Council held a special session on 
the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and adopted Resolution S-14/1 condemning the ongoing 
human rights violations.87 At this session, speaking on behalf of the AU, Nigeria expressed 
deep concern about the deteriorating human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire.88 However, 
Russia deplored the efforts of both the UN and the Human Rights Council in trying to 
enforce the election results in Côte d’Ivoire.89 Expressing a similar notion, China 
demanded respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Côte d’Ivoire and called 
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upon all parties to solve the crisis through diplomatic measures.90 The concerns of Russia 
and China highlighted the still-perceived tension over any intervention in violation of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. These Member States did not believe that regional 
organizations, the UN, or any other international actor had a right to intervene in a 
sovereign state in violation of that state’s territorial integrity, especially to enforce the 
outcome of an election.  
In December 2010, the Special Advisers to the UN Secretary General on the 
Prevention of Genocide and R2P issued a joint statement expressing “grave concerns” 
about the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and highlighted their worries about the incitement of 
atrocities, soberly reminding all parties of their responsibility to protect.91 In a letter to the 
Security Council dated January 7, 2011, the Secretary General emphasized the potential 
risk to civilians in Côte d'Ivoire.92  
On January 10, 2011, the Security Council issued another statement extending its 
support towards AU and ECOWAS efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.93 
Further, on January 19, 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1967 authorizing 
the deployment of an additional 2,000-person military contingent to UNOCI.94 In late 
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January 2011, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon publicly called on Gbagbo to step down and 
highlighted the importance of refraining from any further attacks against Ouattara.95  
Human Rights Watch reported that pro-Gbagbo forces were using excessive force 
in response to largely peaceful demonstrations, resulting in at least 25 deaths since 
February 21, 2011, including seven women killed on March 3, 2011, when security forces 
opened fire with a mounted machine gun and a larger unidentified weapon against 
thousands of women demonstrators.96 Human Rights Watch also implicated Gbagbo and 
several of his close allies in crimes against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute.97 By 
the end of April 2011, reportedly 900 deaths had been confirmed as a result of conflict and 
revenge attacks in Abidjan and western Côte d’Ivoire.98 According to a UNOCI report, at 
least 1,012 persons, including 103 women and 42 children, were killed in post-election 
violence in the regions of Moyen Cavally and Dix-Huit Montagnes.99 
Although world leaders sent Gbagbo a clear message to step down and cease 
violence, Gbagbo was not willing to surrender to such appeals. The international 
community criticized Gbagbo’s followers for large-scale abuses and violence. As Gbagbo 
refused to participate in any negotiations, the AU called for the Security Council to take 
more forceful actions.100 Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch reported that Ouattara’s forces 
killed hundreds of civilians, raped more than 20 alleged Gbagbo supporters, and burned at 
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least 10 villages in Côte d'Ivoire's far western region.101 On March 25, 2011, ECOWAS 
made a formal request to the Security Council to strengthen the UNOCI mandate to enable 
the mission to use all necessary means to protect life and property and to facilitate the 
immediate transfer of power to Ouattara.102 This request also sought to “adopt more 
stringent international targeted sanctions” against Gbagbo and his associates.103 
7.3.2 Responsibility to React 
Given the dire human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1975 on March 30, 2011.104 Resolution 1975 was the second Security Council 
resolution invoking the R2P principle to authorize military force, the first being Resolution 
1973 on Libya adopted on March 17, 2011. Resolution 1975 condemned the gross human 
rights violations committed by supporters of both Gbagbo and Ouattara and cited the 
primary responsibility of the state to protect its population.105 The resolution recognized 
Ouattara as the president and condemned Gbagbo’s refusal to negotiate a solution.106 The 
resolution authorized UNOCI to use force to protect civilians, including preventing the use 
of heavy weapons against civilians.107  
Although Resolution 1975 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council, there 
were different perspectives on the resolution. Member States offered different 
interpretations of UNOCI’s mandate under the R2P-based authorization to use military 
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force included in Resolution 1975.108 Some Security Council members, such as India, 
China, and Russia, had a restrictive interpretation and were particularly concerned that 
UNOCI had abandoned impartiality by singling out Gbagbo’s forces but not Ouattara’s 
forces, especially as both sides had breached the ceasefire and massacred civilians.109 
China expressed its deep concern about the continuing deterioration of security in Côte 
d’Ivoire and stated that any UN peacekeeping operations should strictly abide by the 
principle of neutrality.110 India cautioned that UN peacekeepers cannot be made 
instruments of regime change and UNOCI should not become a party to a Ivorian political 
dispute.111 Further, India also stated that UNOCI should not get involved in a civil war, but 
should carry out its mandate with impartiality, while ensuring the safety and security of 
peacekeepers and civilians.112 These statements demonstrate that some Member States did 
not support the use of force in order to dispose Gbagbo and put Ouattara in power.  
However, the United Kingdom stated that the resolution did not alter UNOCI’s 
robust mandate under which UNOCI was already authorized to use all necessary means to 
protect civilians, but that the resolution did reaffirm UNOCI’s role in protecting civilians 
and preventing the use of heavy weapons against civilians.113 The United States welcomed 
a strong resolution that sent a signal to Gbagbo and his followers to reject violence and 
respect the will of the Ivorian people. The United States also urged the Security Council to 
support and work with Ouattara. 
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As a result, UNOCI and French helicopters assaulted military camps of Gbagbo 
supporters and destroyed heavy weapons and weapons stockpiles to stop imminent 
threats.114 After Gbagbo still refused to cede power, UNOCI and French attack helicopters 
bombed the presidential compound on April 10, 2011. On the same day, Ouattara’s forces, 
backed by UNOCI and French forces, captured Gbagbo.115 In the meantime, the Security 
Council renewed the arms and diamond sales embargo, which had been in place since 
2004-2005, for another year.116 In May 2011, Ouattara was inaugurated as president and, 
by November 2011, Gbagbo had been arrested and handed over to the ICC in The Hague to 
face charges of crimes against humanity.117 Côte d’Ivoire is not a party to the ICC. 
However, in April 2003, Gbagbo’s government submitted a declaration under article 12(3) 
of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding treaty, accepting the court’s jurisdiction at the 
beginning on September 19, 2002.118 Ouattara accepted ICC jurisdiction in December 2010 
and again in May 2011.119 In October 2011, the judges of the ICC authorized the 
prosecutor to open an investigation in Côte d’Ivoire for crimes committed since November 
28, 2010.120 In February 2012, the court extended this authorization to crimes committed in 
Côte d’Ivoire since September 19, 2002.121 
Through Resolution 1975, the Security Council mandated UNOCI to take all 
necessary measures to protect civilians in Côte d’Ivoire on the basis of the R2P principle. 
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There was a general agreement among Member States that the UNOCI mandate to protect 
civilians in Côte d’Ivoire had satisfied the six criteria stipulated for the use of force in the 
ICISS report: just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and 
reasonable prospects.122 However, some Member States criticized UNOCI and French 
forces for undertaking regime change through the Resolution 1975 mandate.  
The primary criticism leveled against UNOCI was that it used the R2P mandate 
given by the Security Council to oust Gbagbo from power rather than protecting civilians 
in Côte d’Ivoire.123 A military intervention under the R2P principle should not use more 
force than necessary to protect civilians.124 Under Resolution 1975, the use of force had 
been limited to protect civilians and, unless force was considered necessary to protect 
civilians and prevent more atrocities, there could not be any intention to remove Gbagbo by 
force from his presidential compound or from the country.125 The use of force by UNOCI 
and French troops lasted approximately seven days, from April 4-11, 2011, until Gbagbo 
was arrested.126 UNOCI and French helicopters launched attacks on Gbagbo’s camps in 
Abidjan, justifying them as preventive strikes.127 On April 10, UNOCI and French troops 
attacked Gbagbo’s residence where Gbagbo’s wife and close associates were captured by 
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Ouattara’s forces.128 By ousting Gbagbo through military operations, UNOCI and French 
troops eventually exceeded their mandated task.129  
Bellamy and Williams claimed that the use of force under the R2P principle by 
UNOCI and French troops “blurred the lines between civilian protection and regime 
change and raised questions about the proper implementation of the R2P principle, the 
proper interpretation of Resolution 1975, and the place of neutrality and impartiality in UN 
peacekeeping.”130 However, Edward Luck, the Special Advisor to the Secretary General on 
R2P, rejected the idea of any connection between the R2P principle and regime change. In 
his statement to the Council of Foreign Relations, Luck stated that “the goal of R2P is not 
to involve itself in regime change, but to protect the civilian populations. However, in some 
cases the only way to protect the population is to change the regime, but certainly it is not 
the goal of R2P per se.”131 Thus, a legitimate question arose as how to protect civilians 
from government-sponsored mass atrocities without ousting the leaders of the same 
government. Bellamy, quoting Luck’s statement, expresses a fundamental dilemma “in 
situations where a state is responsible for committing genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and/or crimes against humanity, how can the international community exercise 
its responsibility to protect populations without imposing regime change?”132   
Although Resolution 1975 was unanimously adopted, some Member States of the 
Security Council had insisted that UNOCI’s mandate should only be used to protect the 
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civilian population.133 Some Member States also expressed their dissatisfaction with 
UNOCI overstepping the mandate under Resolution 1975 during the Security Council’s 
debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts in May 2011.134 The Chinese 
delegation stressed that there must be no attempt at regime change or taking sides in a civil 
war by any party under the guise of protecting civilian populations.135 India highlighted the 
need to avoid any political motives in any decisions to intervene and stressed that the 
response of the international community must be proportional to the threat, involve the use 
of appropriate methods, and make adequate resources available to accomplish these 
goals.136 India also noted the importance of applying protection to civilians in a uniform 
manner and added that intervention be mandated only in cases where there is an actual 
verifiable threat to international peace and security. In this context, India asked the Security 
Council “who watches the guardians?”137 Consistent with Russia’s position throughout the 
crisis, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov questioned the legality of the air strikes and 
suggested that the UN peacekeepers may have overstepped their mandate.138 Taken 
together, these statements indicated a refusal to recognize that Resolution 1975 authorized 
the use of force for reasons beyond protection of civilians. 
However, in response to these criticisms, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon argued 
that “in line with its Security Council mandate, UNOCI has taken this action in self-defense 
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and to protect civilians.”139 Also, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and like-
minded countries justified the actions of UNOCI and French troops. The United Kingdom 
expressed its strong support for UNOCI’s mandate to protect the civilian population as well 
as to prevent the use of heavy weapons against civilians.140 The United States stated that 
UNOCI had responded robustly to neutralize the use of heavy weapons against civilians in 
Côte d’Ivoire.141 France highlighted the importance of the Security Council’s involvement 
in instances of grave violations of humanitarian law, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.142 Commending its action in Côte d’Ivoire, France stated that UNOCI had 
shown determination in preventing civilian casualties and should be a reference for all UN 
missions.143  
There was a clear division among the Member States of the Security Council about 
the scope of authorized military force under Resolution 1975. While some states claimed 
UNOCI and French troops exceeded the mandate of protecting the civilian population, 
others stated that UNOCI and French troops acted in accordance with Resolution 1975. 
Above all, the actions of UNOCI and French forces engaging in regime change in Côte 
d’Ivoire raised much concern. The same controversy occurred in NATO’s use of force in 
Libya. However, Brazil did not make reference to Côte d’Ivoire when introducing the RWP 
concept in light of what happened in Libya. Nevertheless, it made clear that RWP was 
being introduced to remedy the controversies that occurred, so far, in using force in 
humanitarian interventions under R2P. Therefore, although the Security Council authorized 
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the use of force in Côte d’Ivoire under the R2P principle, the controversies that surrounded 
UNOCI’s military force revealed deep controversies about the responsibility to react under 
the R2P principle.  
7.3.3 Responsibility to Rebuild 
Although UNOCI and French forces ousted Gbagbo, the unrest in Côte d’Ivoire has 
not ended, and rebuilding the country experienced major problems. The UN took a number 
of measures to help rebuilding efforts. The UN Secretary General declared Côte d’Ivoire 
eligible to receive support from the Peacebuilding Fund on June 19, 2008. Since that time, 
the Peacebuilding Fund provided a total allocation of over $18 million to help create the 
conditions for sustainable peace in the country. A total of $8.5 million was provided prior 
to the November 2010 crisis, including $3.5 million to support continued political dialogue 
and $5 million for the “mille micro-projects” for youth at risk.  
As the unrest continued in the country, UNOCI remained in Côte d’Ivoire not only 
to protect civilians, but also to help rebuild the country. The latest extension was 
Resolution 2112 in which the UNOCI mandate was unanimously extended until June 30, 
2014.144 Resolution 2112 authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means within its 
capabilities and areas of deployment to carry out its mandate.145 The resolution stated that 
the protection of civilians shall remain the priority of UNOCI.146 It further instructed 
UNOCI to put a renewed focus on supporting the government and the collection of 
weapons with the objective of gradually transitioning security responsibilities from UNOCI 
to the Ivorian government. Throughout this period, UNOCI assisted with the welfare and 
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stability of refugees and other displaced persons.147 Further, UNOCI continued to “monitor 
and investigate human rights violations across the country, while providing human rights 
training courses to improve the situation.”148 UNOCI also supported an electoral process 
with a view towards a speedy democratic transition in Côte d'Ivoire. UNOCI assisted the 
government in creating disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. So far, UNOCI has 
disarmed and demobilized 1,194 former combatants and collected 861 weapons.149 Some 
former combatants have been assigned work roles in prisons and vocational training 
institutions.150  
Despite improved security supported by UNOCI’s rebuilding activities, the human 
rights violations and humanitarian situation in Côte d’Ivoire remains frightening.151 
Although a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in 2011, it has not 
resumed its work.152 In the two years since Ouattara’s inauguration as president, the 
government has made little progress in addressing the root causes of the country’s political 
and military violence.153 Ivorian authorities and the ICC have not arrested or prosecuted 
any of Ouattara’s supporters who committed post-election crimes.154 In fact, no charges 
have been brought against anyone and no investigations against anyone from the forces that 
fought for Ouattara have been initiated. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of 
ex-combatants have not been completed and, thus, they continue to pose a threat to the 
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country’s stability. Throughout 2012 and 2013, national insecurity intensified, and pro-
Gbagbo armed rebels launched seemingly coordinated and well-organized attacks against 
military installations.155 In July 2013, a convoy of the National Authority for Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration was attacked on a stretch of road between the towns of 
Ferkessedougou in the north and Kong in the northwest.156 Tensions and rivalries between 
communities still remain high in the western part of Côte d’Ivoire.157 UNOCI called on 
competent Ivorian authorities to take all measures to identify the attackers and bring them 
before the law.158 Internally displaced civilian populations could not build their houses and 
still live with host families. Those who have returned home are still struggling to rebuild 
their lives.159 Many Ivorian refugees who fled to neighboring countries have returned, but 
there is a continuing need to ensure their reintegration.160  
In addition to the UN’s efforts in rebuilding Côte d’Ivoire, individual countries as 
well as financial institutions helped Ouattara’s government in its rebuilding efforts. France 
has offered financial assistance worth about $578 million, consisting of €350 million loan 
in support of budgetary aid, focused civil servant salary payments and funding of 
emergency social expenditure.161 The EU has offered €180 as a grant-based recovery 
package to support basic social spending, including for health, water, sanitation, and 
agriculture rebuilding efforts.162 The World Bank also offered $100 million for various 
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programs in support of rebuilding Côte d’Ivoire. In addition to this support, the 
International Monitory Fund (IMF) has also offered $74 million to support rebuilding 
efforts.163  
Despite all these efforts, neither UNOCI nor the Ouattara government has been able 
to bring peace and stability to the country, raising serious questions about fulfilling the 
responsibility to rebuild in the R2P principle. These questions exist despite financial and 
other commitments from UNOCI remaining high. Initially, through Security Council 
Resolution 1528 of February 2004, the UN allocated 6,910 total uniformed personnel, 
including 6,240 troops, 200 military observers, 120 staff officers, and 350 police 
officers.164 The present strength of UNOCI includes 9,915 total uniformed personnel, 
including 8,481 troops, 187 military observers, 1,247 police, 409 international civilian 
personnel, 772 local staff, and 154 United Nations Volunteers.165 For the biennium 2012-
2013, UNOCI was appropriated $584,487,000.166 However, during the UN Administrative 
and Budgetary Committee meeting on May 10, 2012, Côte d’Ivoire’s representative 
expressed concern over the inadequacy of the proposed budget.167 He noted that proposed 
budget cuts for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security sector reform 
in Côte d’Ivoire were a negative sign.168 
                                                          
163 Press Release, Statement at the Conclusion of an IMF Mission to Côte d’Ivoire, IMF Press Release 
No.14/134 (Mar. 26, 2014).  
164 S.C. Res. 1528, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004). 
165 Côte d’Ivoire Background, supra note 2. 
166 G.A. Res. 66/248, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/248 A–C (Feb. 24, 2012).  
167 Press Release, Fifth Committee Takes Up Peacekeeping Budget Proposals for 10 Additional Missions for 
2012/13, With a Number of Delegates Arguing Against Across-the-Board Cuts, U.N. Press Release  
GA/AB/4029 (May 10, 2012).  
168 Id. 
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Given the present situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the UN has, thus far, been unable to 
fulfill the responsibility to rebuild in Côte d’Ivoire. Although the UNOCI mandate was 
extended with a view to stabilizing the country, it has failed to establish basic security and 
protection for civilians in Côte d’Ivoire. It has not achieved justice and reconciliation 
between parties involved in the conflict, nor stabilized the economic situation in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Therefore, the responsibility to rebuild Côte d’Ivoire has not yet been effectively 
upheld, which causes doubts about claims that Côte d’Ivoire constitutes a success for the 
R2P principle. 
7.4 Conclusion  
During the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the R2P principle became a key aspect of the 
Security Council’s attempt to respond, in a timely and decisive manner, to mass atrocities. 
However, UN Member States faced difficulties in implementing R2P and protecting the 
civilian population in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis. This case study raises serious questions 
whether the Côte d’Ivoire crisis represents a success or failure for implementation of the 
R2P principle. These questions reinforce doubts that state practice reveals changes in 
international law on humanitarian crises attributable to the R2p principle.  
7.4.1 Responsibility to Prevent 
From the earliest stages of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, the international community 
was actively involved in finding a solution. The UN, together with ECOWAS, the AU, and 
EU, exercised a host of diplomatic efforts to bring the parties to a negotiated settlement. 
Similar to previous crises situations in Darfur and Libya, the government of Côte d'Ivoire 
was considered as having a greater responsibility in protecting its population from mass 
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atrocities. During the Darfur crisis, Member States had been reluctant to agree on the 
failure of the Sudanese government to protect its population. However, when the crisis in 
Côte d'Ivoire occurred, Member States agreed that the Ivorian government had failed to 
protect its population. Given this situation, the regional and international actors took a 
number of measures to prevent atrocities and protect the civilian population in Côte 
d'Ivoire. In fact, Member States repeatedly extended their support for international 
preventive efforts during the Ivorian crisis. Following a similar course as that taken in the 
Libyan crisis, the preventive efforts by regional and international bodies in Côte d'Ivoire 
suggested that the international community had taken a role that could not be blocked by 
sovereignty. In fact, the use of R2P during these crises has seen state practice reject any 
doctrine of absolute sovereignty in the preventive efforts undertaken.  
Therefore, the international community’s efforts to prevent mass atrocities in Côte 
d'Ivoire were embraced, structured, and shaped through the R2P framework. Also, the 
regional and international community’s efforts to prevent atrocities in Libya, as well as in 
Côte d'Ivoire, suggested that states are at least trying to fulfill their preventive 
responsibility within the institutional context. However, as was the case with many 
examples of preventive diplomacy in the pre-R2P context, states are still not legally bound 
to adhere to any norm that requires intervention to prevent atrocities. Therefore, although 
preventive efforts by regional and international actors have been framed by and through 
R2P, it is doubtful these efforts have contributed to changes in international law. 
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7.4.2 Responsibility to React 
Despite the efforts by regional and international entities to prevent mass atrocities, 
Gbagbo refused to engage in any meaningful negotiations with any of the parties and, in 
fact, looked suspiciously upon all regional and international efforts as interference in the 
internal affairs of his country. However, once Gbagbo failed to positively respond to the 
preventive efforts of the international community, the UN and some other Member States, 
in particular, the United States, the United Kingdom, and like-minded countries, called for 
Gbagbo to step down. In this context, Resolution 1975 took action to extend the UNOCI 
mandate to protect civilians in Côte d'Ivoire into the “regime change” area, and this 
development was the second such application with regard to the R2P principle. The 
Security Council framed Resolution 1975 in terms of the R2P principle. This pattern could 
not be seen in either regional or international community decisions in the Darfur crisis. 
However, decisions made by the Security Council to use non-forceful measures and 
military intervention in Libyan and Côte d'Ivoire crises were grounded in R2P. This 
continued state practice in grounding Security Council decisions in R2P proves that the 
R2P principle has come to frame how states think and talk about humanitarian intervention. 
During the Ivorian crisis, the R2P principle seemed to be widely recognized as a concept 
that needed to be adopted in cases of mass atrocities.  
However, in an approach different from the Darfur and Libyan crises, the ICC 
reference was made in the Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. In fact, 
Gbagbo was arrested and submitted to the ICC as a result of the Security Council-
authorized use of military force. Although some Member States expressed their opposition 
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to the arrest of Gbagbo in the circumstances in which it occurred, none of them opposed the 
ICC reference in Resolution 1975. The continued state practice in Darfur, Libya, and Côte 
d'Ivoire of making an ICC reference as part of the responsibility to react, in fact, suggests a 
heightened synergy between R2P and international criminal law.  
The military intervention in Côte d'Ivoire under Resolution 1975 was politically 
supported by both regional and international actors. In fact, the unanimous adoption of the 
resolution meant that Member States accepted the need to take military action in Côte 
d'Ivoire. A similar situation occurred in the Libyan crisis, where none of the Member States 
opposed Resolution 1973. This trend is different from the Darfur crisis, where there was no 
consensus among states or regional entities to take any forceful military measures. What 
happened in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire also raises a question whether this state practice could 
be considered acceptance of the RN2V approach in situations where mass atrocities are 
taking place. As happened in Libyan case, the Security Council’s decision to use force to 
protect the civilian population in Côte d'Ivoire revealed the Security Council’s ability to 
implement the responsibility to react.  
One of the main controversies raised in the Côte d’Ivoire intervention, however, 
was UNOCI’s use of force to effect regime change. The same controversy also plagued 
NATO’s use of force in Libya. However, unlike NATO’s actions in Libya, the use of force 
in Côte d’Ivoire was directly carried out by UN forces. Therefore, the direction to use force 
to oust Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire must have come from UN organs. Indeed, Resolution 1975 
recognized Ouattara as the president of Côte d’Ivoire, which raised questions of whether 
the ultimate goal was fostering regime change while protecting civilians.  
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However, Resolution 1975 did not specify any means or scope for the use of force 
in Côte d’Ivoire. Nor did the resolution specify how the mandate should be used, what 
measures should be taken in protecting civilians, what limitations should be placed on such 
actions, or who would monitor the actions. This lack of clarity on the scope of the use of 
force increased criticism against using the R2P principle to justify the use of military force. 
The same controversy about the limitations on the use of force authorized by the Security 
Council arose during the military intervention in Libya, and carried over to the military 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. As chapter 8 explores, the Syrian crisis reveals how 
damaging this “regime change” controversy has become for the R2P principle.  
7.4.3 Responsibility to Rebuild 
Rebuilding efforts after the military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire have been 
alarmingly slow. UNOCI and the Ouattara government are still unable to restore peace and 
justice in Côte d’Ivoire. Despite all the efforts by the international community, the crisis in 
Côte d'Ivoire has seen a sharp escalation in the number of human rights violations. 
Although military intervention by UN and French troops ousted Gbagbo and temporarily 
prevented post-election violence, these efforts were not able to restore peace and justice in 
the country, nor properly carry out any meaningful rebuilding efforts. This situation is, in 
fact, identical to the ineffective rebuilding efforts in Darfur and Libya. This continuity in 
state practice suggests that the responsibility to rebuild has had the least impact and 
attention of the three R2P responsibilities. Therefore, the failure to rebuild post-conflict 
Côte d’Ivoire suggests the need to re-examine rebuilding strategies, including the creation 
of a better institutional mechanism to achieve intended goals.  
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In summary, state practice in Côte d’Ivoire case study indicates that the R2P 
principle has not changed international law in any significant way. Although many efforts 
were made to prevent the crisis from escalating, such attempts at preventive diplomacy 
were frequent in humanitarian crises before articulation of the R2P principle. Further, state 
practice during the Ivorian episode does not contain any indication states intended to imbue 
the responsibility to prevent with any obligatory status in international law. Under the 
responsibility to react, state practice exposed the deep division among countries on using 
force authorized by the Security Council for R2P purposes. Although the “regime change” 
controversy has no antecedent in the pre-R2P period, the controversy does not support the 
notion that R2P has changed international law on humanitarian crises. In fact, the Libyan 
and Ivorian cases suggest R2P has adversely affected the use of Security Council power 
under international law to authorize military force in addressing large-scale atrocities. 
Finally, the Côte d’Ivoire case demonstrates the responsibility to rebuild in the R2P 
principle has not changed international law with respect to the challenges of rebuilding 
post-conflict societies.     
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                                                                  CHAPTER 8 
                                                           SYRIA  
8.1 Introduction 
By mid-March 2011, the worsening crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) had rapidly 
become the center of regional and international attention.1 Since that time, Syria has experienced 
a major humanitarian crisis, which still continues. As of this writing, there is no indication that 
the fighting will end any time soon. The international community has not only failed to prevent 
mass atrocities in Syria, but has also failed to take effective or timely action to react effectively 
to ongoing mass atrocities. Given the politics that has characterized the Syrian crisis to date, the 
likelihood of effective international cooperation on rebuilding post-conflict Syria is also bleak.  
 The Syrian crisis involves multiple, serious problems that undermine the importance of 
the R2P principle in international relations and international law. The Syrian crisis has 
highlighted the controversy on whether a state can use force for humanitarian purposes without 
Security Council authorization, a long-standing international legal question that did not arise in 
the Darfur, Libya or Côte d’Ivoire crises. The use of force to effect regime change in Libya and 
Côte d’Ivoire also undermined the UN taking effective action in Syria. In fact, China and Russia 
refused to authorize the use of force for, among other rationales, reasons related to their positions 
on the abuse of Security Council authorization in the previous R2P crises of Libya and Côte 
d’Ivoire. Security Council members, at least, could not agree on humanitarian relief issues in the 
Syrian crisis. These disagreements illustrate many of the serious problems that the R2P principle 
has encountered during the Syrian crisis.  
                                                          
1 Peter Wilkinson, Syria: How Will Year-Old Conflict Play Out? CNN (Mar. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/15/world/meast/syria-what-next. 
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8.2 Background to the Conflict in Syria  
Following World War I, France acquired the mandate in Syria and administered the 
country until its independence in 1946.2 Post-independence Syria lacked political stability, and, 
therefore, experienced a series of military coups during its first decades. In 1958, Syria united 
with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic.3 However, in September 1961, Syria and Egypt 
separated, and the Syrian Arab Republic was re-established.4 With a view to stabilizing the 
country, in November 1970, Hafiz al-Assad, a minority Alawite sect member of the socialist 
Ba'th Party, seized power in a bloodless coup.5 Following the death of President Hafiz al-Assad, 
his son, Bashar al-Assad, was appointed as president by a referendum held in July 2000.6 In May 
2007, Bashar al-Assad was re-appointed for his second term as president by a referendum.7  
President Assad and many of the governing elite belong to the Alawite minority group of 
Shia Muslims, while the majority of the Syrian population is Sunni Muslim.8 This sectarianism 
has been described as a characteristic feature of the Syrian conflict. The split between the ruling 
minority Alawite population and the country's Sunni Muslim majority is the sharpest sectarian 
division affecting the peace and stability of the country.9 The Syrian government also maintained 
and supported the Shabiha militia, which has enjoyed extensive privileges under the regime since 
the 1970s.10 The Syrian government used the Shabiha militia as a tool for cracking down on 
                                                          
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Syria: History, GLOBALEDGE.ORG, http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/syria/history (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Kim Sengupta, Syria's Sectarian War Goes International as Foreign Fighters and Arms Pour into Country, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrias-sectarian-war-goes-
international-as-foreign-fighters-and-arms-pour-into-country-7216665.html.  
10 Syria: History, supra note 5.  
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dissent.11 There are many opposition groups against the Assad regime, and, by end of 2012, they 
created several opposition organizations, including the Syrian National Council (SNC), an 
umbrella organization of exiled Syrians, and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), composed of Syrian 
military defectors and armed rebels.12 These rebel groups have called for the regime’s 
resignation since the fall of 2011. In particular, SNC called for regime change in Syria, rejected 
any dialogue with Assad regime, and requested international protection for the Syrian 
population.13 
Initial protests in Syria occurred in middle of February 2011, calling for the abolition of 
emergency law, legalization of a multi-party political system, release of political prisoners, and 
the removal of corrupt local officials.14 When the protests against the Syrian regime escalated in 
every city, the government forces retaliated against the unrest with violence to discourage 
protesters. By early March 2011, the Assad regime introduced new laws permitting the 
establishment of new political parties.15 Still, severe anti-government protests broke-out in mid-
March 2011 in the southern province of Dar’a, after a group of children accused of painting anti-
government graffiti on public buildings were detained and tortured by government forces.16 
Syrian armed forces responded violently, attacking protesters and firing at a funeral procession.17 
Protests also erupted in other cities, including Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Idlib.18 On March 
30, 2011, Assad alleged that Syria was facing a conspiracy by imperialist forces and internal 
                                                          
11 Id.  
12 The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
13 Id.   
14 Events in Syria: A Chronology, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/syriatimeline.html?pagewanted=all (Last visited Feb. 12, 2014). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
  
299 
 
conspirators who supported the imperialists’ efforts to destabilize the country.19 However, given 
the continuous protests, Assad swore in a new government on April 14, 2011, and lifted the state 
of emergency that had been in place since 1963.20 Assad also took measures to abolish the high 
security court of the country and recognized the right to peaceful protests while releasing 
hundreds of detainees.21  
As protests continued around the country, on April 26, 2011, thousands of government 
soldiers backed by tanks and snipers opened fire on civilians in Dar’a and two other locations.22 
Armed security forces conducted house-to-house sweeps. Checkpoints were erected while 
electricity and other essential services were cut off.23 As the protests continued to spread across 
the country, the military reaction by the Assad regime became more violent. According to the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Assad regime’s forces used artillery 
fire against unarmed civilians, implemented door-to-door arrest campaigns, executed raids 
against hospitals, and shot and arrested medical personnel.24 
By the end of 2011, protests escalated throughout the country, and Assad’s armed forces 
continued to retaliate against protesters with extreme brutality. On December 28, 2011, Syrian 
forces opened fire on thousands of anti-government protesters in the city of Hama, killing many 
civilians.25 Battles between official government forces, pro-Assad militias, and rebels continued 
in many cities, including in the Damascus suburbs. In the meantime, Assad held a referendum on 
                                                          
19 Id.  
20 Syrian Protesters Released, Cabinet Named, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 14, 2011), 
http://m.gulfnews.com/news/region/syria/syrian-protesters-released-cabinet-named-1.792862.  
21 Id.  
22 Syrian Uprising Timeline of Key Events, AP-POLITCO.COM, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/syria-
timeline-96270.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
23 Id.  
24 U.N. SCOR, 66th sess., 6524th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6524 (Apr. 27, 2011).  
25 Syrian Uprising Timeline of Key Events, supra note 22. 
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a new constitution, a move that was perceived as a gesture to placate the opposition.26 The 
violence continued, however, as the government launched severe assaults which raged for weeks. 
In March 2012, the main opposition group, the Syrian National Council, formed a military 
council to organize and unify all armed groups.27 On the first anniversary of the start of the 
uprising, thousands of protesters marched in Damascus, and government retaliation resulted in 
the killing of thousands of protesters.28  
In mid-2012, Assad’s government threatened to unleash chemical and biological weapons 
if the country faced a foreign attack.29 This threat was Syria’s first acknowledgement that it 
possessed weapons of mass destruction. In August 2012, the Syrian military restarted chemical 
weapons testing at a base on the outskirts of Aleppo.30 By 2013, concrete evidence of chemical 
weapons use began to surface. In March 2013, both the government of Syria and the rebels 
accused each other of employing chemical weapons in an attack that killed dozens in the Aleppo 
province.31 France raised this matter at the Security Council on March 20, 2013, and the 
Secretary General stated that he would appoint a technical mission to investigate the 
allegations.32 A team of UN experts, appointed by the UN Secretary General, arrived in Syria on 
August 18, 2013, to launch a long-delayed investigation of allegations from both sides of the 
                                                          
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Elizabeth A. Kennedy & Paul Schemm, Syria Threatens to Use Chemical, Biological Weapons, PHILLY.COM (July 
24, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-07-24/news/32828818_1_chemical-weapons-assad-regime-jihad-makdissi. 
30 Report: Syria Tested Chemical Weapons Delivery Systems in August, HAARETZ.COM (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/report-syria-tested-chemical-weapons-delivery-systems-in-august-
1.465402. 
31 Syria Rebels, Regime Blame Each Other for First Alleged Chemical Weapons Attack, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 
19, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-rebels-regime-blame-each-other-for-first-alleged-chemical-
weapons-attack/. 
32 Chronology of Events: Syria, SECURITYCOUNCILREPORT.ORG, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/syria.php?print=true (last visited Mar. 4, 2014); U.N. Secretary 
General, Letter dated Mar. 22, 2013 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2013/184 (Mar. 25, 2013).  
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conflict that chemical weapons had been deployed.33 Just as the UN investigators arrived in 
Syria, news broke that a large chemical attack occurred on August 21, 2013, in the opposition-
controlled and disputed area of Ghouta, Syria.34 The area was struck by rockets believed to have 
contained the chemical agent sarin. Hundreds were claimed to have been killed in the attack.35 A 
United States intelligence report cited by Secretary of State John Kerry showed evidence that the 
Assad regime had killed thousands of citizens in a chemical weapons attack.36 On September 9, 
2013, a team of UN chemical weapons inspectors confirmed that the nerve agent sarin was used 
in an attack on Ghouta.37 Syria reportedly manufactured several types of chemical weapons, 
including sarin, tabun, the more potent nerve agent VX, and mustard gas.38 The Assad regime 
was later found to possess 1,300 tons of such chemical agents.39 
The charges of chemical weapons’ use became a main component of the larger global 
debate about the Syrian conflict. Rebel forces also faced allegations of launching chemical 
attacks.40 The use of chemical weapons prompted strong international responses, including 
serious contemplation of military intervention without Security Council authorization.41 The 
United States and its allies expressed concern over the attacks and claimed that the use of 
                                                          
33 UN Experts Arrive in Syria To Begin Investigation Into Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 
2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/un-inspectors-arrive-in-syrian-capital-on-
mission-to-probe-for-alleged-use-of-chemical-weapons/2013/08/18/31380ab2-07fc-11e3-89fe-
abb4a5067014_story.html. 
34 Patrick J. McDonnell & Shashank Bengali, Syrian Rebels Allege New Gas Attack, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-syria-poison-gas-20130822,0,6908821.story#axzz2vODNQAqM. 
35 Id.  
36 Id.   
37 Edith M. Lederer, UN Inspectors on Syria: Clear and Convincing Evidence' Chemical Weapons Were Used On 
Large Scale, HUFF. POST (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/un-inspectors-syria-chemical-
weapons_n_3934312.html.  
38 Chemical Weapons, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/cw.htm 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2013). 
39 Richard Spencer, Syria: Inspectors Find 1,300 Tons of Chemical Weapons, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 29, 2013), 
www.telegraph.co.uk. 
40 Oliver Holmes, Syria's Chemical Weapons Wild Card: Chlorine Gas, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/22/syria-crisis-chlorine-idUSL6N0NE3WM20140422. 
41 Id. 
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chemical weapons violated international norms.42 The threat of chemical weapons initiated a 
series of warnings from the United States, United Kingdom, and France.43 These countries stated 
that the threat or use of chemical weapons would trigger a forceful response, possibly including 
military intervention.44 
The threat of chemical weapons along with increased suppression of civilians by the 
Syrian regime led the United States to declare its decision to provide arms to Syrian rebels in 
June 2013.45 In the same vein, France and Saudi Arabia also discussed providing limited military 
support to rebels.46 In September, the United States justified a limited military strike against 
Syria before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee.47 In fact, the United States 
openly declared the need for regime change in Syria.48 In response to the threats of a possible 
United States military strike against the Assad regime, Russia proposed that the Syrian 
government join the Chemical Weapons Convention.49 Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention on September 14, 2013.50 The Chemical Weapons Convention requires international 
monitoring of a country’s chemical arsenal and a commitment to destroy weapons.51 On the day 
                                                          
42 Id.  
43 Obama Warns Syria over Chemical Weapons, EURO NEWS (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.euronews.com/2013/03/20/obama-warns-syria-over-chemical-weapons/. 
44 Id.  
45 White House Plan to Arm Syrian Rebels Raises Fears of Terrorist Links, FOX NEWS (June 14, 2013),  
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06/14/assad-use-chemical-weapons-confirmed-us-officials-say/ 
46 Maria Abi-Habib & Stacy Meichtry, Saudis Agree to Provide Syrian Rebels With Mobile Antiaircraft Missiles, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304703804579382974196840680. 
47 Syria: US Using Lies to Justify Strikes, SKY NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013), http://news.sky.com/story/1136853/syria-us-
using-lies-to-justify-strikes. 
48 White House: Syria Regime Has Lost Legitimacy, CBS NEWS (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-house-syria-regime-has-lost-legitimacy/. 
49 Syria Says It Welcomes Russian Proposal to Place Chemical Weapons under International Control, CBS NEWS 
(Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-says-it-welcomes-russian-proposal-to-place-chemical-
weapons-under-international-control/. 
50 Secretary General Receives Syria's Formal Accession to Treaty Banning Chemical Weapons, U.N. NEWS CENTER 
(Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45852#.Ux-qQ8uYZdg. 
51 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction, art. 1, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; 32 ILM 800 (1993) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].  
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Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States and Russia announced a joint 
framework on destruction of Syrian chemical weapons that proposed a timeline for the 
elimination of such weapons and all related equipment and material, as well as on-site 
inspections.52 
By end of 2013, the Syrian economy had drastically collapsed. This devastating 
economic situation affected more than half of the population and left them in extreme poverty. 
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), by the end 
of 2013, the majority of the Syrian population lives in poverty.53 The increasingly dire economic 
situation also contributed to the refugee crisis that has affected the entire region. By the end of 
2013, over 45 percent of Syrians have fled their homes, making them the largest population of 
refugees in the world.54 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that by the 
end of 2013, over nine million Syrians are displaced, 2.2 million had fled as refugees, and 6.5 
million are internally displaced.55 The UN has estimated each of these two figures will increase 
by two million by the end of 2014.56   
Despite this dire humanitarian situation, except for the agreement on destruction of 
chemical weapons, the international community has so far failed to take any action to protect the 
civilian population in Syria. Since the initial stages of the Syrian conflict, the international 
community was concerned about the mass atrocities committed by both the Assad regime as well 
as the rebels. However, the international community’s attention focused primarily on the use of 
                                                          
52 Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/world/middleeast/syria-talks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
53 Syria Crisis, 33 OCHA HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN: SYRIA (Sept.9, 2013), available at 
www.unocha.org/crisis/syria.  
54 Id.  
55 War’s Human Cost: World's Population of Displaced Tops 50 Million, UN Refugee Agency Reports, U. N. NEWS 
CENTER (June 20, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48089#.U7ynMctOVdg. 
56 Id.  
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chemical weapons in Syria. Much criticism, therefore, has been leveled against the international 
community for its failure to effectively implement the R2P principle in the Syrian crisis.57  
8.3 Application of the R2P Principle in International Responses to the Syrian Crisis 
The Syrian conflict has been widely discussed as another test case for the R2P principle 
in international law. From the initial stages of the crisis, there were many claims of mass 
atrocities carried out in Syria.58 Growing concerns about the deteriorating security situation in 
Syria brought R2P into the debates within the international community. The Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on Syria established by the UN Secretary General on 
August 22, 2011, concluded that the government of Syria has manifestly failed in its 
responsibility to protect the population. The inquiry further stated that gross violations of human 
rights had been committed in Syria by both the government as well as the anti-government 
armed groups.59 These atrocities triggered controversies largely centered on the R2P 
responsibilities to prevent and react. With the Assad regime manifestly failing to protect Syrian 
population, the international community, regional organizations, and the UN took a number of 
diplomatic measures to help prevent further atrocities in Syria.  
8.3.1 Responsibility to Prevent  
As the crisis in Syria was unfolding, the Security Council first discussed the situation 
during a meeting on Israel-Palestine negotiations on April 21, 2011, soon after Security 
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Council’s actions on R2P in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire in March 2011.60 By end of March 2011, 
Syrian government forces shot protesters in Damascus and the southern city of Deraa who 
demanded release of political prisoners. These actions triggered days of violent unrest that 
steadily spread nationwide over the following months. The United States, United Kingdom, and 
France expressed their concern about the dire human rights situation in Syria.61 However, the 
Russian delegation stated that it did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of any sovereign 
state.62  
In the face of the Syrian government’s harsh retaliation against the protests that escalated 
throughout the country, the Security Council held its first session on Syria on April 27, 2011, in 
which most delegates’ strongly condemned the human rights violations in Syria.63 The 
delegations stressed the need to help Syria in order to prevent further violence and civilian 
suffering.64 The United States Permanent Representative, Susan Rice, stated that the United 
States condemned in the strongest possible terms the abhorrent violence used by the government 
of Syria.65 The United Kingdom stressed the Syrian government’s responsibility to protect 
peaceful protesters and the need to stop violent repression of such protesters. They further 
highlighted that the protestors themselves must ensure that their actions are peaceful. While 
China and India expressed their concern about the incidents taking place in Syria, Russia stated 
that the current situation in Syria did not present a threat to international peace and security.66 
The Member States of the Security Council considered issuing a press statement as proposed by 
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the EU.67 However, the statement, which stressed the Syrian government’s responsibility to 
prevent violence against their own people, could not be issued because there was no agreement 
among the Member States. In particular, Russia and Lebanon objected, stating that such a press 
statement would be undue interference into the internal affairs of Syria.68 
In response to mounting international unease about the deteriorating human rights 
situation in Syria, the Human Rights Council held a special session on April, 29, 2011, and it 
adopted Resolution 16/1.69 The resolution condemned the Syrian government’s attacks against 
the civilian population and expressed grave concerns about alleged deliberate killings, arrests, 
and instances of torture of peaceful protesters by Syrian authorities. The resolution called for the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to urgently dispatch a fact-finding mission to 
investigate alleged human rights violations in Syria. Although Resolution 16/1 was adopted by a 
majority of votes of the Human Rights Council, notable opposition was raised by some Member 
States. China, Russia, Pakistan, and Malaysia voted against the resolution, while the delegations 
of Nigeria and Saudi Arabia abstained.70 
Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/1, the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights established a fact-finding mission to investigate all alleged violations of international 
human rights law in Syria and to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of 
the crimes perpetrated, with a view to avoiding impunity and ensuring full accountability.71 
Although no explicit reference was made to R2P, the fact-finding mission itself was to 
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compliment the responsibility of the international community to prevent further atrocities in 
Syria. In May 2011, the fact-finding mission started its work, and the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights made a formal request to the government of Syria to cooperate with the mission.72 
Despite repeated requests by the Human Rights Council, the Syrian government did not 
cooperate with the fact-finding mission. Nonetheless, the mission gathered credible, 
corroborated, and consistent accounts of violations from victims and witnesses.73  
As the Syrian government increased its suppression of the opposition, the Human Rights 
Council and some UN Member States put more pressure on the Syrian regime. In succeeding 
months, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, and Portugal made efforts to 
table a resolution at the Security Council condemning the Syrian government’s atrocities, efforts 
that failed in the face of resistance from Russia, China, Brazil, South Africa, and India.74 
Although the resolution noted that the widespread and systematic attacks by the Syrian 
authorities against its people may amount to crimes against humanity under international law, it 
did not refer to R2P or the responsibility to prevent such atrocities. The Member States which 
resisted the resolution argued that the Syrian crisis was an internal matter and the Security 
Council should not dictate the nature of any reform program that the Syrian government should 
undertake.75 These Member Sates absolutely refused any external military intervention in 
Syria.76  
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Although the Syrian crisis was considered an internal matter by some Member States, 
violence in Syria began to creep across the borders into Turkey. In addition, Syrian refugees had 
become an international concern by the end of 2011.77 More than 2.5 million Syrians had fled 
their homes by the end of 2011, taking refuge in neighboring countries or within Syria itself.78 
Absorbing the massive influx of refugees has been an huge challenge for Syria’s neighbors, with 
serious consequences for the stability of the entire region.  
Given the escalation of violence and other humanitarian problems in Syria, Francis Deng, 
the Secretary General’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, and Edward Luck, the 
Secretary General’s Special Advisor on R2P, issued a statement on Syria on July 21, 2011.79 
Emphasizing that the atrocities in Syria amounted to the crimes against humanity, the Special 
Advisors urged the Syrian government to fulfill its responsibility to protect its civilian 
populations.80 
In August 2011, after much discussion, the Security Council adopted a presidential 
statement expressing grave concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria and 
calling for unimpeded access for humanitarian workers.81 While reaffirming its strong 
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria, the Security 
Council also stressed the importance of a Syrian-led political solution to the conflict.82 However, 
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neither the presidential statement nor any country statement made specific reference to R2P or 
the responsibility to prevent in particular. 
Given the escalation of violence and unrest in Syria, the League of Arab States (LAS) 
issued its first condemnatory statement on Syria on August 7, 2011, and called on the 
government of Syria to immediately end the violence.83 However, the statement made no explicit 
reference to R2P. From the initial violence in March 2011 until August 2011, the LAS had not 
responded to the crisis in Syria. The reason for the LAS’ initial silence towards the crisis 
situation in Syria was related to other regional crises that occurred in the wake of the Arab 
Spring, including the political instability in Egypt after the overthrow of Mubarak and NATO’s 
Libyan operation, which kept Arab nations’ attention away from the Syrian crisis. Similarly, 
Persian Gulf countries were engaged with unrest in Bahrain, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia and were 
not willing to take any steps against Syria.  
Given the continuous violence in Syria, the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on Syria was established on August 22, 2011, by Human Rights Council Resolution 
17/1.84 The Commission had a mandate to investigate all alleged violations of international 
human rights law that had occurred in Syria since March 2011.85 The Commission was also 
tasked to establish facts and circumstances that may constitute such violations and other crimes 
perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view of ensuring that 
perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held 
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accountable.86 Resolution 17/1 was adopted with 33 votes in favor, four against, and nine 
abstentions.87 China, Russia, Cuba, and Ecuador voted against the resolution. Explaining its vote 
after the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Russia stated that the resolution was 
one-sided and could further destabilize Syria.88 The Chinese delegation also expressed its 
concern about the resolution and stated that the Syrian crisis should be resolved through 
discussions and cooperation.89 Although the resolution made no reference to R2P or the 
responsibility to prevent, the votes against the resolution represented continued opposition to the 
taking of any diplomatic measures against Syria.  
However, despite these refusals by some of UN Member States to take at least non-
coercive measures against Syria, LAS foreign ministers held a special meeting on Syria on 
August 27, 2011, and proposed a 13-point plan which directed Assad to hold elections within 
three years.90 The president of the LAS met with Assad in September 2011 to discuss the 
proposal, and this meeting reached an agreement regarding the LAS’ proposals.91 
In October 2011, the United Kingdom, France, and Portugal tabled a draft resolution at 
the Security Council, proposing an arms embargo and setting up a new sanctions committee.92 
The resolution in its preamble emphasized the Syrian government’s primary responsibility to 
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protect its population.93 Given strong opposition from some Member States, the draft resolution 
was watered down during negotiations. Despite all the revisions, the resolution could not be 
adopted because Russia and China vetoed it.94 Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa 
abstained on the resolution.95 Russia rejected the resolution and stated that it could not agree 
with accusations against the Syrian regime and deemed the threat of an ultimatum and sanctions 
against the Syrian authorities unacceptable.96 Russia added that the situation in Syria could not 
be considered in the Security Council separately from the Libyan experience and that a similar 
interpretation of the Security Council resolutions on Libya should not be a model for the future 
actions of NATO in implementing R2P.97 Russia suspected that excessive force would also be 
used in Syria as NATO did in Libya. Russia also stressed the importance of knowing how this 
particular resolution would be implemented.98 Russia asserted that a significant number of 
Syrians do not agree with the demand for regime change and would rather see gradual changes, 
believing that they have to be implemented while maintaining civil peace and harmony in the 
country.99  
China highlighted the importance of respecting Syria’s sovereignty, independence, and 
territorial integrity.100 China stated that, under the circumstances, sanctions, or the threat of 
sanctions, would not help to resolve the conflict in Syria and, instead, may further complicate the 
situation. The Indian delegation expressed a similar view and stated that all states have a 
responsibility to respect the fundamental rights of their people, address their legitimate 
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aspirations, and respond to their grievances through administrative, political, economic, and 
other measures.101 At the same time, India stressed states also have the obligation to protect their 
citizens from armed groups and militants. India further stated that the international community 
should give the Syrian government time to implement the far-reaching reform measures it 
announced.102  
The states that supported the draft resolution expressed regret at the Security Council’s 
failure to take action to prevent further atrocities in Syria. The United States was outraged that 
the Security Council had utterly failed to address an urgent moral challenge and a growing threat 
to regional peace and security.103 The United States representative, Susan Rice, expressed 
disappointment at the failure of the Security Council to take action to counter Assad’s brutal 
oppression.104 Rice further stated that, in failing to adopt the draft resolution, “the Security 
Council has squandered an opportunity to shoulder its responsibilities to the Syrian people and 
the crisis in Syria will stay before the Security Council, and the United States will not rest until 
the Security Council rises to meet its responsibilities.”105 Also expressing disappointment over 
the failure of the Security Council to adopt the resolution, the United Kingdom stated that the 
time for strong Security Council action was long overdue and that it has to shoulder its 
responsibilities and take tough actions.106  
In the meantime, the LAS, at an extraordinary session held in Cairo on October 16, 2011, 
adopted a resolution calling for a complete and immediate cessation of the acts of violence and 
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killing, and for an end to armed actions to deal with the crisis with a view to prevent more 
casualties in Syria.107 The resolution called on the LAS to establish an Arab Ministerial 
Committee under the chairmanship of Sheikh Jabr Al-Thani, the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Qatar, to liaise with the Syrian leadership.108 Following this meeting on 
October 16, 2011, the Committee, led by Qatar with delegates from Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and 
Oman, met with Assad on October 26, 2011, and conveyed the decisions of the LAS.109 
On October 30, 2011, Syria accepted the action plan proposed by the LAS and signed the 
plan on November 2, 2011.110 The action plan urged the Syrian authorities to: end all forms of 
acts of violence; free political prisoners; withdraw all military elements from cities and 
residential neighborhoods; and provide free access to the LAS agencies and international media 
to report on developments and monitor the situation. On November 3, 2011, Nabil el-Araby, the 
chief of the LAS, met with the Syrian National Council and informed its members of the LAS’ 
action plan.111  
However, the Syrian regime did not immediately comply with the proposals made by the 
LAS, and, in fact, failed to engage in a dialogue with opposition forces within the time frame 
given by the LAS. This willful inaction by the Assad regime triggered debates about the need for 
measures against Syria. On November 7, 2011, the LAS chief called for a meeting to assess 
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Syria’s failure to comply with the agreed action plan.112 As a result, on November 12, 2011, the 
Ministerial Council of the LAS suspended Syria’s membership.113 This decision to suspend Syria 
from LAS membership was approved with 18 votes in favor. Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon voted 
against the decision, with Iraq abstaining. Following the suspension decision, the LAS adopted 
Resolution 7439 on November 16, 2011, which mandated the LAS send an observer mission to 
Syria.114 Although the resolution aimed to verify implementation of the LAS’ plan of action, to 
resolve the Syrian crisis, and to protect Syrian civilian populations, it made no explicit reference 
to R2P. 
On November 22, 2011, the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Affairs Committee of the 
UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that called on the government of Syria to end all 
human rights abuses.115 The resolution was adopted with 122 Member States voted in favor, 13 
against and 41 abstentions.116 It further urged the Assad regime to immediately implement the 
LAS’ November peace plan.117 The resolution did not create any new mechanisms or 
procedures, yet it meant to send a strong signal to Syria and its people that the ongoing human 
rights violations unfolding there must come to an end. A number of delegations highlighted 
Syria’s primary responsibility to protect its population and prevent atrocities against children and 
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women.118 Russia stated that the main co-sponsors of the resolution should remember that being 
an initial co-sponsor was not only a right, but also a responsibility.119  
In Resolution 7441 of November 24, 2011, the LAS again requested its Secretary General 
to deploy immediately the observer mission to Syria.120 Most importantly, on November 27, 
2011, the Ministerial Council of the LAS proposed economic sanctions on Syria.121 The LAS’ 
proposed sanctions included a travel ban on some senior officials of the Assad regime, a freeze 
on Syrian government’s assets in Arab countries, a ban on transactions with Syria’s central bank, 
and an end of all commercial exchanges with the government of Syria.122  
In the meantime, the Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council 
pursuant to Resolution S-17/1 completed its task and prepared its first report on November 23, 
2011.123 The report concluded that human rights violations were committed by Syrian military 
and security forces since the beginning of the protests in March 2011. 124 The report further 
asserted that crimes against humanity were committed in different locations in Syria during the 
period under review.125 The report underscored the Syrian government’s responsibility to protect 
its population, provide victims with an effective remedy, and stop atrocities against 
population.126 It called upon the Syrian regime to put an immediate end to the ongoing, gross 
human rights violations, to initiate independent and impartial investigations of these violations, 
and to bring the perpetrators of these atrocities to justice. At the same time, the Human Rights 
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Council adopted Resolution S-18/1, which mandated the establishment of a Special Rapporteur 
on the human rights situation in Syria.127 The resolution was adopted by a vote of 37 in favor, 
four against, and six abstentions.128 The Russian delegation, which voted against the resolution, 
stated that the resolution exceeded the mandate of the Human Rights Council.129 Expressing 
similar sentiments, China stated that it could not accept any use of force which would threatens 
the territorial integrity of Syria.130  
The Syria situation was again discussed at the Security Council on December 12, 
2011.131 During this meeting, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated 
that an estimated 5,000 people had been killed in Syria since March 2011, and many more 
civilians had been arrested and detained without trial.132 She noted that nearly 12,000 refugees 
had fled Syria and many more were internally displaced. She highlighted that the Syrian 
government had failed to uphold its responsibility to protect Syrian civilian populations and that 
the international community should undertake effective measures to protect the civilian 
population in Syria.133 
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On December 19, 2011, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on Syria with 133 
votes in favor, 11 against, and 43 abstentions.134 While Brazil voted in favor, India and South 
Africa abstained on the vote on the resolution.135 The resolution called for Syria to immediately 
cease all human rights violations, to protect its population, and to fully comply with their 
obligation under international human rights and humanitarian law.136  
In the meantime, given the pressure from regional and international actors, Syria signed a 
peace deal presented by the LAS in which Syria agreed to an Arab observer mission for an initial 
period of one month.137 The peace deal also served to initiate talks between the opposition and 
the government regarding the cessation of violence, release of political and opposition prisoners, 
and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from cities. China and Russia welcomed the peace deal and 
applauded the LAS’ involvement in the Syrian peace process, rather than bringing the issue to 
the Security Council.138 
However, Syrian opposition leaders criticized the agreement as a new time-wasting tactic 
by Assad's regime and, instead, called for foreign military intervention.139 They condemned the 
LAS’ monitors and regarded the mission as a farce, pointing to the continuation of violence 
against protesters in spite of the monitors’ presence.140 The United States reacted skeptically to 
Syria's agreement to allow the LAS to monitor Syrian compliance with the LAS peace agreement 
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designed to stop the violence in the country. The United States pointed out that it was uncertain 
whose observers would monitor and which cities they would observe.141 Moreover, the 
appointment of Mustafa al-Dabi to lead the LAS observer mission raised doubts about the 
reliability of the mission because al-Dabi had served as a Sudanese military commander and 
intelligence officer and was accused of being involved in war crimes in Darfur.142 Despite all 
these arguments, a LAS mission with 60 observers resumed its mission in Syria by late 
December 2011.143 After establishing contacts with both factions, al-Dabi stated that the 
situation in Homs was normal.144 Although much criticism was leveled against al-Dabi’s 
leadership, the mission remained in Syria. The mission’s report, presented to the LAS on January 
22, 2012, criticized the Syrian government for its failure to implement the agreement and 
recommended an extension of the mission.145 However, Saudi Arabia opposed such an extension 
and decided to pull its monitors out of Syria.146 Following Saudi Arabia, other countries also 
withdrew their observers from the delegation.147 
By end of January 2012, the LAS acknowledged its failure at peace efforts in Syria and 
stated that the Syrian regime had failed to cooperate with the LAS.148 Given the continued 
violence in Syria, the LAS referred the situation to the UN and presented a peace plan which 
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called on Assad to hand over power to his deputy.149 Except for Lebanon, this plan was 
supported by other Arab countries.150 Nevertheless, the countries supporting the plan failed to 
agree whether it should be submitted to the Security Council. 
Throughout all these attempts at negotiation, the violence in Syria continued, and, again, 
UN Member States made another attempt at the end of January 2012 to address the Syrian crisis. 
During the Security Council discussion on the LAS’ peace plan, Morocco introduced a draft 
resolution under which the Security Council would fully support the LAS’ proposal.151 The draft 
resolution included the LAS’ goal of forming a new, national unity government, which required 
that Assad step aside as part of a democratic transition process, grant full authority to his deputy, 
and hold free elections under Arab and international supervision.152  
During the negotiations on the resolution, Russia and China continued to oppose any 
action hinting at regime change, coercive measures, or other foreign interference in Syria, with 
the Russian representative warning that such an intervention could spark catastrophic civil war 
and destabilize the region.153 He stated that, instead of interfering in Syria, it was now more 
important than ever to encourage dialogue among Syrians. However, he made clear that Russia 
would not support a solution that might lead to regime change. China also opposed the threat of 
use of force, especially forcible regime change, to resolve the Syrian conflict.154 The 
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representative of India pointed out that neither repression nor outside intervention could fulfill 
the Syrian people’s aspirations to play a greater role in shaping their own destiny.155  
Clarifying its position, the Chairman of the LAS Ministerial Council stated that there was 
no hidden agenda against the Syrian regime and that the sole objective was to stop the massive 
killing and repression, which had been condemned around the world. He stated that the LAS was 
not calling for military intervention or regime change in Syria.156 The representative of Syria 
stated that said he found it strange to see Arab leaders calling for action against his country, 
which had sacrificed much for Arab causes and joining with other States that wished to destroy 
Syria through the dissemination of false facts. He further stated that Syrians themselves would 
resolve the historic challenges facing their homeland without outside intervention.157  
A vote on Security Council Resolution S/2012/77 was held on February 4, 2012, yet it 
could not be adopted because of Russian and Chinese vetoes.158 In contrast to previous draft 
resolutions on Syria, however, there were no abstentions, and the remaining thirteen states voted 
for the draft resolution.159 Explaining the veto, Russia stated that the draft resolution sought to 
send an “unbalanced” message to Syria and that some influential members of the international 
community had been undermining the possibility of a peaceful settlement by advocating regime 
change.160 China voiced concern that the approach outlined in the resolution would complicate 
the situation in Syria.161 Other Member States, in particular the United States, the United 
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Kingdom, and France, expressed their deep disappointment and anger about the outcome of the 
draft resolution.162 
Given the failure to adopt a resolution at the Security Council, on February 16, 2012, 
Saudi Arabia tabled a resolution at the UN General Assembly condemning the Syrian situation, 
and highlighting the importance of ending human rights violations.163 The Member States 
adopted the resolution with 137 votes in favor, 12 against and 17 abstentions. The resolution also 
expressed its support for the LAS peace plan and requested that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon appoint a special representative to Syria.164  
Given his successful mediation efforts in Kenya, Kofi Annan was appointed as the UN-
LAS joint Special Envoy for Syria on February 23, 2012.165 The Special Envoy was to provide 
good offices aimed at bringing an end to all violence and human rights violations and promoting 
a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis. The Special Envoy was guided in this endeavor by the 
provisions of General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/253 and the relevant LAS resolutions.166  
In rendering his duties as special envoy, Annan consulted Member States and engaged with all 
relevant parties within and outside Syria in order to end the mass atrocities and the humanitarian 
crisis in Syria.167  
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The Commission of Inquiry, established pursuant to Resolution S-17/1 on the situation in 
Syria, submitted its second report to the Human Rights Council on February 22, 2012.168 The 
report concluded that the government of Syria had manifestly failed in its responsibility to 
protect its people. Since November 2011, its forces committed more widespread, systematic, and 
gross human rights violations. The report further noted the abuses committed by anti-government 
groups, although not comparable in scale and organization to those carried out by the Syrian 
government.169  
During this session, the Human Rights Council discussed the situation in Syria.170 It 
adopted Resolution 19/1 with 37 in favor, three against, with three abstentions.171  The Human 
Rights Council condemned the escalating widespread, systematic, and gross violations of human 
rights committed by the Syrian authorities, as well as ongoing attacks against civilian 
populations in cities and villages. In his opening remarks, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, President 
of the UN General Assembly, highlighted the dire image provided by the Commission of Inquiry 
of the situation on the ground in Syria. Al-Nasser also stated that the Syrian government had 
manifestly failed in its duty to protect its people.172 The UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Navi Pillay, called for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire to end the fighting and 
bombardments and requested the Syrian authorities to cooperate fully with international 
mechanisms, including Kofi Annan as Special Envoy. She also requested that the Syrian 
government allow the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a field 
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presence in Syria.173 However, Syria condemned the meeting and said that it was an effort to 
politicize the high-level segment of the Human Rights Council. Syria argued that the Human 
Rights Council was not an appropriate forum for such matters.174  
During this Human Rights Council session, some delegations, in particular China and 
Russia, expressed their concern about the appeals for regime change in Syria, and they rejected 
any attempt to undermine Syria’s sovereignty and territorial independence.175 While expressing 
its concern at the loss of lives in Syria, Cuba rejected attempts to attribute responsibility for all of 
the violence to the Syrian regime. Cuba voiced concern at the appeals for regime change in Syria 
and questioned those who advocated the use of force and violence to resolve the conflict. Cuba 
rejected any attempt to undermine Syria’s sovereignty and territorial independence, and it 
demanded full respect for the principles of self-determination and sovereignty.176 China stressed 
the need for an inclusive political dialogue and stated that it could not approve an armed 
intervention or the imposition of so-called regime change in Syria.177 Russia stated that the 
politicization of the situation in Syria would not facilitate the resolution of the crisis.178 
Venezuela expressed similar concerns and stated that it was unacceptable to justify foreign 
military aggression under the need to protect civilians.179 These concerns of these delegations 
demonstrated a strong opposition to any intervention or at least taking any preventive efforts to 
stop atrocities in Syria. They mainly suspected that such efforts would allow external 
intervention in Syria, which possibly would create another Libyan scenario, including Syrian 
regime change.  
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Other delegations stressed the Syrian government’s responsibility to protect its 
population and demanded that Assad step aside to allow for a peaceful political transition. For 
example, Norway emphasized Syria’s primary responsibility to protect its population and 
reiterated the request that Assad step aside in order to accommodate a political transition.180 
Most importantly, Norway stated that all members of the Security Council had to assume their 
responsibility to protect the population of Syria. The United States stated that Assad must go.181 
Given the continued escalation of violence in Syria, the Security Council issued a press 
statement on March 21, 2012, deploring the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria and 
requesting Damascus to grant access to the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs 
and Emergency Relief Coordinator.182 In light of this statement from the Security Council, 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed hope that this development would mark a turning 
point in the international community’s response to the Syrian crisis.183 
On April 5, 2012, the Security Council adopted another presidential statement urging the 
government of Syria to adhere to its commitment to cease violence.184 On April 14, 2012, the 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2042, which emphasized the primary 
responsibility of the government of Syria to protect its population and authorized the deployment 
of 30 unarmed military observers to Syria to liaise with the parties and to begin to report on the 
implementation of a full cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, pending the 
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deployment of the mission.185 The resolution also requested proposals for a UN supervision 
mechanism in Syria to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties.186 
Although the Russian delegation stated that the text had become much more balanced through 
extensive negotiation, the Syrian representative said the text was still unbalanced as it did not 
place enough burdens on opposition groups. However, the Syrian government supported 
Annan’s mission and any measures that would restore the country’s stability. For his part, Annan 
pledged support for monitoring the ceasefire, while warning that the monitors must respect 
Syria’s sovereignty.187 
On April 21, 2012, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2043 and 
established the 300-person UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), to monitor the 
cessation of violence and implementation of the Special Envoy’s plan.188 Importantly, the 
Russian delegation indicated that the Syrian regime would cooperate with observers.  However, 
Russia deplored any deviation from the mandate and stated that the Libyan model should always 
remain in the past.189   
On June 1, 2012, upon the request by the Permanent Representatives of Denmark, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the EU, and the United States, the Human Rights Council 
convened a special session on the deteriorating human rights situation in the Syria and recent 
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killings in El-Houleh.190 During the general debate, most Member States condemned the killings 
in El Houleh, with many delegations describing the atrocities as crimes against humanity.191 The 
Member States demanded that the Syrian Government cooperate with Special Envoy Annan and 
the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry, while several delegations stressed that the 
Security Council must immediately refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).192 However, some Member States stated that the events in El Houleh must not be 
used as a pretext for foreign intervention, a condition which would hold serious consequences for 
world peace.193 China called on the government of Syria to implement the plan of the Special 
Envoy and Security Council resolutions.194 China, however, decisively opposed any form of 
international intervention and regime change.  
On June 7, 2012, Annan briefed the Security Council on the deteriorating situation in 
Syria, and, on June 15, 2012, UNSMIS suspended its activities. Following Annan’s briefing to 
the Security Council, Russia suggested a conference to establish a contact group on Syria.195 On 
July 19, 2012, a draft resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was introduced at the 
Security Council, cosponsored by France, Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.196 The resolution stressed the Syrian government’s primary responsibility to 
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protect its population and prevent atrocities. It also authorized the Security Council act under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to demand verifiable compliance within 10 days of the 
resolution’s adoption. The resolution was once again vetoed by Russia and China, while Pakistan 
and South Africa abstained.197 Russia reiterated its position that it would not accept any 
resolution containing a threat of sanctions.198  
Given the continued failure of the Security Council to address the situation in Syria, the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution on August 3, 2012, deploring the Security Council’s 
failure to act on Syria and calling for a peaceful political transition.199 On August 2, 2012, Kofi 
Annan resigned as UN-Arab League mediator in Syria. Annan pointed to the Syrian 
government’s refusal to cooperate in reaching a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the escalating 
military campaign of the Syrian opposition, and the lack of unity in the Security Council as 
causes for the continued crisis in Syria.200 On August 17, 2012, Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed 
as the Special Representative for Syria.201 Brahimi proposed an Eid al-Adha ceasefire, a proposal 
not implemented because of the escalation of violence in Syria.202  
During its next session, the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 24/22 on the 
continuing grave deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation in Syria with 40 in 
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favor, one against, and six abstentions.203 The resolution condemned the use of chemical 
weapons and the “gross, systematic and widespread violations of human rights” by the Syrian 
authorities. The resolution, in less-specific language, deplored “any human rights abuses” and 
violations of international humanitarian law by opposition armed groups.204  
Since the beginning of unrest in Syria, various UN organs have continued to hold 
meetings and have informally considered many draft resolutions. As can be clearly seen, at least 
one Member State had voted against most of the resolutions. The key objection mainly 
emphasized non-intervention in internal affairs and the refusal to permit the use of force to 
achieve regime change. Both Russia and China have significant economic and military relations 
with Syria. As permanent members of the Security Council, each has vetoed three resolutions 
designed to isolate the Assad regime. Russia says it remains committed to finding a peaceful 
solution, but continues to provide the Assad regime with military support. Due to the substantial 
differences of opinion among the Member States, the Security Council could not take any 
significant preventive action on the Syrian crisis.  
On September 19, 2013, in light of the newly proven charges of possession and use of 
chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, Russia and the United States transmitted to the Security 
Council their framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons agreed in Geneva on 
September 14, 2013.205 On September 24, 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and the 
United States Secretary of State John Kerry met on the sidelines of the General Assembly to 
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discuss a draft resolution on the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons.206 On September 
27, 2013, the Member States of the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118 
demanding verification and destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles in Syria.207 The 
resolution stated that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constituted a threat to international 
peace and security. The resolution also called for the full implementation of the September 27, 
2013, decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which 
contained special procedures for the expeditious and verifiable destruction of Syria’s chemical 
weapons.208 Specifically, the resolution prohibited Syria from using, developing, producing, 
otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, or retaining chemical weapons, or transferring them to other 
States or non-State actors, and also underscored that no party in Syria should use, develop, 
produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer such weapons. The resolution further called for the 
expeditious destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons program, with inspections to begin by 
October 1, 2013.209 The resolution also called for convening peace talks and endorsed the 
establishment of a transitional governing body in Syria with full exclusive powers. 
Resolution 2118 opened a path for a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis under the 
patronage of the Security Council. It averted the threat of unilateral military strikes by the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The resolution refers to the option of imposing measures under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in the event Syria fails to implement the chemical weapons 
destruction plan.210 However, this reference does not per se authorize the use of force. Therefore, 
any military action by the United States and its allies without the Security Council’s 
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authorization would have certainly not have been approved by the Security Council. Resolution 
2118 does not provide for an automatic authorization to use force in the event that the 
disarmament process fails or the conflict in Syria escalates. A possible intervention would 
require yet another compromise within the Security Council. Therefore, Resolution 2118 shifted 
the debate on the use of force against Syria to collective security action, which is in line with the 
R2P principle. However, Resolution 2118 does not mention the international community’s 
responsibility to protect the Syrian population from mass atrocities, but refers solely to the threat 
to international peace and security posed by Syria’s possession and use of chemical weapons. 
Thus, the question of the international community’s responsibility to respond to other atrocities 
in Syria, which do not emerge from chemical weapons, remains unanswered. 
Although Resolution 2118 formed part of the diplomatic solution to the chemical 
weapons’ problem, as Stahn points out, the resolution pays little attention to the accountability 
dimensions of the alleged use of chemical weapons.211 The resolution addresses the use of 
chemical weapons primarily through disarmament obligations and enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution does not include any concrete options for the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, which prevents any referral to the ICC.  
However, UN Secretary General Ban hailed the resolution’s passage as “the first hopeful 
news on Syria in a long time,” but said, even amidst that important step, “we must never forget 
that the catalogue of horrors in Syria continues with bombs and tanks, grenades and guns.”212 He 
said the plan to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons was “not a license to kill with conventional 
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weapons.”213 Ban also stressed that the perpetrators of the chemical attacks in Syria must be 
brought to justice and stated a UN mission had returned to Syria to complete its fact-finding 
investigations.214   
In the debate that followed Resolution 2118, Member States of the Security Council 
praised the text for placing binding obligations on Assad’s regime, by requiring the regime to get 
rid of its “tools of terror.”215  U.S. Secretary of State Kerry said that the Assad regime bore the 
burden of meeting the terms of the resolution.216 At the same time, Sergey Lavrov, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, emphasized that:  
[T]he responsibility for implementing the resolution did not lay with Syria alone. The text 
had not been passed under the Chapter VII of UN Charter, nor did it allow for coercive 
measures. Violations of its requirements and use of chemical weapons by anyone must be 
carefully investigated. Violations must be hundred per cent proven. It contained 
requirements for all countries, especially Syria's neighbors, which must report on moves 
by non-State actors to secure chemical weapons.”217 
In October 2013, the Member States of the Security Council authorized the establishment 
of an OPCW-UN joint mission to support, monitor, and verify the destruction of the Syrian 
chemical weapons program by June 30, 2014.218 The OPCW-UN joint mission initiated 
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preliminary inspections of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal on October 1, 2013.219 Under 
OPCW supervision, Syrian military personnel began destroying munitions. The destruction of 
the Syrian chemical production facilities were completed by October 31, 2013.220  
However, the destruction of chemical weapons themselves could not be completed by 
December 31, 2013, as planned.221 Yet, as international efforts continued to eliminate Syria’s 
chemical weapons program, a first consignment of priority chemical materials was removed 
from Syria on January 7, 2014. The chemicals were transported from two sites to the Syrian port 
of Lattakia and were loaded onto a Danish cargo ship.222 After loading the chemical weapons, 
the ship left for international waters and would remain at sea awaiting the arrival of further 
chemical materials at the Lattakia port.223 Sigrid Kaag, the Head of the UN team charged with 
destroying Syria's chemical weapons, briefed the Security Council on the progress as well as 
logistical and security challenges, confirming that the first quantity of chemical materials loaded 
onto a Danish ship on January 7, 2014, would be destroyed outside Syria.224 She highlighted this 
development as a first important step in an expected process of continued destruction of Syria’s 
chemical weapons.225   
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Nevertheless, by end of January 2014, only about 4% of the chemical weapons declared 
by the Syrian government had been removed from Syria.226 Under the UN-backed chemical 
weapons destruction plan, the Syrian authorities are responsible for packing and safely 
transporting them to Lattakia. Syria's chemical weapons must be completely removed and 
destroyed by June 30, 2014.227 However, Syria has missed several deadlines to remove the 
chemical weapons, and it claimed it would miss the June 30, 2014, deadline to destroy its 
chemical arsenal, possibly by several months.228 
Despite efforts by the international community, violence continued across Syria. 
Bombing by helicopter gunships was reported in the town of Kafr Zeita in central Hama 
province in February 2014.229 Shelling was also reported in eastern Ghouta on the outskirts of 
Damascus, in the town of Mleiha.230 By the end of February 2014, hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian civilians had fled rebel-held parts of the city of Aleppo under heavy aerial bombardment 
by the Syrian government, which created one of the largest refugee flows of the entire civil 
war.231  
While the conflict in Syria is ongoing, international donors have already pledged nearly 
$2.4 billion to support humanitarian relief efforts that are urgently needed by UN agencies and 
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humanitarian partners which provide life-saving aid to millions of people affected in Syria, as 
well as in countries hosting Syrian refugees.232 Further, the Syria Humanitarian Response Plan 
(SHARP) and the Regional Response Plan (RRP) launched by UN agencies and partners called 
for $6.5 billion in aid efforts in 2014.233  However, this appeal for $6.5 billion in emergency 
funding for 2014 has been mostly ignored by Member States, leaving humanitarian relief efforts 
in Syria unlikely to gear-up during 2014. In addition, humanitarian efforts are failing in Syria 
because access to those who most need help is threatened, restricted, or denied by the Assad 
regime.234  
As the international community’s negotiations aimed at ending the war have stalled, 
attacks on Aleppo accelerated at the end of February 2014.235 U.S. Secretary of State Kerry 
restated the Obama administration’s criticism of Russia’s role in the escalating violence.236 He 
stated that Russia was undermining the prospects of a negotiated solution by “contributing so 
many more weapons” and political support to Assad.237 Kerry further states that Russia is, in 
fact, enabling Assad to double down on his efforts, which is creating an enormous problem.238 
Since the international community’s efforts to prevent the escalation of violence in Syria have 
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been unsuccessful, Kerry stated that the United States and its allies would be taking critical 
decisions on how to respond to the Syrian crisis.239  
8.3.2 Responsibility to React  
Part of the motivation behind the R2P principle was to shift the legal debate from a right 
of humanitarian intervention to the international community’s collective responsibility to protect 
civilians when a state has manifestly failed to protect its population. It was clear that Assad’s 
regime had failed in this responsibility to prevent and, in fact, refused to protect the civilian 
population in Syria. On the other hand, preventive diplomatic measures taken by the 
international community since the Syrian crisis began have not produced results. Russia and 
China repeatedly argued that the Syrian crisis is an internal matter and that the civil war could be 
resolved only if the Assad regime is part of the negotiations. Both Russia and China rejected any 
military solutions for the Syrian crisis. However, the United States, United Kingdom, and France 
have constantly considered Assad as the principal cause for the atrocities in Syria, and these 
countries believed any political resolution, with or without coercive measures, should eventually 
lead to regime change.  
Soon after the Syrian uprising in 2011, China’s policy on Syria was outlined by a Chinese 
foreign ministry spokesperson which stated that: 
[S]yria is a country of major influence in the Middle East Region. China believes that 
when it comes to properly handling the current Syrian situation, it is the correct direction 
and major approach to resolve the internal differences through political dialogue and 
maintain its national stability as well as the overall stability and security of the Middle 
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East. The future of Syria should be independently decided by the Syrian people 
themselves free from external interference.240 
Chinese policy towards the Syrian crisis remained consistent since early 2011.241 
Throughout the Syrian crisis, China has not been amenable to any type of foreign intervention in 
Syria.242 Given the experience of the Libyan intervention and the extended use of the UN 
mandate by NATO to oust Gaddafi, China has opposed the use of force under R2P. China firmly 
called for a peaceful solution to the crisis through political dialogue and has constantly exercised 
its veto against UN resolutions on Syria. Throughout this period, China reaffirmed that its 
support for a resolution against Syria would not help improve the situation. China requested the 
international community to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 
Syria.243 China does not support armed intervention or regime change in Syria, and it believes 
that the use of sanctions also does not help resolve this issue appropriately.244  In fact, China 
insists that, even to implement non-military measures, the principles of the UN Charter and the 
basic norms of international relations should be strictly observed.245 The Chinese perspective on 
intervening in internal affairs of other states has been re-iterated during the Syrian crisis, which 
in turn undermined the effective implementation of responsibility to react as part of protecting 
civilian population in Syria from mass atrocities. 
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From the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Russia has appeared reluctant to directly criticize 
the Syrian regime, and, in fact, has opposed the application of international sanctions through the 
Security Council. Being Syria’s traditional partner, Russia actively extended political and 
weapons support to the Assad regime.246 During the crisis, Russia has maintained regular direct 
contact with the Assad regime. Throughout the Syrian crisis, Russia maintained the desire to 
avoid a repeat of the Libyan situation, where it believed the UN mandate was used for regime 
change. For example, Russia Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that “it is not in the interests 
of anyone to send messages to the opposition in Syria or elsewhere that if you reject all 
reasonable offers we will come and help you as we did in Liby. It’s a very dangerous 
position.”247 Russia continuously stated that the situation in Syria must be resolved by the Syrian 
themselves without outside interference. Russia categorically opposed any unilateral sanctions or 
use of force against Syria, stating that any such action against the Assad regime would reduce the 
opportunities for solving the Syrian crisis. 
Due to Chinese and Russian vetoes, and disagreements among Security Council members 
on the imposition of sanctions against the Assad regime, the Security Council could not exercise 
the responsibility to react as part of trying to protect Syria’s civilian population. Various civil 
society organizations have expressed their disappointment over the Security Council’s failure to 
fulfill the responsibility to react against the Assad regime and protect the Syrian population. 
Simon Adams, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, stated 
that “action to stop crimes against humanity should not be held prisoner to sectional political 
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interests and convenient alliances. This veto will cost lives in Syria. In preventing the UN from 
upholding its R2P, China and Russia have placed themselves on the wrong side of history. 
Today’s veto is a victory for impunity, inaction and injustice. The long-suffering people of Syria 
deserve better than this.”248 Amnesty International (AI) claimed that countries that wielded their 
veto power to block resolutions have utterly failed in their responsibilities to protect the Syrian 
people.249 Malcolm Smart, AI’s Middle East and North Africa Director, stated: “it is shocking 
that after more than six months of horrific bloodshed on the streets and in the detention centers 
of Syria, the governments of both Russia and China still felt able to veto what was already a 
seriously watered down resolution.”250 Don Kraus, CEO of Citizens of Global Solutions, an 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect member, wrote in an op-ed for the 
Huffington Post that “there are clearly major human rights violations being committed in Syria. 
By using their veto power, Russia and China are not meeting their responsibility to protect and 
are also preventing the rest of the world from doing so. It is clear that the two governments have 
put national interests ahead of their international responsibility.”251 
While China and Russia were against any sanctions or intervention against the Syrian 
regime, the United Kingdom, the United States, and their allies favored the use of force in Syria. 
The United States, the United Kingdom and France threatened Syria with the use of unilateral 
force only after the Syrian chemical weapons attack in August 2013. Although the United States 
and the United Kingdom threatened Syria with possible unilateral force, neither countries 
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justified their intervention claims in Syria on R2P. Both countries justified their push for use of 
unilateral military force against Syria on the basis of the use of chemical weapons by Syria. 
Thus, the threat to use unilateral military force was mainly about enforcing the prohibition on use 
of chemical weapons rather than fulfilling R2P. 
The British government threatened the Assad regime with the use of unilateral force in 
order to halt the use and production of chemical weapons, and to protect civilian population. 
They justified their decision on the ground of humanitarian intervention without referring to 
R2P.252 The legal position on military action by the United Kingdom against Syria is set out in 
UK government’s note dated August 29, 2013: “under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
it would be lawful for the United Kingdom to use force against another state without a Security 
Council resolution authorizing the use of force, if the Security Council cannot agree to authorize 
the use force, and if other conditions are met.”253 The document goes on to list three conditions 
that would have to be met:  
(1) There is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a 
whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and 
urgent relief; 
(2) It must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if 
lives are to be saved; 
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(3) The proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of 
humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim.254 
On January 14, 2014, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office submitted an 
official response to questions posed by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on 
the legality of humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization.255 This 
document reconciled the British legal position with R2P as reflected in 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document.256 As Goodman noted, the document highlighted three related prepositions: 
(1) R2P and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document involve political commitments 
aimed at the Security Council taking action; 
(2) R2P as set out in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document does not address the    
question of unilateral State action in the face of an overwhelming humanitarian 
catastrophe; and 
(3) Unilateral humanitarian intervention is a lawful option when the Security Council 
fails to take action to stop an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.257 
The United Kingdom tried to argue that R2P and forceful humanitarian intervention 
compliment each other, when the Security Council failed to authorize the use of force. In such a 
situation, the United Kingdom’s position is that international law permits states to use force. 
Harold Koh agrees with former British Legal Advisor Sir Daniel Bethlehem, who stated that “in 
                                                          
254 Id.  
255 Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, Further Supplementary Written Evidence From the 
Rt. Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Jan. 14, 2014), available at 
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Letter-from-UK-Foreign-Commonwealth-Office-to-the-House-
of-Commons-Foreign-Affairs-Committee-on-Humanitarian-Intervention-and-the-Responsibility-to-Protect.pdf. 
256 Id. Ryan Goodman, UK Government Issues Major Statement on Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, JUST 
SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/2014/01/30/uk-government-issues-major-statement-legality-
humanitarian-intervention/. 
257 Id.  
  
341 
 
the case of the law of humanitarian intervention, an analysis that simply relies on the prohibition 
of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and its related principles on non-
intervention and sovereignty, is overly simplistic.”258 According to Koh, international law has 
not progressed since Kosovo.259 Koh criticizes the Russian and Chinese vetoes as an absolute bar 
to lawful action.260 Koh justifies humanitarian intervention in Syria even without Security 
Council authorization because of the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the country.261 For 
Koh, the “per se illegal” rule, or the illegality of humanitarian intervention without Security 
Council authorization, is plainly overbroad. Koh does not agree with humanitarian intervention 
as being treated as illegal under international law, except for self-defense. For Koh, a nation 
could lawfully use or threaten the use of force for genuinely humanitarian purposes, even absent 
Security Council authorization.262 
However, although articles 2(4) and 24(1) of the UN Charter give the Security Council a 
responsibility to act in cases where acts are a threat to international peace and security, it does 
not make that an exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. Under this view, the UN 
Charter does not answer the question whether a group of states with genuine humanitarian 
motives can act collectively with military force to protect civilian populations in cases where the 
Security Council fails to take an effective action in protecting civilian populations from mass 
atrocities. The United States, United Kingdom, and France kept open the option of the use of 
force for humanitarian purposes without the Security Council approval. After the Syrian 
chemical weapons attack in August 2013, these countries took a similar approach towards the 
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Syrian crisis as well. Thus, in the face of the use of chemical weapons by Syria and the Security 
Council’s failure to take action to protect the civilian population in Syria, the United States, 
United Kingdom, and France openly declared their readiness to take military action against the 
Assad regime, even without a Security Council resolution.263 
The United States’ position did not use humanitarian intervention or R2P as its 
justification for intended military action against Syria. Instead, the United States cited the Syrian 
government’s use of chemical weapons as a justification for its use of force.264 The legal position 
of the United States on the use of force without Security Council approval is seen in President 
Obama’s speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2013 when he stated that: 
[W]e live in a world of imperfect choices.  Different nations will not agree on the need 
for action in every instance, and the principle of sovereignty is at the center of our 
international order.  But sovereignty cannot be a shield for tyrants to commit wanton 
murder, or an excuse for the international community to turn a blind eye.  While we need 
to be modest in our belief that we can remedy every evil, while we need to be mindful 
that the world is full of unintended consequences, should we really accept the notion that 
the world is powerless in the face of a Rwanda or Srebrenica?  If that’s the world that 
people want to live in, they should say so and reckon with the cold logic of mass graves. 
But I believe we can embrace a different future.  And if we don’t want to choose between 
inaction and war, we must get better - all of us - at the policies that prevent the 
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breakdown of basic order.  Through respect for the responsibilities of nations and the 
rights of individuals.  Through meaningful sanctions for those who break the rules.  
Through dogged diplomacy that resolves the root causes of conflict, not merely its 
aftermath.  Through development assistance that brings hope to the marginalized.  And 
yes, sometimes - although this will not be enough - there are going to be moments where 
the international community will need to acknowledge that the multilateral use of military 
force may be required to prevent the very worst from occurring.265 
Obama administration officials have said they would take action against the Syrian 
government, even without the backing of other countries or the UN, because diplomatic paralysis 
must not prevent a response to the alleged chemical weapons attack outside the Syrian capital.266 
Before the chemical weapons destruction plan, the United States justified the use of force as a 
response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons.267 However, even with the Syrian 
chemical weapons destruction plan underway, the United States has not retreated from the 
possibility of using force without Security Council authorization. 
However, whether or not Security Council authorization was required to intervene and 
protect the civilian population in Syria, the use of chemical weapons should not have been the 
deciding factor. The international community’s focus was on chemical weapons, and this 
approach has undermined responding to the other serious crimes that have continued in Syria. 
However, with the Russian proposal to eliminate Syria’s chemical arsenal, the United States 
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withdrew the threat of unilateral military intervention against Syria. On September 27, 2013, the 
Security Council was able to obtain consensus on Resolution 2118, which addressed the 
framework for the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons.268 Nevertheless, as stated by U.S. 
Senator John McCain, “by drawing a ‘red line’ on chemical weapons, President Obama gave the 
Assad regime a green light to use every other weapon in his arsenal with impunity.”269  
8.3.3 Responsibility to Rebuild 
Of course, at this point, trying to predict rebuilding efforts in Syria may be imprudent. 
The international community remains dedicated to saving Syrians from further chemical 
weapons attacks. However, it is unlikely that chemical weapons removal alone will solve the 
underlying issues of this conflict. In fact, the international community has so far failed to protect 
the Syrian civilian populations from the atrocities of the Assad regime. The conflict in Syria is 
ongoing and is likely to continue for some time.270  
The Syrian crisis has resulted in a tragic impact on development performance in Syria 
through destroying economic, social, and human capital, with unbearable losses for the Syrian 
population. As a result of continued fighting, Syria’s economy has taken a devastating blow. 
About 75 percent of the manufacturing facilities in Aleppo are no longer operating.271 The total 
loss to the Syrian economy from the crisis by the end of 2012 is estimated at $ 48.4 billion.272 
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Public and private investments were adversely affected by the crisis. The unemployment rate is 
also on the rise. By end of 2012, the unemployment rate had increased by 24.3%. 
In addition to the economic impact, the Syrian crisis affected the lives of over 9 million 
people since the start of the crisis in 2011, including 6.5 million people who are now 
displaced.273 According to UN reports, as many as 2.5 million people are stranded in hard-to-
reach areas, including in besieged towns where access to aid has been limited or non-existent.274 
Some two million people have fled the country and are now living with host families and in 
refugee sites in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt. The UN Humanitarian Chief Valerie 
Amos, who visited displaced families in Syria in January 2014, stated that Syria is the biggest 
humanitarian crisis the world faces.275 
Although the Syrian crisis has been ongoing for years, the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission has not discussed any post-conflict rebuilding strategies in Syria. In fact, no 
Member States have raised that issue in any serious way. If Assad prevails and remains in power, 
UN-backed rebuilding efforts would confront a number of obstacles, including lack of support 
from important Member States. In such a case, contributions from traditional donors, such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU, would be highly unlikely. However, since the 
conflict is not over, and in light of how the conflict has unfolded, serious doubts have been raised 
about the likelihood of effective rebuilding efforts that will eventually take place in Syria.  
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8.4 Conclusion  
The Syrian crisis, now recognized as one of the worst humanitarian tragedies of the 21st 
century, has also been accepted as the most recent R2P controversy.276 The situation in Syria has 
not changed even after the implementation of the destruction of chemical weapons in the 
country. All discussions on confidence-building measures and allowing aid to affected areas 
ended without any success. The Geneva talks on a political resolution to the conflict and 
improving humanitarian conditions resumed on January 22, 2014, but ended without any 
agreement.277 This failure was due to the Syrian opposition groups and the international 
community’s pressure to oust Assad from power. The Syrian government refused to engage in 
any discussions on transition plans, and emphasized the need to fight against terrorism.278 The 
Syrian government continued its suppression against opposition groups and civilian populations 
living in rebel held areas.279 Clashes intensified between the rebel groups and made the situation 
even worse. In addition to the escalating violence in the country, Syria could not abide by the 
deadlines of the chemical weapons destruction plan.280 After missing the February 5, 2014, 
deadline for handing over all chemical weapons stockpiles, Syria accepted a new April 27 
deadline.281  
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While violence and human rights deterioration continued in Syria, the UN also took a 
number of measures to support imperiled civilian population. In February 22, 2014, the Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2139 and demanded that Syrian authorities and rebel 
factions allow unhindered support for UN humanitarian agencies.282 Importantly, Syria 
announced its readiness to cooperate with the Security Council resolution, if Syria’s state 
sovereignty was respected.283 Following this resolution, UN aid trucks entered Syria on March 
20, 2014.284 In the meantime, with increased political and military confidence, the Assad regime 
announced its decision to hold presidential elections in June 2014 and declared Assad a 
presidential candidate.285 Despite this major political step, violence in the country continued to 
mount and human rights conditions continued to deteriorate. Against this background, the UN 
Syrian envoy Brahimi resigned on May 13, 2014.286 Although the humanitarian situation in the 
country had deteriorated, Russia and China vetoed the Security Council Resolution calling for 
the Syrian crisis to be referred to the ICC.287 Although these states agreed to refer the Darfur, 
Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire crises to the ICC, they refused such a reference in Syrian case.  
Despite the development and use of R2P in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, the Syrian crisis has 
so far demonstrated that R2P is still burdened by many unresolved problems. In fact, the R2P 
principle seems to have mattered very little in how this crisis has unfolded. Years have passed 
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since the Syrian crisis began and reactions to this crisis have been mixed, certainly far from 
anything resembling a consensus, let alone a clear international legal situation.  
Analysis of the state practice during the Syrian crisis revealed disagreements on whether 
Syria had fulfilled its responsibility to protect its civilian population. The ongoing mass atrocities 
against civilians in Syria warrant the application of the R2P principle. However, China, Russia 
and other like-minded countries took the position that the Syrian crisis was an internal matter, 
which the Syrian government was capable of handling. Meanwhile, other members of the BRICS 
- Brazil, South Africa, and India - were also skeptical whether R2P had been triggered in Syria. It 
seems that these Member States were upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, 
despite well-reported mass atrocities. On the other hand, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and like-minded countries demanded that the Syrian government stop atrocities against civilians. 
This same situation occurred during the Darfur crisis, where Member States could not agree 
whether Sudan had failed to protect its population. However, during the Libyan and Côte 
d’Ivoire crises, Member States eventually agreed that these respective states’ failed to protect 
their population. Similar to the Darfur crisis, state practice during the Syrian crisis thus revealed 
a greater recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention principles rather 
than R2P. However, in light of chemical weapons possessed and used by the Syrian regime, 
Evans stated that the proven use of chemical weapons would be a profound breach of Syria’s 
responsibility to protect.288  
Nevertheless, throughout the Syrian crisis, the Security Council made a number of efforts 
to implement different preventive measures to protect civilians. Despite all such efforts, 
however, three Security Council resolutions were vetoed by Russia and China. Neither country 
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was willing to impose any direct preventive measures, such as sanctions or air travel bans, 
claiming that such measures violated territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Member States 
objected to adopting the R2P framing in UN decisions, and not even a condemnatory statement 
could be agreed upon in the Syrian crisis.289 Although state practice in the Libyan and Côte 
d’Ivoire crises indicated that R2P influenced how states think and talk about humanitarian 
intervention, the state practice in the Syrian crisis did not reflect this influence. State practice of 
important countries during the Syrian crisis emphasized sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
non-intervention even in the face of mass atrocities.  
Since all preventive efforts by regional and international actors failed to stop Syrian 
atrocities, and in the light of Syria’s use of chemical weapons, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France favored the use of military force in Syria. However, neither the United 
States nor the United Kingdom justified their intervention claims in Syria on R2P. The United 
States justified its claim on the basis of the use of chemical weapons by Syria. This state 
practice, in fact, is a departure from the R2P framing. On the other hand, these countries were 
ready to use military force against Syria even without Security Council authorization. However, 
India, China, Russia and like-minded countries opposed such a unilateral military actions against 
Syria on the basis of non-intervention, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Syria. This 
controversy also marked a return to the traditional controversy in international law on whether 
Security Council authorization is required to use force for humanitarian intervention purposes. 
During the crises in Darfur, Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, this controversy did not arise. Re-
emergence of this traditional controversy in international law is a failure of R2P, especially to 
resolve this long-standing controversy in international law on the use of force.  
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Chinese and Russian vetoes suggested that these countries were working to protect an 
important regional ally. Although China and Russia did not block the use of force in Libya or 
Côte d’Ivoire, their vetoes on resolutions against Syria demonstrated their suspicion about a 
possible misuse of Security Council authority based on what happened in the Libyan and Côte 
d’Ivoire episodes. Despite the fact that many other countries favored such stronger international 
intervention, the Security Council failed to take any action because of Chinese and Russian 
vetoes, and this outcome suggests that the R2P’s close association with the Security Council 
needs to be re-thought.   
However, the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 2118 demanding 
verification and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles in Syria demonstrated a positive sign 
of agreement among the UN Member States, at least regarding the production and usage of 
chemical weapons by Syria. Although Member States were united in acting to eliminate Syria’s 
chemical weapons, they were not ready to provide robust humanitarian assistance for victims in 
Syria. In fact, the UN reportedly failed to collect the targeted budget for much-needed 
humanitarian assistance for thousands of Syrians. Although the UN and many other non-
governmental organizations have issued periodic reports on the crisis, none has provided a 
sustainable solution to the humanitarian crisis or relief efforts in Syria. The Security Council has 
not wielded real effort to address the needs of the trapped civilian population in Syria. The 
majority of the Syrian population, outside of government-controlled areas, has remained in 
urgent need of medical and humanitarian assistance. Even the main humanitarian relief 
providers, such as OXFAM, Red Cross and Red Crescent, and Save the Children are not present 
in areas of urgent need, in particular because of the security, safety, and access issues. The 
international relief efforts are delayed not only because of the bureaucratic hurdles, but also of 
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inaccurate needs assessment, and the absence of an effective Security Council mandate for cross-
border relief. On the other hand, although states may support humanitarian relief efforts, how the 
Security Council might act with impact without the consent of the Syrian regime is not clear. 
The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria poses major challenges to the R2P principle. As 
the Syrian crisis demonstrates, instances of mass atrocities and human rights violations, similar 
to historical atrocities in both Bosnia and Rwanda, still persist. One of the main reasons for the 
continuation of mass atrocities in Syria is inaction by Security Council. Apart from the R2P 
principle’s own uncertainties regarding its scope, the lack of real consensus between some 
Member States has further hindered decisive action under R2P to halt ongoing atrocities in Syria. 
The international community, thus, confronted the very familiar controversies about sovereignty 
and non-intervention and the need to protect civilian population from human rights violations. 
Simply stated, no consensus could be reached among the Member States on what response 
should be implemented to protect civilians in Syria. Similar uncertainties confronted pre-R2P 
humanitarian intervention context as well. Thus, state practice throughout the Syrian crisis 
revealed that R2P has not changed existing international law.  
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       CHAPTER 9  
          CONCLUSION 
 9.1 Introduction 
This thesis analyzed whether the emergence and development of the R2P principle has 
changed international law on addressing large-scale atrocities. It answered this question by 
examining doctrinal aspects of international law and state practice on such humanitarian crises, 
before and after the R2P principle appeared in 2001. The international legal history on this issue 
involves the gradual convergence of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, the 
prohibition on the threat or use of force, international humanitarian law, and international human 
rights law. The international legal rules in each of these areas has changed over time, creating 
controversies in terms of the rights and obligations of states. These problems came to a head in 
the post-Cold War period in the international community’s reactions to the humanitarian crises in 
Rwanda and Kosovo. After these episodes, there was a great desire to change international law 
so that responses to large-scale atrocities could be both legal and legitimate. This desire led to 
the development of the R2P principle, which attempted to re-formulate how states approached 
humanitarian crises as a matter of international law. However, this thesis concludes that the R2P 
principle has not changed international law on humanitarian crises, leaving the international 
community facing essentially the same controversies that existed at the end of the 20th century.  
In particular, state practice after the creation of the R2P principle exhibited the same 
controversies on humanitarian intervention evident in the pre-R2P era, especially with respect to 
the use of force for humanitarian purposes. State practice under the R2P principle’s 
“responsibility to react” has not resolved the long-standing controversy over the legality of 
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forceful humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization. In addition, new 
concepts the R2P principle introduced to the debate on humanitarian crises - the responsibilities 
to prevent and rebuild - have not evolved into new international legal rules with clearly 
demarcated rights and obligations for states.  
9.2 International Law on Humanitarian Intervention before Development of the R2P 
Principle 
 Changes in international law during the 20th century made humanitarian intervention an 
increasingly controversial issue. Developments after World War II set up the tensions that 
characterized this issue during the Cold War. On the one hand, the UN Charter re-emphasized 
the traditional principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, supplemented by a new prohibition 
on the threat or use of force by states. These rules led many to conclude that states could not use 
force for humanitarian reasons without authorization from the Security Council exercising its 
Chapter VII powers. On the other hand, international law began to reflect the importance of 
protecting civilians in armed conflict and respecting the human rights of people during peace. 
These rules informed arguments that, in the context of large-scale atrocities, the principles of 
sovereignty, non-intervention, and the prohibition on the use of force and the failure of the 
Security Council to act should not prevent states from taking action to mitigate or stop 
humanitarian tragedies.  
 The problems related to these two positions became clear during the Cold War. Although 
humanitarian intervention authorized by the Security Council did not create much doctrinal 
controversy, the Security Council was not a robust organ of the UN during the Cold War because 
of the overarching geopolitical conflict between the superpowers. As Chapter 2 discussed, 
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humanitarian interventions involving the use of force but not authorized by the Security Council 
were controversial in international law, both doctrinally and with how state practice unfolded. 
With the significant changes in international politics that happened in the early post-Cold War 
period, the relationships in international law between sovereignty and non-intervention, the 
prohibition on the use of force, human rights, and humanitarian law became more unstable and 
created heightened tensions in terms of rights and obligations concerning humanitarian crises. In 
these circumstances, the international community’s responses in the Rwandan and Kosovo crises 
created serious disagreements on the status of humanitarian intervention in international law. The 
international community’s actions in Rwanda, which did not violate international law on the use 
of force but were nonetheless considered morally illegitimate, and NATO’s use of force in 
Kosovo, considered by many to be illegal but legitimate, motivated leaders and experts to seek a 
better way to address large-scale atrocities in international law. The R2P principle became the 
answer to this challenge. 
9.2.1 Doctrine: Controversy from the Convergence of Four Bodies of International Law 
 As noted above, the doctrinal case during the Cold War against international law 
recognizing a state’s right to use force to address humanitarian atrocities without Security 
Council authorization rested on the combination of the principles of sovereignty, non-
intervention, and the prohibition on the threat or use of force. The only exception permitting the 
use of force for humanitarian reasons, as opposed to self-defense, was the Security Council’s 
power to authorize states to use force to address a threat to international peace and security. 
Developing countries, especially those emerging from colonial rule, and socialist states strongly 
backed this doctrinal understanding of international law.  
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However, the development of international human rights law during the Cold War  
provided a doctrinal justification for the use of force for humanitarian purposes in the absence of 
Security Council authorization. Following the establishment of the UN, the international legal 
protection for human rights underwent dramatic development. These developments included 
adoption of many international human rights instruments, such as the UDHR, ICCPR, and 
ICESCR. With the steady advance of international human rights law, support grew for the 
proposition that a state could no longer plead the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention 
as a bar to intervention by the international community when that state abuses its sovereign 
power and massively violates human rights.  
Similarly, international humanitarian law developed significantly in the post-World War 
II period (e.g., the four Geneva Conventions of 1949), including in the context of non-
international armed conflicts (e.g., Additional Protocol II of 1977). The evolution of international 
humanitarian law contributed to advocacy for humanitarian intervention against large-scale 
atrocities during armed conflicts, even in contexts not involving Security Council authorization. 
For many, international human rights law together with international humanitarian law supported 
the claim that international law permitted humanitarian intervention in response to large-scale 
atrocities, even in absence of Security Council action.  
9.2.2 State Practice: The Road to the Rwandan and Kosovo Crises and the Desire for 
Change in International Law 
Generally speaking, state practice during the Cold War demonstrated reluctance on the 
part of states using force at least in part for humanitarian purposes to justify their actions on a 
“doctrine” of humanitarian intervention. Instead, the preferred argument was self-defense, no 
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matter how weak the argument was in the context in question. This state practice supported those 
claiming international law did not recognize humanitarian intervention as an independent right to 
use force absent Security Council authorization. However, the controversy about whether such a 
right existed persisted throughout the Cold War, and increased in intensity with the further 
development of international human rights and humanitarian law.  
After the Cold War ended, this controversy came to a head through the international 
community’s responses to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and Kosovo. The UN and the 
international community failed to take timely and decisive actions to address genocide in 
Rwanda. This failure did not involve, however, the violation of any international legal 
obligations on states to intervene or violation of the limits on the use of force imposed by 
international law. However, the international community’s response to genocide in Rwanda was 
widely considered a moral tragedy, even if it did not arguably violate international law.  
Concerning the Kosovo crisis, NATO intervened with military force without Security Council 
authorization, triggering the old debate about whether international law recognized humanitarian 
intervention as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force and the authority the Security 
Council to authorize states to use force. Many leaders and experts considered the NATO military 
intervention as a technically illegal but legitimate action to stop mass atrocities and protect 
civilians.  
The Rwandan and Kosovo experiences encouraged leaders, such as UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, to argue a better approach to large-scale humanitarian atrocities was 
needed. Annan challenged states and non-state entities to work towards strategies that would 
help the international community avoid illegitimate and illegal actions in responding to 
humanitarian atrocities. The ICISS took up this challenge and proposed the R2P principle as the 
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answer to the dilemmas the Rwandan and Kosovo crises highlighted concerning international 
law and humanitarian crises. 
9.3 The R2P Principle: Key Doctrinal Elements Purporting to Represent Change in 
International Law that Did Not Change International Law 
As conceived by the ICISS and explained in Chapter 3, the R2P principle consists of 
three responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the 
responsibility to rebuild. The ICISS and proponents of the R2P principle claimed that the 
principle was different from what came before, especially in emphasizing that responses to 
humanitarian atrocities involve more than the question about the use of force. The claims that the 
R2P principle is new and different because of its three responsibilities becomes an important 
baseline for analyzing whether it has, in fact, changed international law.  
 
9.3.1 Responsibility to Prevent 
The responsibility to prevent is considered by many R2P proponents as the most 
important of the three responsibilities the ICISS identified. The R2P principle focuses on the 
responsibility of each state prevent atrocities. However, R2P’s responsibility to prevent did not 
represent a change in international law because pre-R2P international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law already required states to prevent atrocities. Failures by states to 
prevent atrocities in the pre-R2P period meant the international community got involved in 
efforts to prevent crises from getting worse, which meant sovereignty and non-intervention 
posed no bar to international efforts to prevent atrocities. For example, many efforts were made 
within and outside the UN to try to address atrocities in Rwanda and Kosovo peacefully, a 
pattern seen in humanitarian crises during the Cold War as well. Further, neither the ICISS report 
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nor the World Summit Outcome Document produced clarity on what international law requires 
in terms of prevention from states watching atrocities unfold in other countries.  
9.3.2 Responsibility to React  
The responsibility to react in the R2P principle attempted to confront the controversies in 
international law on humanitarian intervention, especially the controversy about the use of force 
for humanitarian purposes in the absence of Security Council authorization. While sovereignty 
and non-intervention remain important principles, the responsibility to react highlighted the 
international community’s responsibility to take action in cases of mass atrocities when 
prevention does not succeed. However, neither the ICISS report nor the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document resolved pre-existing disagreements about the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes. The ICISS report acknowledged the Security Council’s authority in this context, but, in 
convoluted language, left open the possibility that a state or group of states could legitimately 
and legally use force for humanitarian purposes without Security Council approval. The World 
Summit Outcome document only referred to the need to obtain Security Council authorization, 
which many viewed as a different way of avoiding the long-standing question the ICISS itself 
awkwardly tried to navigate. Therefore, the responsibility to react did not change international 
law doctrinally because (1) it reflected many pre-existing components of international law on the 
use of force and armed conflict, and (2) did not resolve the controversy over whether 
international law permits military intervention for humanitarian purposes without Security 
Council authorization.  
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9.3.3 Responsibility to Rebuild 
The responsibility to rebuild attempted to address post-conflict rebuilding efforts, an 
issue that was not prominent in pre-R2P international legal discussions about responding to 
humanitarian atrocities. However, the ICISS report itself expressed skepticism about the 
willingness of states to accept sustained rebuilding responsibilities given the weak state practice 
that existed on this issue. Further, the ICISS report does not clearly state who or what has the 
responsibility to rebuild, leaving the scope and substance of this responsibility in doubt. The 
World Summit Outcome Document did not refer to the responsibility to rebuild when it 
addressed R2P. Instead, it addressed post-conflict rebuilding in another section and called for 
establishment of a UN Peacebuilding Commission. Thus, like the ICISS report, the World 
Summit Outcome Document identified the importance of post-conflict rebuilding but did nothing 
to illuminate the relationship between international law and a “responsibility to rebuild.”   
9.4 R2P in Action from 2001 through 2013: No Change in International Law 
Although the R2P principle was introduced to remedy pre-R2P controversies on 
humanitarian atrocities and international law, the state practice that followed 2001 ICISS report 
has failed to demonstrate any meaningful change in international law on humanitarian 
intervention. In Chapters 4-8, this thesis examined state practice both in general terms (Chapter 
4) and in specific case studies (Chapters 5-8) in order to detect states changing their behavior in 
accordance with the R2P principle’s component elements. In terms of customary international 
law, the thesis tried to assess whether R2P was reflected in general and consistent state practice 
supported by a sense that R2P was legally binding on states. In treaty law terms, did state 
practice reflect governments interpreting the UN Charter according to the precepts of R2P? What 
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this thesis found was state practice that repeatedly resembled state practice from the pre-R2P era, 
indicating that R2P has not changed international law.   
9.4.1 Responsibility to Prevent 
 State practice related to the responsibility to prevent reinforced each state’s long-standing 
international legal obligations to prevent atrocities in their territories - obligations grounded in 
pre-R2P bodies of international law on human rights and armed conflict. R2P-related references 
to the responsibility to prevent in state practice (e.g., as happened in Darfur, Libya, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Syria) relied on this pre-existing law, indicating R2P did not change substantive 
obligations on preventing atrocities already part of international law. In cases where states failed 
to comply with these obligations, state practice reflected efforts inside and outside the UN to 
prevent atrocities from getting worse through various means not involving the use of force. 
However, these types of efforts were routinely made in similar situations in the pre-R2P period, 
as illustrated by efforts made in the Rwandan and Kosovo crises. This consistent pattern makes it 
difficult to conclude that R2P prompted any meaningful change in the quantity of prevention 
efforts or how states perceived international law in this prevention context. Further, most of the 
atrocity contexts analyzed in this thesis involved failed prevention efforts, which suggests that 
R2P did not significantly improve the quality of prevention activities the international 
community undertook. 
9.4.2 Responsibility to React 
State practice after the emergence of the R2P principle reflected the same controversies 
on humanitarian intervention as existed in the pre-R2P era. Even though there has not been 
another Kosovo-type controversy since R2P was formulated, the responsibility to react has not 
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resolved disagreements in international law about the use of force for humanitarian purposes 
without Security Council authorization. For example, Russia, China, and other countries have 
consistently argued that force can only be used under R2P with Security Council authorization. 
By contrast, the United States, United Kingdom, and their allies maintained that using force for 
humanitarian reasons without Security Council approval remained a legal option in limited 
atrocity situations, arguments most clearly seen during the Syrian crisis. These two positions also 
characterized the pre-R2P debate on international law and the use of force in humanitarian 
interventions. One attempt to avoid this problem was the RN2V proposal, which aimed at 
securing Security Council action and avoiding the controversy that emerges when the Security 
Council cannot respond effectively. Even though abstentions by Security Council members on 
votes involving R2P issues (e.g., Chinese and Russian abstentions in the authorizations to use 
force against Libya and Côte d’Ivoire) provides some evidence of RN2V in action, RN2V is not 
a rule of international law that changes the manner in which the Security Council functions under 
the UN Charter.  
In addition, the “regime change” controversies that erupted after the Security Council 
authorized the use of force under R2P in the Libya and Côte d’Ivoire cases have overwhelmed 
the RN2V idea and threatened to return the Security Council to what it endured during the Cold 
War - the inability of the five permanent members to agree on authorizing the use of force for 
any reason. In this context, the RWP proposal has made no headway politically and does not 
constitute an international legal principle applicable to uses of force authorized by the Security 
Council.  The arguments and counter-arguments reflected in the Syrian case study about whether 
international law permits states under R2P to use force for humanitarian purposes without 
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Security Council authorization are essentially what was debated during the Cold War and the 
immediate post-Cold War period about humanitarian intervention.   
9.4.3 Responsibility to Rebuild  
Of the three R2P responsibilities, the responsibility to rebuild was the one with the 
weakest linkages to pre-R2P international law, meaning this responsibility had the longest road 
to travel before it could change international law. The road is still long. State practice on the 
responsibility to rebuild reinforces the skepticism the ICISS report expressed in including this 
responsibility in the R2P principle. As this thesis shows, time and again the international 
community’s efforts at post-atrocity rebuilding have been inadequate, which reflects political 
unwillingness by states to provide sustained and sufficient support for rebuilding efforts. This 
unwillingness demonstrates that states do not believe that international law imposes any specific 
obligations on them to contribute meaningfully to rebuilding activities in post-atrocity societies.  
9.5 Conclusion 
When atrocities occur, international lawyers advising governments, working with the 
Security Council or advocating through non-governmental organizations, now frequently use the 
language and concepts associated with the R2P principle. In that sense, R2P has changed the 
rhetoric of international law concerning how the international community talks about 
humanitarian atrocities. State practice sharpened the R2P idea in narrowing its application to 
situations involving genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes and 
rejecting its use in other situations, such as responding to humanitarian problems created by 
natural disasters. However, as this thesis demonstrates, neither the doctrinal aspects associated 
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with R2P nor the state practice under the principle reflect material change in international law 
relevant to addressing large-scale atrocities. 
What started with a challenge from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the 
international community to find a better way to calibrate sovereignty and the imperative to 
protect people from atrocities became, over the first decade of R2P’s existence, an idea that, 
according to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, merely reflected long-standing principles and 
practices in international law and the UN. What changed between Annan’s future-looking 
challenge and Ban’s conservative perspective was not international law. Rather, this change 
reflects the realization that the turn-of-the-century optimism about resolving controversies 
associated with responding to atrocities lost credibility even as states and the UN talked more 
and more about R2P. The Syrian crisis - the latest major R2P episode - has involved both the 
failure of the international community to respond adequately (echoes of Rwanda) and 
controversies about the use of force without Security Council authorization (echoes of Kosovo). 
This observation captures how little things have changed since the two seminal events that 
prompted the R2P effort in the first place.     
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